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Abstract
This thesis explores the effectiveness of non- contractual agreements as com-
mitment devices and the consequences of these agreements on behaviour.
Three essays are presented.
The first study explores the effect public statements about intended social
behaviour have on actual future behaviour. In practice, codes of conduct
and oaths of office are widely used to strengthen professional integrity and
alignment to a common good. In this instance, the effect of promise-making
is simulated and changes in behaviour are tracked in a laboratory experi-
ment. It is evident that making a public statement about intended social
behaviour has a significant positive effect on behaviour in social dilemmas.
Furthermore, the effect is greater when the pledge is compulsory rather than
voluntary. This is because a co-ordination effect is operating in addition to
the commitment effect.
The second study explores whether promises can help to promote co-operation
in environments with uncertain choice options. The experiment disentan-
gles the moment of promise making from the situation when the individual
needs to decide whether to keep or break the promise. Just shortly before
the decision stage, the individual learns how much material benefit he or she
needs to forego in order to keep the promise. The study investigates how
elastic a moral commitment is and how mental stress influences the decision
3
4to keep a promise. The heart rate of participants was measured throughout
the experiment. It was observed that making a promises freely, significantly
reduced behavioural variation resulting from changes in the decision envi-
ronment. Whereas, when the promise was predetermined, the commitment
effect mitigates as potential material gains from promise breaking increase.
In the third study the effect of promise making was tested in the field. The
study focussed on using small rewards as incentives for making true on a
promise to honour good payment behaviour. This was implemented to en-
courage tax compliance. The results of this unique randomised control trial
reveal that, on average, taxpayers react positively to supportive incentives.
This effect was strongest when the promise to pay accurately was combined
with a non-financial reward, acknowledging the promise keeping. We found
evidence for the same effect observed in the laboratory study. When a selec-
tion takes place, taxpayers who were compliant in the past are more likely to
make the promise. Additionally these taxpayers also improve their payment
behaviour, an effect that we called commitment effect in the first study.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In our daily lives, we often encounter moral commitments. We give marriage
vows, make our children promise to behave well and believe the promise of
our business partners that they will deliver good quality. Such statements of
intent are signalling commitment, with the purpose of generating trust and
elevating a relationship or exchange. In contrast to contractual agreements,
such statements are legally non-binding and receive a binding function only
through their moral component. But is this component strong enough to
harness self-interest and overcome the temptation to exploit the given trust,
in situations when breaching a promise does not bear any material conse-
quences? Are these not circumstances which long for contracts, that legally
define all dimensions of a relationship?
In real life many situations are characterised by asymmetric information:
one party knows more about the surrounding circumstances than another;
and these conditions facilitate deception and exploitation. In order to con-
trol such opportunistic behaviour, standard economic theory suggests strong
regulations, close monitoring and strict enforcement of penalties.
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However, in reality, monitoring is impeded by complex structures; and en-
forcement is difficult and highly costly to implement. In business practice,
nevertheless, we observe frequent trade outside of hard-copied contracts,
strong monitoring or enforcement. Moreover, most contracts used in day-
to-day business activities, are simple, with key features only vaguely defined.
Sometimes, business deals are even sealed only with the prominent hand-
shake between two honourable merchants. This is in pure contrast to what
standard economic theory predicts. Macaulay (1963) interviewed hereto
1200 businessmen and lawyers in a cross-industry study on non-contractual
relationships in business life. And the survey results show, practitioners are
not only aware of the incompleteness in contracts, but even refer consciously
to non-binding agreements rather than written contracts. Then the vague
structure allows for ex post adjustments and a deal relying on the fragile
contexture of trust and trustworthiness, strengthens the intrinsically moti-
vated social behaviour within the actors. Along these lines, Schelling (1989)
finally states that promises are used frequently in business life instead of
legal provisions, because the actors know that contracts anyhow are very
unlikely to be enforced.
Despite the importance of incomplete contracting in practice, it is surprising
how little research has been done on the characteristics of non-binding agree-
ments (Tirole, 1999). On one side, it has been experimentally shown that
strong monitoring or the threat of punishment is not always a beneficial way
to reach compliance in contractual relationships. Bohnet et al. (2001), for
example, showed that subjects in a contractual game perform better when
the enforcement component of a contract is weak. Trustworthiness is under
such conditions crowded-in. Also Irlenbusch (2006) examined the effect of
non-binding contracts, and his results suggest that trade comes about fre-
quently when non-binding contracts are used, especially in situations with
23
incomplete information. But on the other side, it is still unclear how the
benefits of non-binding agreements can be applied.
The work in this thesis is hence motivated by the assumption that trust and
incomplete contracts, relying on people’s propensity to keep a promise, may
be (economically) optimal when enforcement costs associated with a com-
plete contract are high. And the following examination will focus on the
effect of non-binding statements, also called promises, proposed as an alter-
native to strong regulations aiming to promote social behaviour in economic
decisions.
In three studies, using conceptual and methodological approaches from Be-
havioural and Experimental Economics, the characteristics of non-binding
statements are explored, and their effect on strategic behaviour in various
contexts is tested.
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1.1 Motivation
Good policies and constitutions are those that support socially
valued ends not by harnessing selfish preferences to public ends
but also by evoking, cultivating and empowering public-spirited
motives. (Bowles, 2008, p.19)
Since the emergence of Behavioural Economics many discrepancies between
human behaviour and the concept of the homo oeconomicus have been delib-
erated. Bounded rationality has been explained by psychological, emotional
and cognitive factors.
The role of social preferences has been widely discussed as an explanation for
the observed discrepancies to predictions derived from standard economic
theory1. Recently, first studies started to discuss the underlying ethical
constitutions that might drive social behaviour (Henrich et al., 2001; Bowles,
2008; Zak, 2011a; Stringham, 2011; Falk and Szech, 2013).
Moral motives are an idea that is not new in Economics. Already, Adam
Smith has mentioned the role of internal ethical constraints in the decision
making process in his book ‘Moral sentiments’ from 1759.
’How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some princi-
ples in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others and render
this happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except
pleasure of seeing it.’ [Chapter 1, p.3]. Moral sentiments (Adam Smith 2010
[1759]).
1Please see for inequity aversion: Kahneman et al. (1986); Thaler (1988); Fehr and
Ga¨chter (2000b); Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton et al. (2000); for altruism: Camerer
(1988); Andreoni (1990); Fehr and Fischbacher (2003); Crumpler and Grossman (2008);
and for reciprocity: Akerlof and Yellen (1990); Rabin (1993); Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002);
Falk et al. (2008)
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According to Smith’s view, humans derive utility from practising moral
virtues, such as prudence, justice and beneficence. Respecting moral values
in the decision making process generates internal rewards, whereas violations
cause internal discomfort or tension. Several studies in Neuroscience could
show that this discomfort is also mirrored in the neural activity. An overview
of this work can be found in Zak (2011b). From a sociological perspective,
these ethical constitutes lay the ground for norms (informal and formal),
conventions, values, dispositions and commitments, constituting what good
behaviour in relation to others implies (Sayer, 2005).
In present Economics, on the other side, the role of internal constraints
is widely ignored. The complexity of psychological motives does not meet
the requested criteria of simplicity, needed in mathematical models, which
became a popular analytical tool in Economics in the 20th century. Moral
motives are hard to detect and to measure and thus difficult to implement
as a single variable in a formal model.
While the trend to abstract and formalise allowes the isolation and iden-
tification of the causes of numerous factors in the economy, the shift also
comes with a cost. In particular, neglecting,for example, the possibility that
decision-makers may also be motivated by ethical constitutes, can lead to
conclusions not corresponding to reality and ultimately bears the danger of
bringing on wrong policy recommendations.
As mentioned before, first evidence exists that regulations and strong con-
tracting can undermine moral motives that are likely to guide co-operative
behaviour (Irlenbusch, 2006; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1995). Policies us-
ing the traditional instruments of control and punishment, then run the
risk of being understood as distrust (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), under-
mining intrinsic motivation and may, in consequence, generate less efficient
outcomes than environments with a lower degree of external guidance (An-
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dreoni, 1988; Bohnet et al., 2001; Houser et al., 2008).
The research presented in this thesis is based on the assumption that two mo-
tivational forces are influencing human behaviour: the pursuit to maximise
one’s own benefit and the will to behave according to internal moral values.
This research aimed to explore ways to strengthen this second dimension
in the decision making process. It is assumed that non-binding agreements,
like promises, are perceived as less intrusive than strong regulations, moni-
toring or enforcement, and that trust based on the fragile structure of such
non-binding agreements promotes social behaviour, due to moral concerns.
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1.2 Outlook
This thesis aims to contribute to the exploration of non-contractual agree-
ments, like promises and their effect on behaviour. Promises have been
shown to generate trust and maintain co-operative behaviour even in the
absence of contract enforceability. Before the studies undertaken in this
dissertation are presented, an introduction to the method used for analysis
is given: controlled economic experiments, and a comprehensive literature
review on studies using promises in the context of economic activities, is
provided. Then the thesis proceeds with three studies examining different
characteristics and the effectiveness of non-binding agreements.
Public Non-binding Statements in Social Dilemmas
Study 1 is motivated by ethical guidelines and codes of conduct, which are
compulsory in some professions. Members of these professions have to un-
dertake a public pledge, in which they promise to follow the behavioural
principles provided in the code. Recently, after many incidents of failure
regarding professional integrity, the demand for such ethical commitments
is high. Study 1 contributes to the investigation of public promises and
is the first empirical study opposing voluntary and compulsory statements
in the setting of social dilemma. Three findings are dominant: first, natu-
rally a selection effect occurs, more socially oriented subjects are willing to
make public declarations about their intentions. Second, after controlling
for this endogeneity, a commitment effect is prominent. Subjects who made
the promise additionally increase their contributions to the common. This
is, to the researcher’s knowledge, the first study, that disentangles these
two effects clearly and thus provides clean evidence for the existence of a
commitment effect. Third, the comparison of the voluntary and compul-
sory condition reveals, that contributions on an aggregate level are higher
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in groups where the statement was compulsory for everyone. The assurance
that every player has to pledge the statement serves as a co-ordination de-
vice and facilitates high individual contributions. The knowledge emerging
from this research contributes to a better understanding of institutionalised
moral commitments and can provide novel insights for the design of effective
oaths and codes of conduct in practice.
Promises in Investment Situations with Uncertain Outcomes
Study 2 investigates the effect of promises on behavioural variability. It has
been shown that people are moral relativists in daily life (Goldstone and
Chin, 1993). Whether a person behaves socially or opportunistically is the
outcome of an internal balancing act of external benefits and internal moral
motives. The ultimate outcome is hence strongly dependent on the material
incentives given in the decision situation.
In this study we investigate whether a promise can lead to more consistency
in (socially oriented) behaviour. In contrast to existing work, the circum-
stances a promise will apply to are not known, when the individual makes
the declaration to behave socially. In previous studies, the decision deter-
minants were known before a promise was undertaken; the consequence of
making a promise could thus be perfectly foreseen. By introducing uncer-
tainty about the choice option, we are able to disentangle (stated) intentions
in the promise situation from a manoeuvring process in the decision situ-
ation. In the analysis the behavioural data is matched with physiological
measurements; the heart rate variability of promisors is measured during
the experiment. The results show that when a promise is made voluntarily
and is self-formulated, it is more likely that the promisor keeps the promise
and reacts in a less volatile way to incentives for opportunistic behaviour.
Variability in behaviour is significantly reduced. The physiological measure-
ments support the hypothesis of an internal balancing act between guilt
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aversion (promise keeping) and the temptation of material gains (promise
breaking).
Application: Commitment to Pay - A Field Experiment on Promises
in the Tax Context
Study 3 explores possible applications of non-binding statements. In col-
laboration with a Swiss tax authority, we test in a field experiment the
effectiveness of supportive incentives and promises on tax morality. It is
known that external investigations like regulation, control, punishment and
high financial rewards can crowd out intrinsic motivation. Instead of using
incentives, which are perceived by the individuals as intrusive, this study
introduces incentives, which are instead perceived as supporting the social
behaviour. The supportive incentives acknowledge the good conduct and
co-operation with the tax authority and the incentive is combined with a
compliance promise that needed to be made prior. This unique feature has
never been investigated in a tax setting before.
It has been found that the moral commitment combined with a non-monetary
incentive was effective in generating high compliance. The combination with
a financial reward contrarily lead to low compliance; the reason is seen in
a crowding-out through over-regulation. Moreover, this research can iden-
tify a selection and commitment effect of the promise in this field setting
and supports though the external validity of our results in the laboratory
experiment. This study contributes to an ongoing praxis relevant discussion
about tax compliance and how it can be influenced.
The last chapter concludes with a summary and potential policy implica-
tions, and will give an outline for future work.
30 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.3 Methodology
All projects in this thesis used randomised controlled trials as the method
of experimentation to test respective hypotheses. Economic experiments
are used to create a ’microeconomic environment in the laboratory where
adequate control can be maintained and accurate measurement of relevant
variables guaranteed’ (Wilde 1980 as quoted in Smith, 1982). Experiments
can be used to test theories, explore causes for theory’s failure or evaluate
policy proposals. Al Roth, winner of the Nobel Memorial prize in Economic
Sciences 2012, sees experiments as an important tool to better understand
the choice architecture with regard to market design and policy regulations
(Kagel and Roth, 2000).
Generally, economic experiments can be classified into three categories; lab-
oratory, field and natural experiments. In this thesis, the former two were
used and will be discussed more in detail in the following.
The first category, which comprises the majority of existing studies, is the
laboratory experiment. This method became very popular in social science
for its controllability. The question of interest is abstracted in the exper-
iment and addressed by simple decision tasks in the laboratory. Over the
last two decades a set of standard games has been established in Experimen-
tal Economics, with which areas of economic interest can be explored (such
as investment, bargaining, co-ordination, etc.). An important characteristic
is the incentivisation of all decisions. The compensation for participating
in the experiment is directly related to the choices made in the experiment.
This mechanism ensures that participants take their decisions seriously, thus
hypothetical answers are averted (Falk and Heckman, 2009).
In this type of experiment subjects are randomly assigned to treatment
groups, in which the central feature is varied, but all other characteristics
are kept constant. The control over the decision environment enables the
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researcher to test hypotheses and identify the causal relationship of changes
in behaviour. The controlled process also offers the possibility to replicate
the results and enables further investigation by other researchers. Such a
high control in the decision environment is hard to replicate in naturally
occurring settings.
Nevertheless, the controllability also comes naturally with a cost and find-
ings derived from laboratory experiments have limitations. As decisions are
made in an artificial environment, anonymity is always ensured and the de-
cision situations are highly abstract; thus external validity is an important
point on which to reflect. Additionally are participants, in most studies,
university students, who share a similar age, economic background and edu-
cation level. Even if it is possible to elicit demographic and economic values
in a post experimental questionnaire, and include this information as con-
trol variables in multivariant analysis; the sample is not representative of an
entire population.
To address this issue, first studies have been conducted with different subject
pools or higher stakes involved in the decision process (Smith and Walker,
1993; Slonim and Roth, 1998; Andersen et al., 2011; Exadaktylos et al.,
2013; Fre´chette, 2014). The results suggest that the size of effects usually
varies, but no qualitative difference in the behaviour of students and the
general population could be found. A second concern is the fact that most
of the behavioural experiments are conducted in ’weird’ (western, educated,
industrialized, rich, developed) countries (Henrich et al., 2010, for a discus-
sion). Findings and implications should therefore be treated with caution
when applied to other cultural contexts.
In the third project presented in this thesis, a field experiment has been
conducted. In this project, the effectiveness of supportive incentives and
moral commitments in the real world setting of tax payments was tested.
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Treatment variations are introduced by different announcement letters sent
by the tax authority. Typically in field experiments, subjects are not aware
of the experiment. The idea is to avoid behavioural changes due to the
external observation. ’Subjects do not know that they are participants in
an experiment. Therefore they neither know that they are randomized into
treatment nor that their behaviour is subsequently scrutinized. Such an ex-
ercise is important in that it represents an approach that combines the most
attractive elements of the lab and naturally occurring data: randomization
and realism.’ (Levitt and List, 2009, p.9).
The benefit of high external validity promotes the approach to test theories,
interventions and policy programs with field experiments.
In this thesis, it is first identified how statements about intended social be-
haviour influence the decision making process in the controlled setting of a
laboratory experiment. Secondly, these findings are applied to the real world
setting of tax payments and the effectiveness of such interventions is mea-
sured, taking heterogeneous characteristics of the promisors into account.
Chapter 2
Literature
Traditionally, communication which is costless and non-binding, is seen in
Economics as cheap talk. Promises, in anonymous, one-shot games, are
one form of such communication and should thus not influence the player’s
evaluation of any given strategy profile. Promise-breaking does in such
condition not bear legal or material consequences and the player will always
make a promise but deviate from the declaration in the later stage. This is
due to a time inconsistency in the preferences of the promise-maker. In the
first step it is optimal for the promisor to convince the interaction partner
of the own trustworthiness, so that an exchange can be relied upon. But
after this is mastered, the optimal choice for the promisor to serve his or her
self-interest, i.e. the choice ’reverses to a suboptimal plan that is sequentially
rational in the subgame’ (Klein and O’Flaherty, 1993, p.297).
Under the assumption of complete information, the interaction partner is
aware of this preference inconsistency and hence does not assign value to
the statement. And acceding the rules of backward induction, the verbal
statement then influences neither the behaviour of the message sender nor
the receiver.
Contrary to these predictions, a wide branch of experimental evidence ex-
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ists showing that communication affects behaviour (Farrell and Rabin, 1996;
Crawford, 1998; Duffy and Feltovich, 2002). Messages in pre-play commu-
nication tend to be truthful and are believed by the interaction partners
(Celen and Kariv, 2004). In the following, first a brief overview of the gen-
eral effect of communication in experiments is given and then specific forms
of promises are discussed. A definition is given of what promises are and
theories from Social Psychology and Behavioural Economics are reviewed on
about why promises are kept and moreover, why such statements can work
as an effective co-ordination device.
2.1 Communication matters
Over the last decades, Social Psychology and Experimental Economics have
recognised that communication has a significant impact on social behaviour
(Ledyard, 1997). Early studies demonstrated that communication can facil-
itate exchanges, even in the absence of enforcement possibilities (Deutsch,
1958; Braver and Wilson, 1986; Isaac and Walker, 1988). The communica-
tion helps the players to co-ordinate; interaction partners are more willing
to trust and thus, higher co-operation levels can be reached (Ostrom et al.,
1992).
Psychological literature identified four channels by which communication
can influence co-operation behaviour (in experimental games). First, com-
munication provides information and facilitates an understanding of the
game; Second, communication promotes co-ordination of co-operative ac-
tions and reduces strategic uncertainty about others player’s behaviours.
Third, communication elicits social norms such as trust, commitment, promise-
keeping; and fourth, communication induces conformity by peer pressure
or increased group identity (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Bicchieri,
2005).
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It also has been found that the effect of communication varies with the type
of the communication format used. In most comparative studies, face-to-face
communication had a stronger effect on co-operative behaviour than written
messages. The message addressor can be identified, social cues (facial move-
ments, tone of voice) transferring the message are more accurate (Bicchieri
and Lev-On, 2007) and consequently, the statement becomes more salient.
On the other side, face-to-face communication is complex and hard to code.
This research therefore only uses written messages, which still demonstrate
a significant effect on behaviour. Based on the findings of previous work it
can be assumed that more complex, salient communication would affect be-
haviour in the same way, but on a different scale (Frohlich and Oppenheimer,
1998; Brosig et al., 2003).
In particular, my work on public moral commitments, also often called
promises. These messages are characterised by the statement of future in-
tentions. The message addressor aims with a verbal commitment to change
the beliefs of an interaction partner, so that an exchange can be relied upon.
Reviewing the relevant literature, this will also touches upon the areas of
morality and lying. Lying should herby be seen as the communicative act of
presenting something wrongly. The deceit is successful if the lie is believed.
A false promise by this means is a specific form of lying; the promisor tries
to manipulate the expectations of a potential interaction partner to facili-
tate exchange. The actor reveals consciously not his or her true intentions.
Since contrarily to contracts, no enforceability for promises is given, promise
breaking does not bear consequences in material terms and the actor gains
strategic advantages through a false promise.
However, not all promises are made with the intention to break them and
a substantial number of promises are kept, even under the temptation of
a material benefit. Moreover a vast branch of experimental studies can be
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found, showing that promises or statements of intent enhance trust, co-
operation and efficiency.
Promises are defined as non-binding co-operative statements, which are ini-
tiated to change the beliefs of the exchange partner, so that an exchange can
be relied upon. The effectiveness of the declared intentions depends on the
perceived trustworthiness. If the recipient believes the promise and takes
the stated intention for granted, trust can be created. Trust is, in this con-
text, the willingness ’to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of
intentions or behaviour of another.’ (Rousseau et al., 1998, p.395).
In experimental studies, message receivers are regularly found to believe the
promise and trust the promisor. Senders, on the other hand, systematically
assume that their message will be taken for granted by the receivers and live
up to their word, even if they have to forego material benefits by keeping the
promise (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Ostrom et al., 1992; Ellingsen
and Johannesson, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Bicchieri and Lev-
On, 2007; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009).
This observation leads ultimately to the question: What is the actual mo-
tivation for an individual to keep a promise? In naive reasoning, we can
imagine two possible reasons for promise keeping1:
• Strategic promise keeping: Actors keep their promise because of
strategic and reputational concerns.
Keeping a promise increases the probability of co-operation with po-
tential exchange partners in the future.
This aspect is central in repeated interactions.
• Intrinsically motivated promise keeping: The motivation to keep
a promise lies for the promise-maker internally.
1A similar categorisation can be found in the computational promise theory of Bergstra
and Burgess (2014).
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Moral motives or the avoidance of internal discomfort (guilt, cognitive
dissonance) motivate the promise keeping.
This work concentrates on the later, and explores approaches that may ex-
plain promise-keeping, besides strategic concerns. The chapter proceeds
as follows: First, relevant theories from Social Psychology and Behavioural
Economics will be reviewed. Secondly, empiric studies in Experimental Eco-
nomics will be discussed. Ultimately in the last section, this research will
categorise existing experimental studies in an attempt to explain behavioural
variation in promise behaviour by characteristic differences of the message,
the promise environment or the promise maker.
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2.2 Approaches towards Promise-keeping
2.2.1 Related Theories in Social Psychology
Early work in Social Psychology investigated what constitutes a commitment
in human behaviour and how it affects decision-making.
In an early experiment Freedman and Fraser (1966) came upon an interest-
ing observation, which later lead to the ’foot-in-door-technique’, a method
widely used in marketing practice. In the study, the researchers were asking
home-owners in Californian neighbourhoods whether they would be willing
to install a ’Drive Safely’ sign in their front yard. For some households,
the house-owners had already, a few weeks prior, been independently ap-
proached with the request to sign a petition to support the maintainability
of the state’s beauty. Since signing a petition seemed to be a cheap and triv-
ial request, the majority in the treatment group agreed to do so. However,
the effect on future decisions was remarkable. When house-owners signed
the petition a priori, the likelihood of performing the later request, to install
the ’Drive Safely’ sign in the front yard, was tripled (Cialdini, 1993).
In the literature, the reason for such a dramatic increase is seen in an alter-
nated self-image of the house-owners. The act of signing the beautification
petition made the public spirit of a person more salient. When the house-
owner is then approached a second time by the actors, he or she wants to
act consistently with this image.
Ultimately a commitment is created, a fact that Kiesler and Sakumura
(1966) describe as the binding of an individual to a certain behavioural
act. Once a stand is taken, the individual is very likely to comply with this
action in future.
For a commitment to be effective, Kiesler (1971) assumes that the decision
needs to be an autonomous choice of the individual, made either through
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a previous action or statement. Later research showed, moreover, that
the commitment effect increased when the initial action is made explicit,
involved effort or is publicly made. Opportunities to forget or deny are
thus depleted (Geller et al., 1989; Boyce and Geller, 2000; Jacquemet et al.,
2013a).
In the literature two origins for the motivation to comply with a commitment
can be found. First, behaving inconsistently with priorly stated intentions
creates internal discomfort for the individual. Festinger (1957), founder of
the cognitive dissonance theory, argues that humans have an inner urge for
consistency. Acting, for example, against a stated intention, causes inner
tension. This inner dissonance needs to be sooner or later released, either
by an action or a change in attitude. In the 60s this view was considered
cutting-edge in psychology, where it was assumed that behaviour is mainly
shaped by its consequences, such as in Skinner (1953); Pavlov (1924).
The second origin is seen in the changed beliefs of the outside world. By
signing the petition, for instance, the actor creates the impression of being
a public spirited person. The actor, when approached a second time, wants
to live up to the way he or she is perceived by others (Cialdini, 1993).
These two driving forces are discussed again in the next section, from the
perspective of a behavioural economist. Both explanations, however, lead
to the conclusion that once a commitment has been made, it has a powerful
effect on decision-making.
This paragraph summarizes the important findings from studies on com-
mitment in Social Psychology. In the following this thesis concentrates on
studies in Behavioural and Experimental Economics regarding the effect of
promises. Promises are hereby published intentions, whereby commitments
are a subset of intentions, which may not necessarily be a promise (Farrell
and Rabin, 1996).
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2.2.2 Promises in Behavioural Economics
Before shedding light on explanations for promise-keeping from a behavioural
economics perspective, the perspective of neoclassical economics on non-
binding statements is recalled. One way to analyse honesty according to
standard economics is the approach of Becker (1968). In his theory of crime,
Becker claims that every (criminal) act is a rational choice depending on
the external incentives and constraints. According to this view, honesty is
a function on the likelihood of getting caught and the consequence the de-
tection of a lie brings with it. Hence, when a false statement does not bear
material consequences, for instance because the interaction is anonymous or
one-shot, communication is always used to deceive the interaction partner.
A prominent study in this context is Gneezy’s deception study (2005). In
a two player game, the first player learns about the payoffs of two options,
Option A and B. Option A obtains equal payoffs for both players. Option
B, on the other hand, obtains a higher payoff for Player 2, the interaction
partner. Player 2 does not know the payoffs, but needs to decide which payoff
allocation shall be realised. Player 1 can send an advice message about which
option will bring Player 2 more money. Player 2 then decides whether to
trust Player 1 and follow her2 advice or choose the counter-option. The
experiment was based on a single interaction and the procedure was double
blind, neither the participants nor the experimenters knew the identity of a
player.
In such a setting Player 1’s dominant strategy is to deceive the counter player
in order to obtain a higher payoff. However, the experimental data reveals
that a significant fraction of subjects tell the truth, even with the forfei-
ture of material benefits. This finding is widely recognised in Experimental
2In the description of all listed studies, Player 1 is referred to in the feminine gender
and Player 2 in the masculine.
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Economics as a empirical evidence for lying aversion. Distributional prefer-
ences as a reason for reporting the right option can hereby be rejected, since
Gneezy controlled with a dictator game for such and finds a significantly
lower fraction of Player 2’s favouring payoffs. Nevertheless, since Player 1’s
payoffs were dependent on the choice of Player 2, strategic concerns can-
not be completely ruled out in the decision to tell the truth. Sutter (2009)
addresses this concern in his study. Using Gneezy’s design Sutter asked
the players, after they sent the message, whether they believed that the
recipient would follow their advice. Based on this information, 30% of the
truth-tellers could be identified as sophisticated liars. These subjects sent
the true message, because they were convinced that the interaction partner
would not believe the message and consequently would choose the opposite
option, which left them with less money.
The two other prominent promise studies are Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2004) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). These two studies motivated
a still ongoing discussion in the field, as to whether promises are kept due to
a preference to keep one’s word, as discussed in the psychological commit-
ment theory (Kiesler, 1971), or due to an expectation-based guilt aversion
(Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), which
has been previously described as alternated beliefs of the outside world. In
the following, the two approaches will be discussed on the basis of the studies
of Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) investigated whether a potential norm
of promise keeping can lead to higher co-operation levels in an investment
game. In a two person game the players face a hold up problem. Player 1
is endowed with 60 kronor and can decide whether she wants to invest the
money or keep the money for herself. If she decides to invest, the amount
increases to 100, but now Player 2 decides how the new amount shall be
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divided between the two players. Player 2 makes a proposal about the spilt
and Player 1 decides whether to accept or reject the proposed split. If Player
1 rejects, both players end up with zero as payoff. Under the assumption of
self-serving and risk neutral preferences for both players, backward induction
leads to a subgame perfect equilibrium, in which Player 1 chooses not to
invest. This is a suboptimal outcome, since investment and the acceptance
of any offer would lead to a higher common payoff. The respective decision
tree can be found in Figure 2.1.
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) test different communication schemes in
this experiment. Again, from a standard economic point of view, no form
of communication, when classified as cheap talk, should affect the strategic
behaviour of the players.
However, when Player 2 had the possibility to make a pre-play statement
about his or her intended offer, higher co-operation levels were realised. The
promises were believed by the player in the role of Player 1, and Player 2s
behaved in a trustworthy manner and kept the stated promises. Ellingsen
and Johanneson see the reason for this in an internal cost that breaking a
promise implies for an actor. Furthermore, argue the authors, if Player 2
knows this reluctancy of Player 1 to lie, then a promise is a credible predictor
for future behaviour and ultimately the statement of intent promotes co-
operation and efficiency.
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) argue on the other hand, that people feel
guilty when letting others down; promises raise the (payoff) expectations of
others and promise-makers want to live up to their word to fulfil the expec-
tations. The decision to keep a promise is respectively dependent on the
second order beliefs; when the promise-maker expects his interaction part-
ner to believe the message, he will feel guilty when not fulfilling the promise.
The statement per se has no value for the promisor. In the literature this is
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Figure 2.1: Decision Tree - Ellingsen and Johanesson, 2004
Player 1
NO INVESTMENT
Player 1: $ 60
Player 2: $ 0
Player 2
OFFER X
Player 1
Player 1: $ 0
Player 2: $ 0
REJECT ACCEPT
Player 1: $ x
Player 2: $100 - x
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also called expectation based guilt aversion.
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)’s experiment is based on a trust game
with hidden action. Figure 2.2 displays the decision steps. Player 1 has
to choose whether she wants to interact (IN) or choose the outside option
(OUT). If Player 1 decides to interact, Player 2 can choose not to ROLL,
which secures him a secure payoff and leaves Player 1 with a zero payoff;
or Player 2 can decide to ROLL. In this case he can receive a lower payoff
than in the DON’T ROLL option, but Player 1 has a high chance to also
receive a high payoff. The game is played one shot. From a game theoretic
point of view, the pareto optimum is realised when Player 1 chooses IN and
Player 2 decides to ROLL; so the expected payoffs are higher than when the
game stops. But on an individual level Player 2’s dominant strategy is to
decide not to ROLL, when Player 1 chooses IN. Since Player 1 anticipates
this behaviour, the dominant strategy is ultimately (OUT, Don’t ROLL).
In Charness and Dufwenberg’s experiment, Player 2 (the one who must be
trusted) has the possibility to send a free form message to his interaction
partner, prior to the interaction. From a standard economic perspective,
this communication should again not influence the strategy choice of the
players.
However, the experimental results demonstrate that the opportunity to send
a message is frequently used; messages are trusted and promisors act in
a trustworthy manner and fulfil their promises. The analysis of first and
second order beliefs reveals that promises successfully shifted the beliefs of
both players. Due to this change in beliefs, promises are, according to the
view of expectation-based guilt aversion, an effective co-ordination device
that leads to higher co-operation levels.
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Figure 2.2: Decision Tree - Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006
Player 1
OUT IN
Player 1: $5
Player 2: $5
Player 2
ROLL DON’T ROLL
Chance Player 1: $ 0
Player 2: $ 10
FAILURE SUCCESS
Player 1: $ 0
Player 2: $14
Player 1: $12
Player 2: $10
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At last, Vanberg (2008) tried, based on the two former studies and their
opposing explanations for promise keeping, to disentangle the two possible
motives for promise keeping. Using Charness’s design, Vanberg rematched
pairs after the pre-play communication phase. After the rematch players
in role of the promisor learnt the message, which was sent by the previ-
ously matched person to their interaction partner. The second movers, on
the other side, do not learn about the rematch, hence their first order be-
liefs still depend on the message received during the communication phase.
Vanberg proposed that when promise-makers are motivated by expectation-
based guilt aversion, promises should always be fulfilled, even when the
promise was made by another person. Whereas if the commitment-based
explanation is true, the promisor should only feel guilty when he behaves
inconsistent to what he signed up for. Finally, the results support the lat-
ter, promises were kept in Vanberg’s experiment only when the statement
was made by the promisor himself. Table 2.1 at the end of this chapter,
provides a condensed comparison of the four fundamental promise studies
in Experimental Economics.
Since Vanberg’s study, further experiments have been conducted and the
discussion is still ongoing as to whether promises are kept due to the expec-
tations of others or internal constraints.
Ismayilov and Potters (2012), for instance, replicated Charness and Dufwen-
berg’s study and delivered the pre-play message only with 50% probability.
The results show that promises were more likely to be kept when it was de-
livered to the interaction partner, but promisors behaved also trustworthily
when the message was not delivered. The study supports Vanberg’s conclu-
sion that promises are kept due to a preference to keep one’s word per se,
independent of the expectations of others.
Ellingsen et al. (2010) elicited expectations of message recipients in a trust
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game and communicated these beliefs to the trustee. Thus, the belief manip-
ulation in this study has been done by giving information about the other’s
belief and not by a promise. The results show that no significant relation-
ship between expectations and back transfers is existent in the data. The
authors argue that they found thus evidence against the expectation-based
guilt aversion. Furthermore, Ellingsen and Johanneson suggest that pre-
viously seen correlations between second order beliefs and back transfers,
like in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), were due to anchoring or a false
consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977). In the psychological literature this bias
describes people’s tendency to project their way of thinking onto others.
Despite the wide support of the commitment-based theory of promise keep-
ing, a recent paper of Ederer and Stremitzer (2013) finds support for the
expectation-based explanation of promise keeping. In a modification of
Charness and Vanberg’s game, a promise is made prior to both parties
learning that the second mover is only able to fulfil his or her promise with a
certain probability. Hence, the first and second order beliefs are alternated
exogenously after the promise has been made. Following the commitment-
based explanation the effect of a promise should remain constant. But the
authors find that the exogenous variation of beliefs dramatically influences
the likelihood that a promise is kept. The authors suggest a lexicographic
theory of promise keeping, which describes that the expectations of the inter-
action partner only matter if a direct promisory link exists and the promise-
maker feels therefore responsible for the alternated expectations. While the
result is interesting, it should be considered that the announcement of vary-
ing probabilities also affects the subject’s processing of information. An
experimenter demand effect is likely.
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2.3 Differences in Promise Behaviour
Comparing the exiting promise studies a profound variety is found in the ef-
fect promises have on the behaviour of the decision-makers. In the following
studies are classified, which alter certain characteristics of the decision envi-
ronment. It can be seen that the effect of a promise depends on the form of a
statement and the situation it applies to, but also the type of promise-maker.
Hereby have also been studies included, which analyse lying behaviour, but
potentially shed light on characteristic differences in promise keeping. Table
2.2, at the end of this chapter, provides again a condensed comparison of
these studies.
2.3.1 Contextual Differences
In the previously mentioned deception study, Gneezy alternated the payoffs
in three treatment conditions. The comparison of the lying ratio between
the treatments indicates that lying aversion is not absolute. Less subjects
lied, when the monetary loss, that lying implied for the interaction partner
person, was high. Whereas, when the benefits from lying increased and the
loss for the interaction partner stayed constant, more subjects lied. Hence,
it can be assumed that people are sensitive to incentives in their lying deci-
sion. Psychological studies on conditional ethicality provide insights in this
context (Bazerman and Prior, 2004; Chugh et al., 2005; Haidt, 2007). For
instance, Shalvi et al. (2011) suggest that people go through an internal
cost-benefit analysis before making the decision whether to lie.
To examine lying aversion in a controlled anonymous setting, Fischbacher
and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013) developed the dice paradigm, in which subjects roll
a dice, unobserved by the experimenter. Subjects then self-report the result
and get paid accordingly. The results of this study and many follow up
studies show that the distribution of reported outcomes differs significantly
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from the real distribution. But participants also do not lie maximally, even
when the detection probability of a lie is zero, like it is in this setting.
Strategic concerns and social preferences as motives for honest reporting can
be ruled out by the experimental design, since no other person3 is affected
by the choice.
The tendency to lie a bit, but not maximally (incomplete dishonesty) is
explained in the literature by self-image concerns (Baumeister et al., 1998;
Schweitzer and Hsee, 2002; Mazar et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2009; Gino and
Pierce, 2010). The individual wants to benefit from deviating from the truth,
but only so much as that the positive self-concept is not threatened.
From these findings we can construe that the likelihood of promise keeping
interacts with the material benefits a promisor needs to forego in order to
keep a promise and the harm the potential breach of a promise imposes on
the interaction partner.
2.3.2 Individual Differences
Promise behaviour does not only vary in different scenarios, but also differs
among agents. For example, is it known that women are more reluctant to
tell a lie that leads to higher payoffs, but potentially hurts another person
(Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012; Childs,
2012).
On a different basis, Mazar et al. (2008) and Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi
(2013) observed that some subjects always tell the truth, in the form of
correct answers to a quiz or true dice tosses, even if this results in zero
payoffs. These observations indicate that heterogeneous differences among
individuals exist regarding their honesty preferences.
From a general point of view, the idea to have different types of subjects in
3except the experimenter
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experiments is not new. The literature in public good games, for instance,
identifies, based on contribution pattern, three types of players. First the
idealistic co-operators, who contribute to the common good regardless of
others’ behaviour. The second category incorporates the selfish free-riders,
who always maximise their own benefits regardless of others’ behaviour.
And last, the conditional co-operators, who represent the majority of par-
ticipants. This group adapts in their contributions to the behaviour of the
other players within the group (Fischbacher et al., 2001).
In regards of honesty behaviour, Hurkens and Kartik (2009) suggest two
types of players: people are one of two kinds: either a person will never
lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying
over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. The later type is sensitive
in the honesty decision to the incentives the environment offers. This type
corresponds with the observation made in the previous section regarding
contextual differences in promise keeping.
Also Gneezy et al. (2013) investigated the possibility of heterogeneous pref-
erences in lying behaviour in reporting game. In a two subject design, the
participant in the role of Player 1 learns the realisation of a number be-
tween 1 and 6. Player 1 has then to decide which number to report to the
experimenter, and her payoffs increase hereby linearly with the number re-
ported. In a second step, Player 1’s reported number is sent to Player 2.
Subsequently, Player 2 has to decide whether he wants to follow Player 1 or
choose another number. Player 2’s payoff depends at this time on two fac-
tors; first whether he follows Player 1, and second if so, whether the reported
number corresponds with the true realisation. Since Player 1’s payoffs are
independent from Player 2’s action, the self-serving strategy is for Player 1
to always report the highest number. But if Player 1 also cares about Player
2’s payoff, the lying decision is also shaped by the Player’s 1 belief about
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whether Player 2 will follow the reported number.
The results of this study reveal that the likelihood of lying is significantly
lower when Player 1 learns that Player 2 suffered materially in the previous
round, because Player 1 followed the lie of the first player. The feedback
participants received after each round is hereby used as a proxy for the belief.
Unfortunately, the authors did not elicit the first order beliefs of Player 1
as to whether Player 2 will follow. The authors identified three types of
subjects: those who never lie, those who always lie, and those who react
steadily to material incentives to lie.
This research assumes that these three types are transferable to the deci-
sion to keep a promise, and thus expects to see subjects, first who take a
promise seriously and always keep a promise, independent from external cir-
cumstances; second, subjects who use the promise as a signal to deceive, but
never intend to keep their word; and third, subjects varying their promise
behaviour, dependent on the material benefits they can gain by deviating
from their word.
So far, two factors have been presented to explain variations in promising
behaviour; first the difference in decision environments and secondly, the dif-
ferences among actors. In the literature these two approaches can be found
in models with heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness or in type based-
models, in which agents are, for example, either an economic or ethical type
(Gneezy, 2005). Empiric studies are usually conducted with a between sub-
ject design, so that it cannot be resolved whether the behavioural variation
is due to contextual or type differences.
Gibson et al. (2013) ultimately contrasts the two explanations for variation
in honesty behaviour. In the experiment, subjects acted in the role of a CEO,
who had to announce the firm’s earnings to a passive market. Two state-
ments were provided, the true earning and a modified version with which
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the participant obtains higher payoffs. The higher the reported earnings,
the higher the salary of the CEO, i.e. the participant. The announcement
was made to an imaginary market, hence participants did not have an in-
teraction partner in this experiment. In this way strategic reasons for lying
and the influence of social preferences like altruism, reciprocity or guilt aver-
sion can be ruled out. The study was conducted with a strategy method;
answers were thus elicited for various compensation schemes. Following the
type-based model, economic types should always lie, independent from the
payoffs, whereas ethical types should never lie. But if subjects are sensitive
in their lying behaviour to external incentives, a trading behaviour between
lying and material gains is predicted. The lying decision should alternate
over the various compensation schemes. Such behavioural patterns would
support a heterogeneous preferences model.
Finally, the results show that one-third of the participants forewent higher
compensation for truth-telling. But the amount of truth-tellers decreased
with increasing benefits from lying. This result is robust also on an individ-
ual level. Hence, the authors argue to have found support for a model that
posits heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness. Moreover, the finding also
suggests the existence of a general lying aversion, independent from beliefs
of interaction partners.
Whether the study’s result is the ultimate evidence, that variation in promis-
ing behaviour is only due to contextual differences, is doubtful. The use of
the strategy method is highly likely to have induced an experimenter de-
mand effect to alter the choices and it is left to future research to test the
robustness of this result.
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2.3.3 Differences in Promise Format
The psychological commitment theory of Kiesler (1971) emphasises the im-
portance of an autonomous choice for the effectiveness of a commitment.
Also in Experimental Economics, studies investigated different forms of com-
munication and concluded that freely chosen promises induce the strongest
effect on behaviour. In the following the most prominent studies on differ-
ences in the promise format will be discussed.
Lundquist et al. (2009) compared the effect of free form messages with a con-
dition where pre-specified promises were offered. In a bargaining game with
one-sided asymmetric information, subjects had the role of a buyer or seller.
The sellers held private information about their talent and could inform the
buyer about the efforts they intended to deliver in a pre communication
phase. The buyer then needed to decide which form of contract to offer
the seller. Since some sellers had a talent below the necessary cut-off, they
had a strong incentive to lie in order to get a contract offered. The authors
compared a scenario with free communication with two conditions, in which
communication was pre-specified and varied in the strength of the promise.
It is notable that the promise was in this study, about the trustworthiness
of information and not about an intended action.
The results demonstrate that lying was significantly less frequent in the
free communication condition than when pre-specified messages were of-
fered. The authors list two possible reasons for this observation: the lying
aversion is stronger when the message is self-formulated and second, with
pre-specified messages, the subjects might have felt more obliged to make a
statement.
Also Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) tested the effect of different commu-
nication formats. In a follow-up study of their work from 2006, in which sub-
jects could send free form messages about their intention to ROLL (please
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see the previous section for a description of the game), participants were
now endowed with a blank sheet and a pre-written promise, ’I promise I
will roll’, that they could send to their counter player. The message space
was hereby common knowledge.
Promise rates in this second study were significantly higher than in the first
study. The result supports the assumption that agents feel more obliged
to make a statement when pre-formulated promises are offered. At the
same time, the results show also that elicited promises generated only little
trust and promisors acted only marginally more trustworthily compared to
a situation with no communication; but significantly less trustworthily when
compared with the condition, in which free form messages were available.
Belot et al. (2010) finally examined the effects of voluntary and elicited
promises outside the controlled framework of lab experiments. In a Dutch
TV show called ‘Will (s)he share or not?’ the players can make a statement
about their intention, sometimes in response to an explicit question by the
presenter. Consistent with the results from the laboratory experiments, the
authors found that players, who made their promise voluntarily, were 50%
more likely to co-operate than when the promise was elicited.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Public
Statements on Social
Dilemma Behaviour1
Introduction
Professional misconduct, for example by bankers or doctors, may seem at
first like simple criminal behaviour and the detection of the respective breach
carries legal consequences for the actor. But in many cases also a second,
wider dimension of exists. Besides clients, patients suffering directly from
unethical behaviour, misconduct also destroys public trust in the industry,
in which the actor is operating. Hence, professional integrity carries also
the characteristic of a common good. When, for example, a fraud case
becomes public, the entire profession faces the consequent costs. Stronger
regulations, less investments and client interactions can follow the failures
regarding professional integrity. Consequently, it should be in the interest of
1This is joint work with Uwe Dulleck and Lionel Page.
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all members to preserve the trustworthiness of a profession. The single actor,
however, faces material incentive to behave in an opportunistic way and
deviate from the professional standards, while free-riding on the compliance
of the other profession members.
The compliance with academic norms can be another example for such a
trust common. Individual researchers can benefit from non-compliant be-
haviour, whether it is the case of serious misconduct as manipulating exper-
imental data, or the weaker form of misconduct, such as an incomplete de-
scription of experimental setups or only partial revelation of research meth-
ods. But, in all cases, the private benefit comes with a potential cost for all
researchers in the field. In case of detection the entire scientific community
loses credibility (Ioannidis, 2005; Martinson et al., 2005; Fanelli, 2009, for
a general discussion on scientific fraud) (Begley and Ellis, 2012, for unre-
producible ’landmark’ studies in cancer research ) (List et al., 2001; Necker,
2014, for a discussion in Economic research).
In practice, a common approach for dealing with this problem is to require
oral and written statements from actors in the respective field, promising
proper, pro-social conduct. Statements of this kind are either voluntary or
compulsory. Examples of compulsory statements are the Hippocratic oath
of doctors or statements on conflicts of interest that are compulsory for
many academic journals. Recently, such oaths have also been proposed for
managers2, economists (DeMartino, 2010) and bankers (Boatright, 2013).
Especially since the financial crisis (GFC) the idea has gained popular sup-
port in order to restore professional integrity in the banking and manage-
ment sectors. A code of conduct for bankers should encourage (...) bankers
2The Harvard Business and Columbia Business School implemented, for example, an
MBA oath in the graduate program. While the graduates from Harvard can freely decide,
whether they want to pledge that the goal of a business manager is to serve the greater
good, students at Columbia must honour the code.
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to take into account the impact of their activities on the wider economy and
on society, rather than focusing on making a short-term profit.” (Webb,
2010). The Netherlands ultimately established such a code for bankers in
2010. All Dutch bankers have to declare the following oath now before en-
tering the profession. ”I declare that I will perform my duties as a banker
with integrity and care. I will carefully consider all the interests involved in
the bank, i.e. those of the clients, the shareholders, the employees and the
society in which the bank operates.”
Considering the broad application of non-binding, public statements about
intended future behaviour, as used in oaths and codes of conduct; surpris-
ingly little research has been done on the topic. Neither in psychology nor
in economics has much attention been paid to the effect of oaths or codes of
conduct. Academic interest on this topic is only just emerging (de Bruin and
Dolfsma, 2013). Many questions are still unaddressed. For example, how
do the public and interaction partners perceive a public statement about
intended behaviour? Does the commitment help the promisor to stay fo-
cused on his or her social function? Are oaths and codes of conduct able to
strengthen the intrinsic motivation to behave pro-socially? And do interac-
tion partners have greater trust in agents, who committed publicly to social
future behaviour?
The cognitive dissonance theory in psychology describes how individuals
seek for consistency in behaviour (Festinger, 1957). In this light, individ-
uals, who made a statement about future behaviour, are highly likely to
also perform this behaviour in order to avoid inner disharmony. Accord-
ing to Kiesler’s commitment theory, the behavioural strategy relies on the
fulfilment of an act of free will (Kiesler, 1971).
Complementary research in experimental economics has found that a sub-
stantial number of individuals avoid lying, even if they have to forego a
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material gain by doing so (Gneezy, 2005). People who make, in pre-play
communication, a promise about future co-operative behaviour, are also
likely to keep their word. The promise is taken by the interaction partner as
a serious attempt to co-ordinate and can thus help to foster co-operation (e.g.
Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg,
2008). The effect of promises has been studied hereby in one-to-one inter-
actions. This work, in contrast, studies the effect of an institutionalised
promise in a public good context; the promise is given and predetermined
by an institution and addressed to a group. It investigates whether a pub-
licly made statement about intended social behaviour can help to overcome
a social dilemma.
From the previous research it is known that the commitment strength can
vary, depending on the characteristics of a statement. It is assumed that
a public pledge has a greater impact on the individual’s commitment than
a promise made in a one-to-one interaction (Joule and Beauvois, 1997).
While Kiesler (1971) points out the importance of an autonomous choice
in the commitment decision, recent studies provide empirical support that
elicited or pre-formulated promises have only a little effect (Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2010; Belot et al., 2010).
The impact of officially made statements has also been analysed by Jacquemet
and colleagues. The authors offered a solemn oath to participants, with
which they promised to tell the truth during the experiment. In consequence,
the experiments show that, subjects were more likely to reveal their true
preferences (Jacquemet et al., 2013a) and communication was more truth-
ful, so that the chance of co-ordination failure could be reduced (Jacquemet
et al., 2013b). Another study, which also investigated the effect of an eth-
ical declaration is Mazar et al. (2008). When participants were reminded
at the beginning of Mazar’s experiment, that the study will fall under the
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universitys honor code, significantly more students self-reported honestly
the amount of correct answers they scored during the experiment. While
these three studies concentrate on the elicitation of truthfulness, truthful
communication, we focus in our study, in contrast, on the compliance in
social behaviour.
All existing promise or oath studies, to the researchers’ knowledge, miss
to control for endogeneity while measuring the effect of a statement. The
effect is usually identified by a between-subject design, and the endogeneity
of promise making is therefore neglected. Consequently, the studies are
unable to determine whether an increase in social behaviour is due to a
commitment effect or due to the fact that only socially oriented people
are making a statement about intended social behaviour. The design of
this research allows to address the issue and hence enables the testing of
whether a commitment effect really exits. In a treatment variation, the effect
is compared with a compulsory pledge, which is more common in practice.
However, according to the previously discussed commitment theory (Kiesler,
1971), a voluntary vow should be more effective.
After identifying and separating the selection effect, the results suggest that
public pledges do have a positive effect on pro-social behaviour. We pro-
vide herewith empirical evidence for a commitment effect. The results also
show that the effect was strongest when the public pledge was compulsory.
The reason is seen in the assurance that the other actors faced the same
commitment. This is called the co-ordination effect in this study.
The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section provides the reader with
background information on the public good game and communication as a
co-ordination device in such settings. After, the design of the experiment is
described and hypotheses about the expected behaviour are presented. A
result section follows and the chapter closes with concluding remarks.
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Contextual Background
Public Good Game
A large part of human activities rely in one aspect or another on contribu-
tions to and uses of the commons. In economics public goods are charac-
terised by non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption. While every
actor will benefit from the provision of a public good, no individual has the
incentive to pay for its provision, since the individual cannot be effectively
excluded from use (Varian and Repcheck, 2010). But if no one contributes
to the provision of the common, the entire group or society will be worse off.
Such situations are also called social dilemma. Typical examples of public
goods are fresh air or national defense, but also public trust in a profession,
like in our study, carries the characteristics of a public good.
In Experimental Economics this conflict between individual and collective
interest is analysed with the public good game (Marwell and Ames, 1979).
Usually a group of four players is formed and each group member receives a
personal endowment. In the following the players have to decide how much
of the endowment they want to contribute to the common project or account.
Contributions to the common are multiplied and then equally divided be-
tween all players. The game is designed in a way that the marginal return
of a unit contributed to the commons is always lower than when the unit
is kept in the private account. But from a social perspective, the marginal
benefit from a unit contributed to the common is higher, since everyone
benefits from it. Thus, the social optimal strategy is that every player con-
tributes the entire endowment. But from an individual perspective, it is
more beneficial (dominant strategy) to contribute nothing and free-ride on
the contributions of the other players. Ultimately, according to standard
economic predictions, no public good is provided.
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However, experimental studies provide contradictory evidence. People are
not rational free riders, but also do not contribute optimally. Average con-
tributions are, in one-shot experiments, between 40−60% of the endowment
(Ledyard, 1995, for an overview). Individual contributions range from 0 to
100%.
In dynamic settings, when the game is played repeatedly, contributions, in
most studies, decay steadily over time toward the Nash equilibrium (Led-
yard, 1995; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000a; Zelmer, 2003).
But, average contributions, even after 60 rounds, tend to still be positive
(Laury and Holt, 2008). The decline is explained by the fact that the ma-
jority of participants are conditional co-operators, whose contributions are
positively correlated with the beliefs about the contributions of the other
players. Conditional co-operators who observe that the other players free
ride, will consequently reduce their contributions. Generally the players are
hereby imperfect conditional players, who contribute slightly less than ev-
eryone else (Fischbacher et al., 2001). This self-serving bias finally leads to
the observable deterioration of contributions over time.
Hence, the classical literature on public good games concludes that the so-
cial optimal outcome can never be reached without an external institution
(Samuelson, 1954; Olson and Olson, 1965).
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Communication in Public Good Games
Recent studies show that communication can serve as an effective co-ordination
device in social dilemma situations (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). Pre-
play communication, even when cheap talk, defined as a non-binding and
costless messages, fosters co-operation and leads to significantly higher con-
tributions (for an overview of 35 years research on communication in social
dilemma experiments see Sally, 1995).
A recent study of Koukoumelis et al. (2012) shows that it is not necessary for
a positive effect that all group members can communicate with each other.
In the experiment, one person was selected randomly to send a free message
to everyone. This message helped the groups to coordinate on the contribu-
tion equilibrium, which was less often reached without communication.
Bochet et al. (2006) provide experimental evidence that subjects treat one
another’s messages as a serious attempt to co-ordinate (in the public good
game). Hence, communication is effective, because it changes the beliefs of
the interaction partners. And Fischbacher et al. (2001) attest that 50% of
the subjects increase contributions when they expect that others will do so.
Punishment is an alternative enforcement mechanism that has been found
to be highly efficient in promoting contributions in social dilemma. Sub-
jects are willing to punish group members for low contributions, even if
the punishment option is costly. Consequently, the availability of a punish-
ment option is an effective threat for free riders and increases the general
contribution level significantly (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000a).
In this study’s last section, it is investigated whether a public statement
is strong enough to maintain co-operation or if a punishment mechanism
is needed to enforce the commitment made by a promise. In Bochet and
Putterman (2009) subjects appreciated the verbal announcement of future
contributions, but efficiency could only be increased when a sanctioning
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mechanism was available.
Nevertheless, the final effect of a punishment option in a public good game
is unclear. Nikiforakis (2008) and Masclet et al. (2003) found that, if the
punishment threat was severe enough, overall earnings could be increased.
Contrarily, Bochet et al. (2006); van Soest and Vyrastekova (2007) report
that after taking the costs for punishment into account, earnings did not
change. And in still other studies, punishment even lowered overall earnings
(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000a, 2002; Ostrom et al., 1992).
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3.1 Experimental Design
The experiment contains three stages. Each stage consists of ten rounds, in
which the standard public good game is played. The first stage serves as
a baseline to measure heterogeneity, before in the second stage the oath is
introduced. The third stage additionally offers a punishment option.
In each round of the public good game the players have to decide how much
they want to contribute to the common good. The payoff function can
hereby be described as follows:
p = ωi − zi + a ∗
n∑
j=1
zj (3.1)
If the respective round is chosen for payoff, the participant receives the
amount kept for private benefit (ωi − zi: endowment- contribution to com-
mon project) plus an equal share (in this experiment a 1/4) of the sum of all
contributions (
n∑
j=1
zj) to the commons multiplied by a constant (a). In our
experiment the initial endowment ωi takes the value 20 and the multiplier
a has the value 0.4.
Independently from what the other players do, the marginal private benefit
from each point allocated to the private benefit is 1, while the marginal
private benefit of a contribution to the commons is 0.4. From a group
perspective, the marginal benefit from each ECU allocated to private benefit
is identical, but the marginal benefit of an ECU contributed to the common
is 1.6. Hence, from a social perspective, contributing the entire endowment is
optimal. But the concepts of individual rationality and payoff maximisation
lead to free-riding as the dominant strategy.
To control how beliefs influence the contribution choice, we asked subjects
after they decided how much they want to contribute, to indicate their
expectations about the contributions of the other players (first order beliefs)
and the guess of others expectations with respect to their own contributions
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(second order beliefs). The belief payment function was incentive compatible
and based on the quadratic scoring rule. However, to make it easier for the
students to understand, we described the possible outcomes verbally in the
instructions3
We elicited the beliefs in all sections and all treatment groups. After all
participants stated their beliefs for each group member, feedback was given
for all individual contributions within a group4.
To determine the payments for the decision choice and the accuracy of the
beliefs, three rounds were randomly selected at the end of each stage. By
this mechanism we minimised wealth effects and prevented hedging within
a stage5.
Treatments
Participants were allocated in three treatment groups. Every player went
through three stages of the experiment. Table 5.2 summarises the design.
In each stage the public good game was played ten times.
In the first stage all players played the standard public good game. This
stage served as baseline to control for learning effects and heterogeneity
3When the best guess was correct the individual received additional 10 ECUs. When
the guess deviated by 1 point from the actual entry, the subject received 9 ECUS; 6 ECUs
for a deviation of 2 points and 1 ECUs for a deviation of 3 points. When the deviation
was larger than this, no additional ECUs could be gained.
4Croson (2001) found that feedback about each single players’ contribution compared
to information about the total contribution does not change the average contributions.
Also Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000a) do not find a difference in contributions for feedback on a
average level or feedback that displays the entire contribution vector.
5No consensus exists in the literature whether or not subjects change their behaviour
when only one random period gets paid out. But Anderson et al. (2008) provide evidence
that doing so, does not change the deterioration pattern in a public good game. We used
this procedure in all treatment groups.
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between players. In the second stage the control group repeated the baseline
game.
Table 3.1: Experimental Design
STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3
CONTROL Standard PGG Standard PGG
Standard PGG
Punishment (50%)
VOLUNTARY Standard PGG
Voluntary Oath Voluntary Oath
Standard PGG
Standard PGG
Punishment
COMPULSORY Standard PGG
Compulsory Oath Compulsory Oath
Standard PGG
Standard PGG
Punishment
In two treatment groups, a statement was offered to communicate intended
contribution behaviour. The intervention took place before the second stage
started. The statement said that the participant would contribute a mini-
mum of 75% of the endowment. In the voluntary oath group participants
decided simultaneously whether they wanted to make the oath. It was made
explicit that making the pledge has no consequence on the set of possible
future choices and does not limit the decision later in the experiment, i.e.
the statement was a form of cheap talk.
All participants who decided to pledge the oath had to type in the follow-
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ing, ’I promise to contribute each round at least 15 ECUs to the project’.
According to Kiesler (1971) and Joule and Beauvois (1997) commitment is
higher when the subject is engaged in the act of promise making. For this
reason we have chosen to let subjects type the statement instead of purely
clicking a box.
Subjects who decided not to pledge the statement, had to type in a neu-
tral text. This text was already used in the baseline stage and stated an
agreement to participate in the experiment. The length of the sentence was
similar to the statement, so that no one in the room could identify who was
making a promise and who was not. The exact wording can be found in the
Appendix 8.1.
All players learned who else made the oath in their group before the first
contribution decision needed to be made. Oath-takers were labeled through-
out the consequent ten rounds of Stage 2. In the compulsory treatment
group, the statement was compulsory for all players and made in the same
way than in the voluntary group. Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of the
game. Instructions can be found in the Appendix 8.1.
In the last stage, new groups were formed and participants in the treatment
group could/needed to again make the oath. Additionally a punishment
option was now offered. After the players learned in the feedback round
how much each of the other players contributed to the common, punishment
points could be allocated. Received punishment points decreased the period
income by a double. The cost for a punishment point was 1 ECU and paid
from the income earned in the contribution decision. A maximum of five
points could be allocated to each counter player. After the allocation, each
subject learned the aggregate of punishment points imposed on them by the
other group members. In order to identify the pure effect of punishment,
half of the subjects in the control group did not have the option to punish
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of Game
other group members in Stage 3. Table 8.4 displays the costs and the effect
of the punishment points; the same table was also given to the participants
in the instructions.
Table 3.2: Distributing Points
cost of points for you 0 1 2 3 4 5
reduction of other group member’s payoff 0 2 4 6 8 10
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Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted between November 2012 and April 2014 with
the experimental software CORAL (Schaffner, 2013). Participants were stu-
dents from the Queensland University of Technology, recruited with the on-
line recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment lasted
for about an-hour-and-a-half. The average payment was 25.3 AUD. In each
session the participants were divided in groups of four and the group compo-
sition stayed the same for each stage. New groups were matched after each
stage. With 16 subjects per session, a stranger matching was guaranteed.
Before participants could start the experiment, comprehension questions
needed to be answered correctly. Sessions were equally distributed over the
three treatment groups. The data compromises observations of 192 individ-
uals and 5760 decisions in total.
Hypotheses
Under the assumption of rationality and own payoff maximisation, it was
expected that players would contribute nothing to the common project.
Furthermore, any form of communication is meaningless and participants
would not be affected by the statement.
From existing research we know that human behaviour deviates fundamen-
tally from these predictions. Contributions to the commons are on average
positive and deteriorate over the course of the experiment (Ledyard, 1995;
Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000a; Chaudhuri, 2011). It has also been found that com-
munication enhances the contribution levels significantly (for an overview on
the effect of communication Sally, 1995; Bochet et al., 2006; Balliet, 2009).
With respect to the statement, literature in Social Psychology shows that
statements affect behaviour, even when non-binding. Two theoretical ex-
planations exist for this behaviour. One rests on the assumption that an
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aversion to lying exists; either because the person has a preference for keep-
ing their word (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Vanberg, 2008) or because
the promisor does not want to go against the social norm of not breaking a
promise (Binmore, 2006; Bicchieri and Lev-On, 2007). Alternatively, authors
argue that the effect is more indirect: the statement raises the expectations
of others, and since the person making the statement anticipated this he or
she was motivated not to disappoint the expectations of others (Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006). Both theories suggest that making a statement
should increase contributions to the common in this experiment. Therefore,
the first hypothesis to test is whether the statement makes a difference on
the behaviour that can be observed:
Hypothesis 1: Participants who choose to (voluntary oath) or have to
(compulsory oath) make a statement contribute more than those that do
not.
In case of voluntary statements, an effect could come from two potential
explanations: First, a selection effect indicating that people who are intrin-
sically motivated to contribute more, tend to make the statement; second,
a commitment effect such that the statement itself increases contributions.
Given our experimental design, the treatment group 1 (voluntary oath) al-
lows us to disentangle the commitment effect from the selection effect by
comparing the Stage 1 to the Stage 2 behaviour, where the voluntary state-
ment is offered. We can see whether participants who voluntarily choose
to make the statement in Stage 2, have on average, higher contribution
in Stage 1 (selection effect). And we can determine if participants who
voluntarily make the statement, increase their contributions in Stage 2 com-
pared to Stage 1 (commitment effect). Subjects’ decisions might not only
be influenced by the commitment, but also by the information given in the
offered statement. Hence, ‘(..)to contribute a minimum of 75% of the en-
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dowment.’ may serve as reference point for desired behaviour. We therefore
test whether the presentation of the statement itself has a framing impact
on the situation.
Hypothesis 2a: Participants who voluntarily choose to make the statement
in Stage 2, have on average higher contributions in Stage 1 (selection effect).
Hypothesis 2b: Participants who voluntarily choose to make the state-
ment in Stage 2, increase their contributions in Stage 2 compared to Stage
1 significantly (commitment effect).
Hypothesis 2c: Participants who choose not to make the statement, change
their contributions in Stage 2 respectively to Stage 1 (reference point).
Considering treatment group 2: the compulsory statement allows us to study
a possible co-ordination effect, which would subsequently give further in-
sights into the commitment effect of a statement. The literature shows
that contributions of other group members increase participants’ contribu-
tions. This is referred to as conditional reciprocity, a well-recognised driver
for contributions to the commons (Fischbacher et al., 2001). If a state-
ment affects the behaviour through a commitment effect, independent of
whether the statement is voluntary or compulsory, then conditional reci-
procity implies that contributions in treatment group 2 should be higher
due to a co-ordination effect. Forcing all participants to make the statement
triggers positive conditional reciprocity: subjects engage in more pro-social
behaviour in situations where they expect others to do so as well.
Hypothesis 3a: In treatment group 2, where statements are compulsory,
contributions in Stage 2 are higher compared to the baseline stage.
Hypothesis 3b: Comparing Stage 2 of treatment group 1 with treatment
group 2, the deterioration of contributions over the ten rounds is lower in
treatment group 2 than in treatment group 1 due to a co-ordination effect.
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An open, empirical question is to what extent the commitment effect of a
voluntary statement is stronger than of a compulsory statement. Observa-
tions from the voluntary statement treatment, where all four group members
chose to make the statement, may give some insights. One would expect that
their contributions are even higher than in the compulsory treatment, due
to the increased commitment of a voluntary statement interacting with a
high co-ordination component.
Stage 3 of the experiment introduced to two baseline treatment groups a
punishment option, which might help to enforce co-operation. When enter-
ing Stage 2, participants have a long history of play given the two previous
stages. This is likely to affect the play, and predictions as well as results
regarding this stage should be treated with caution and seen only as indica-
tive.
The ability to punish has been shown to increase co-operation (Fehr and
Ga¨chter, 2000a, 2002; Bochet et al., 2006), but can also trigger pre-emptive
retaliation (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000b; Herrmann et al., 2008; Nikiforakis,
2008), i.e. participants with low contributions retaliate against high con-
tributors, trying to deter future punishment. Nevertheless, if people do
not like to see their expectation disappointed, they might want to punish
and punishment should be even stronger in the compulsory treatment group
where the statement creates a common norm:
Hypothesis 4a: Participants who make low contributions and made a state-
ment, either voluntary or compulsory, are more likely to attract punishment
(broken-promise punishment).
Hypothesis 4b: Enforcement of contributions is stronger in the compulsory
treatment group compared to both other treatment groups.
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3.2 Experimental Results
We first discuss the effects of the statements without taking potential pun-
ishment into account, i.e. we consider Stage 1 and 2 of the experiment.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First we analyse the effect of a voluntary
statement (treatment group 1), control for a selection effect and identify
a possible commitment effect. In a second step we compare these results
with the effect of a compulsory statement (treatment group 2). We will also
explore the development of the effect over time. After the interplay of the
different kind of statements the punishment option will be discussed. Ul-
timately, we will shed light on the characteristics of voluntary oath-makers
and the probability that the promise is fulfilled depending on demographic
information elicited in a post-experimental questionnaire.
3.2.1 Voluntary Statement
It is rational to use the oath as a signal, if promise makers believe that they
can influence with the declaration the beliefs of the interaction partners. The
promisors should, regardless, seek to maximise their profits. The receivers
should recognise the promise as cheap talk and not be influenced by it.
However, we do not find support for this in our data. Half of the subjects
take the oath, but also get affected by it. Figure 3.2 shows the contributions
in Stage 1 and Stage 2 in the Control and Voluntary treatment group.
For the further analysis we distinguish between subjects who pledged the
statement, Oath-takers, and subjects who decided not to pledge the state-
ment, Non-Oath-takers. The two groups are noticeably different in their
behaviour. Oath-takers contribute more to the common project. And sub-
jects who contributed, for instance, more in the baseline stage, are more
likely to pledge a statement. A detailed analysis of the characteristics of
Oath-takers can be found in the later section.
78 CHAPTER 3. PUBLIC STATEMENTS
Figure 3.2: Contributions in Stage 1 and 2
Note: This graph shows a Box-Whisker plot of the average contributions over time in
Stage 1 and 2, for the Control and Voluntary treatment group.
The bottom and top of the box show the interquartile range in the distribution of realised
contributions. The black line marks the median, while the circle identifies the mean value.
In the treatment group, 48% of the subjects are voluntary Oath-takers, 31
subjects in total. The contribution level of these players is significantly
different to the contribution of Non-Oath-takers in the second stage. The
average contribution over time for Oath-takers in Stage 2 is 12.82 ECUs,
whereas the contribution of the Non-Oath-takers is 7.60 ECUs (Average
contributions over time of Voluntary Oath-takers vs. Non-Oath-takers in
Stage 2 (MWT): z = −3.682, p < 0.001). These subjects, who decided
not to take the statement, contribute in a similar way to the subjects in
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the Control group, with an average contribution of 7.65 ECUs. Hence, the
increase in contributions is created by the Oath-takers.
Result 1: Subjects who decide to make a statement voluntarily about their
future behaviour, change the contributions to the commons.
Figure 3.3 distinguishes between subjects who decided to make the state-
ment and subjects who decided against it. The treatment effect consists of
two components: a selection effect and a commitment effect. We observe,
that subjects who later take the oath already contribute on average more in
the first stage. Non-Oath-takers contribute on average 7.56 ECU (sd: 2.83);
the Oath-takers contribute 9.65 (sd: 3.56). This is a significant difference
(Average contributions over time of Voluntary Oath-takers vs. Non-Oath-
takers in Stage 1 (MWT): z = −2.506, p = 0.01), that implies different
types of players.
Result 2a: Subjects who decide to voluntarily take the oath, are already
high contributors in the first section. We call this selection effect. But in
addition to the selection effect, we also observe a commitment effect. The
Oath-takers significantly increase their contributions in the second stage due
to the promise (Average contributions over time of Voluntary Oath-taker
Stage 1 vs. Stage 2 (MWT): z = −3.07, p = 0.002).
Result 2b: Oath-takers show higher contributions due to their promise.
We call this commitment effect.
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Figure 3.3: Contributions in Stage 1 and 2, Statement
Note: This graph shows a Box-Whisker plot of the average contributions over time in
Stage 1 and 2. Contributions are plotted separately for subjects who decide for or against
making the statement in second stage. The boxes illustrate the interquartile range of the
distribution of realised contributions. The black line marks the median, while the circle
identifies the mean value. The black dots display outliers6.
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The promise literature sees guilt aversion as a possible reason for promise
keeping. People raise others’ expectations by making a promise. When it is
their turn to fulfil the expectation, promise-makers do not want to let others
down.
We find support for this explanation in our data. Players expect higher
contributions from a player who pledged the statement. Oath-takers, on the
other side, correctly anticipate the higher expectations (second order beliefs)
and act accordingly (higher contributions). To measure the pure effect of
the statement in regard to others’ expectations, we look only on the first
round of the second stage. This is the first interaction when a new group
is matched. Players are not yet able to predict the other players’ behaviour
based on history. Table 3.3 displays the expectations from the other players,
their own second-order beliefs and the actual contributions.
Expectations are higher in the treatment group than in the control group,
(First order beliefs from first round7 in Stage 2; Control vs. Voluntary
(MWT) z = −3.748, p < 0.001). Expectations are higher towards the
Oath-takers, but also towards Non-Oath-takers: the other players expect
higher contributions in the treatment group. The introduction of the state-
ment, though, influences the beliefs. The second order beliefs in contrast
are only higher for Oath-takers, who believe that the other players expect a
significantly higher contribution from them (Second order beliefs from first
round in Stage 2; Oath-takers vs. Non-Oath-takers (MWT): z = −5.572,
p < 0.001). These observations are in line with previous research (Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006, 2010), which argued that promises are kept due to
a expectation based guilt aversion. According to this view, subjects raise
the expectations (first order beliefs) other group members about their future
7The Mann Whitney test is only for the first round of the second section, but if done
for the entire section, the results do get stronger.
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Table 3.3: Beliefs
Control Treatment
Non-Oathtaker Oathtaker
Expectation of others 8.04 8.61 12.73
(3.82) (4.06) (4.17)
Second order belief 8.12 7.58 13.33
(4.41) (4.48) (4.79)
Corr.coef. 0.92 0.93 0.93
Real contribution 7.65 7.52 12.82
(4.53) (4.98) (5.33)
Note: This table presents in the average beliefs and contributions over time in Stage 2, with
standard deviations in brackets.
The first row displays the average expectation towards a player in the control group (col-
umn 1), a player who decided against the oath (column 2), and a player who made the oath
(column 3). The second row lists the second order belief, i.e. the guess of the respective
player about the average expectation of the other group members on his or her contribu-
tions. The last row presents the average contributions realized by the respective player, the
row between displays the Pearson correlation coefficients, which measures the association
between the second order beliefs and the realised contributions.
contributions by making the oath publicly. The oath-takers, on the other
hand, anticipate this raise (second order beliefs) correctly and would feel
guilty when disappointing the expectations. However, we are not able to
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rule out oath-takers stating higher second order beliefs simply to be con-
sistent with the higher contribution made. It is left for future research to
disentangle these two explanations for the higher beliefs of Oath-takers.
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3.2.2 Voluntary vs. Compulsory
In the following we explore how the effect changes when the statement is
compulsory for all players. According to the commitment theory in Social
Psychology (Kiesler, 1971), the commitment effect is stronger when a de-
cision is made voluntarily. Our results suggest the opposite, we observe
the highest contribution in the compulsory treatment with 13.12 ECUs (sd:
5.61) compared with 10.08 ECUs (sd: 5.77) in the voluntary statement treat-
ment and 7.65 ECUs (sd: 4.53) in the control group. Figure 3.4 shows the
average contributions over time in the respective treatment groups. Table
3.4 compares the contributions of the different treatment groups between
Stage 1 and 2.
Figure 3.4: Comparison Contributions in Stage 1 and 2
Note: This graph shows a Box-Whisker plot of the average contributions over time, in
Stage 1 and 2 for all three treatment groups. The boxes illustrate the interquartile range
in the distribution of realised contributions. The black lines mark the respective median,
the circles show the respective mean value.
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For the comparison between treatment groups, it must be mentioned that
contributions in the compulsory group were different in the baseline to the
contributions in the voluntary and control group. The standard deviation of
average contributions is relatively large and some of this effect is due to vari-
ations across different experimental groups. We proceed with a parametric
analysis that can control for these differences. Table 3.5 displays the results
of OLS regressions, with which we estimate the average contribution choice,
depending on the treatment group and the stage the individual was in the
experiment. The average over time is generated on an individual level, so
that we take the heterogeneity between t players into account.
Model A estimates the contributions for each treatment group and stage.
While the contributions in the control group are lower in Stage 2 compared
than in Stage 1, the contributions in the voluntary and compulsory treat-
ment have increased in Stage 2 compared with Stage 1. The increase is not
statistically significant between the voluntary and compulsory treatment
group (t-test: p= 0.43).
Model B distinguishes, for the voluntary treatment between subjects, who
made the statement and subjects who decided against it. Comparing vol-
untary with compulsory Oath-takers, we see that the commitment effect is
stronger when the statement was made voluntarily. But, the difference is
not statistically significant (t-test, Model B: p = 0.67). Figure 3.5 displays
the respective contributions.
The psychological commitment theory (Kiesler, 1971) and cognitive disso-
nance theory (Festinger, 1957; Joule and Beauvois, 1997) suggested that
commitment can only be effective if the commitment decision is the au-
tonomous, free choice of an individual. Hence, we expected, a significantly
lower effect for the compulsory statement. This is not the case and we as-
sume that in our setting another effect comes into play in the compulsory
3.2. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 87
Figure 3.5: Comparison Contributions in Stage 1 and 2, Statements
Note: This graph shows a Box-Whisker plot of the average contributions over time in Stage
1 and 2. The boxes illustrate the interquartile range in the distribution of the respective
realised contributions. The black line marks the median, the circle show the mean value.
group, namely the co-ordination effect. Subjects are more willing to con-
tribute, due to the assurance that all members also faced the statement
to contribute a minimum of 15 ECUs. The additional effect of this co-
ordination device can be seen in groups, in which all members voluntarily
have chosen to make the statement. Due to the nature of endogeneity, we
only have two groups, in which all four members chose to make the state-
ment voluntarily. The results are therefore only suggestive, but we see that
in such cases contributions outweigh all other scenarios. We discuss the
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behaviour of those two groups in more detail in the next section.
Model C controls in the multivariate analysis for the number of Oath-takers
in a group and we see that the commitment effect for the voluntary Oath-
takers shrinks. The estimated changes in contribution of voluntary Oath-
takers between Stage 1 and Stage 2 are not statistically significant any more
(t-test, Model C: p= 0.70); we therefore fins support for our hypothesis that
the statement serves as a coordination device. Model D takes past experience
(the average of group contributions in Stage 1) and the own past behaviour
into account. It becomes apparent the past has a significant impact on the
behaviour, but the increase in contributions for Oath-takers is robust.
In the next stage, the dynamic development of contributions will be anal-
ysed.
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Table 3.5: Average Contributions over time, per Treatment and Stage
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Voluntary Treat -0.127
(0.897)
Voluntary No Oath -1.138 -1.725 -0.366
(1.061) (2.032) (1.569)
Voluntary Oath 0.950 1.630 0.386
(1.084) (2.016) (1.555)
Compulsory Treat 1.908 ** 1.908 ** 2.283 1.014
(0.897) (0.875) (1.727) (1.338)
Stage 2 -1.050 -1.050
(0.897) (0.875)
Stage 2 x Voluntary 1.512*
(0.897)
Stage 2 x Vol. No Oath -0.0455 0.261 0.0184
(1.219) (1.892) (1.456)
Stage 2 x Vol. Oath 3.171* 2.494 2.960**
(1.258) (1.874) (1.442)
Stage 2 x Compulsory Treat 2.522*** 2.522*** 2.555* 2.424**
(0.897) (0.875) (1.386) (1.067)
N state -0.268 -0.0170
(0.454) (0.353)
Avg Pot S1 -0.103***
(0.0338)
Avg Contrib S1 0.944***
(0.110)
Constant 8.698*** 8.698*** 9.361*** 4.114***
(0.635) (0.619) (1.777) (1.502)
Observations 384 384 189 189
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.144 0.144 0.493
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions, estimating the average con-
tribution for each stage and treatment group.
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3.2.3 Dynamic Comparison
Figure 3.6 depicts the change of contributions over time for Stage 2. To
accommodate for session differences we consider the contribution differences
between Stage 1 and 2. This means we calculated for each individual the
difference in contributions between the first round in Stage 1 and the first
round in Stage 2, and so on. For ease of presentation we use fitted values
(see Appendix 8.1 for the raw data).
Table 3.6 displays the regression results for the difference between Stage 1
and 2. The left side of Figure 3.6 is based on Model E, the right side based on
Model F, which distinguishes between voluntary Oath-takers and subjects
who decided not to make a statement. Model G additionally controls for
past experience in Stage 1 and serves as a robustness check.
It can be seen that in the first round of the second stage the effect of the
statement is, on an aggregate level, in the voluntary group as strong as in
the compulsory group. But then the increase deteriorates faster when the
statement was voluntary. The dynamic is driven by participants who made
the statement and reduced their initially higher contributions over time.
This pattern can be explained with conditional co-operation. After the first
round subjects learn how the other group members contribute and adjust
their contributions accordingly; over time the good intentions of contributing
15 ECUS or more vanish. In the compulsory group, contrarily, everyone
committed to the statement and contributions stay high longer.
Result 3: Contributions deteriorate faster in the voluntary treatment groups
than the contributions in the compulsory treatment groups. This provides
evidence for a co-ordination effect.
While the psychological commitment theory suggests a stronger effect of
self-chosen commitments, we see that in a social dilemma, the assurance
that everyone signs up for the same in a compulsory statement also brings
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Table 3.6: Dynamic Change in Contributions, per Treatment in Stage 2
Model E Model F Model G
Round -0.0485 -0.0485 -0.0485
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Voluntary Treat 7.838***
(2.472)
Voluntary No Oath 3.700 3.378
(2.492) (2.528)
Voluntary Oath 8.542** 9.049**
(3.632) (3.681)
Compulsory Treat 5.366** 5.366** 6.530**
(2.310) (2.310) (2.493)
Round x Voluntary Treat -0.340**
(0.158)
Round x Vol. No Oath -0.174 -0.174
(0.167) (0.167)
Round x Vol. Oath -0.517** -0.517**
(0.234) (0.235)
Round x Compulsory Treat -0.116 -0.116 -0.116
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
Avg Pot S1 -0.153***
(0.0209)
Constant -0.298 -0.298 5.010**
(1.678) (1.678) (1.859)
Observations 1920 1920 1920
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.052 0.139
Standard errors, clustered on the indiviudal levels, are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions on the change in
contribution levels for each round of Stage 1 and Stage 2.
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Figure 3.6: Fitted Values Difference between Stage 1 and 2
Note: This figure presents fitted values of the differences in average contributions. The
graph on the left describes how contributions change in the treatment groups for each
round between Stage 1 and 2. The graph on the right distinguishes between Oath-takers
and subjects, who decided against the pledge in the voluntary treatment group.
benefits. Hence, the first best choice from a policy perspective would be a
statement that is voluntary, but everyone decides to commit to it. Figure 3.7
scatters separately the average contributions of these two groups, in which
all group members voluntarily made the statement. It can be observed that
in those groups, contributions were significantly higher in most rounds than
in the compulsory or the other voluntary treatment groups. However, we
only observe four such groups; statistical power is hence extremely low and
the observation can only be taken as indicative.
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Figure 3.7: Comparison Contributions in Stage 1 and 2, Statements
Note: This figure displays average contributions for each round in Stage 1 and 2. The
development of the two groups in the voluntary treatment, in which all group-members
decided to make the oath voluntarily, is plotted separately.
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3.2.4 Statements and Enforcement
In the third stage of our experiment we allowed participants to distribute
punishment points. We introduced the punishment option to investigate
whether an enforcement mechanism in combination with a commitment de-
vice helps to sustain co-operation over time; and if participants get harsher
punishment when making the same contribution than participants who did
not promise anything.
Before the start of the third stage new groups were formed, ensuring that
no participant had group members with whom he or she had shared a group
before. The protocol regarding the statement stayed the same, i.e. no state-
ment for baseline, voluntary statements for treatment group 1 and compul-
sory statements for treatment group 2. As before, participants were able
to see whether others in their group made a statement and how much they
contributed in the current round. But participants were now able to punish
other group members. By giving up one unit, players could reduce the payoff
of another group member by two units. Up to five punishment points could
be distributed to each player. After each round subjects learned the aggre-
gate of punishment points imposed on them by the other group members.
The costs of distributed and received punishment points were discounted
from the income of the contribution task.
In our analysis we have found that punishment points are usually awarded
by high contributors to low contributors, and to a lesser extent from low
contributors to high contributors. This is consistent with the literature (Fehr
and Ga¨chter, 2000a,b). Comparing the treatments, we observe that subjects
in the compulsory treatment receive harsher punishment for contributions
below the stated level of 15 ECUs.
We asked if subjects, who made the statement, get punished more harshly for
the same contributions, than players who did not make the statement. On
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average, no difference can be observed when the level of contributions was
the same. To ease the presentation average punishment points are clustered
in Figure 3.8 for the following contribution levels8:
= 0, < 5, < 10, < 15,= 15, > 15
.
Figure 3.8: Received Punishment Points
Note: This graph shows the average amount of punishment points a subjects received for
a certain contribution level. Contributions are clustered based on the scale described in
the text.
Players who contributed a lot to the common project punish those players
who contributed less. On the other hand, low contributors also punish the
8A table with the entire distribution of punishment points over the contribution levels
can be found in the Appendix 8.1.
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high-contributors. The oath enhances this effect. If a player pledged the
oath, but contributes less than promised, he or she gets punished more,
by high-contributors, than someone who did not take the oath. This is
especially true, when the punisher also pledged; these players enforce the
norm of promise-keeping. Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz (2009) found similar
punishment behaviour. Subjects who punished with a high probability after
being deceived, were precisely those who previously sent truthful messages.
But this story can also be told in a different way: if a high-contributor faces
a low-contributor, he or she is less likely to get punished if he or she pledged
the oath. The oath serves as a justification for the ’too’ good behaviour.
However, it is emphasized that the behaviour in the last stage has a strong
path dependency. Results can only be seen as indicative, since order effects
cannot be ruled out. It is left for future work to investigate how promises
and punishment behaviour interact with each other.
3.2.5 Social Welfare
From a policy perspective we want to consider that punishment is costly. In
the voluntary oath treatment, the punishment option increases contributions
significantly. However, from a social perspective, a significant lower welfare
level is realised than in Stage 2 without enforcement.
Table 3.7 displays the contributions and consequent total payoffs of all treat-
ment groups in Stage 2 and Stage 3. Costs of received and distributed
punishment points are withdrawn from the contribution payoffs in Stage 3.
The punishment points reduce the overall surplus more than they increase
contributions. Ultimately, the final payoffs are similar to the earnings in
the control group with punishment. In the compulsory oath treatment, on
the other hand, the welfare level was higher in Stage 3, with punishment,
than in Stage 2, without punishment. The introduction of punishment led
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to higher contributions and the social cost of punishment was less than the
gain from increased contributions.
Result 4a: From a social welfare perspective the voluntary statement is
more effective than the combination with a punishment option.
Result 4b: For the compulsory statement the enforcement mechanism is
beneficial and helps to maintain contributions on a high level.
Table 3.7: Final Payoffs
Final Payoff Stage 2 Stage 3 z-value*(p-value)
CONTROL 24.18 22.79 1.336 (p=0.18)
CONTROL PUNISH 25.04 24.31 0.490 (p=0.62)
z-valuea*(p-value) -1.88 (p=0.06)
VOLUNTARY 26.06 23.68 3.005 (p=0.003)
z-valueb*(p-value) 0.793 (p=0.428)
COMPULSORY 27.88 26.77 1.365 (p=0.172)
z-valuec*(p-value) -3.175 (p= 0.002)
z-valued*(p-value) -4.439 (< 0.001)
Note: This table presents the average final payoffs earned in each Stage.
a Pure Punish effect: Control vs. Control Punish
b Control Punish vs. Voluntary Punish c Control Punish vs. Compulsory Punish
d Voluntary Punish vs. Compulsory Punish * Wilcoxon Mann Whitney Test
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3.2.6 Characteristics of Oath-takers and Oath-keepers
Post-experimental Questionnaire
In the following two paragraphs, this research investigates whether subjects
who choose to make a statement hold specific characteristics and whether
oath-keepers differ in this respect to subjects who break their promise. For
this purpose we elicited demographic information and psychological mea-
sures in a post-experimental questionnaire. We asked subjects for their sex,
age, degree, course and religiosity9.
We also asked five questions from the Socio-moral Reflection Measure Ques-
tionnaire (SRM) (Basinger and Gibbs, 1987; Gibbs et al., 2013), which con-
tains items addressing socio-moral values like truth telling. The questions
we asked were addressing the attitude towards promises and lying10.
We also elicited a short version of the Crowne and Marlow Social Desirability
Scale (SDS). This scale is often used in Psychology and Clinical Research
to measure the need for social approval11.
9To have an indication how religious participants were, we asked ”Apart from weddings,
funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services these days?” The
variable was coded with ”More than once a week” (1), ”Once a week” (2), ”Once a
month” (3), ”Once a year” (4), ”Less often than once a year” (5), ”Never” (6).
The observed average of 4.43 suggests that participants on average went to church between
once per year or less; apart from weddings, funerals and christenings.
10We asked the following questions: 1) How important is it for people to keep promises,
if they can, to friends? 2) How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can,
even to someone they hardly know? 3) How important is it for parents to keep promises,
if they can, to their children? 4) How important is it for people to tell the truth?
The variable is coded in reverse order: very important (1), important (2), not important
(3).
Thus a high score in SRM indicates that the person stated that he/she perceives promise
keeping as less important.
11The original version includes 50 items, we used a shorter version from Fischer and
Fick (1993) which is proofed to be also valid and internally consistent (Barger, 2002).
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A person with a high SDS score is more likely to perform certain behaviour
with the desire to be socially accepted or approved.
Ultimately, as an estimator for strategic reasoning we integrated the cogni-
tive reflection test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005). This test is designed to assess
an individual’s ability to suppress an intuitive and spontaneous idea, that is
incorrect, and engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response.
Answers were incentive compatible, so that participants were paid 1 AUD
for each correct answer. The CRT measure ranges from 0 to 3, indicat-
ing a person with a high CRT score is able to resist intuitively compelling
responses.
In the following, we first shed light on the characteristics of subjects who
voluntarily made the oath in the voluntary treatment group. In a second
step we compare characteristics of subjects keeping the promise (oath) with
others who do live up to their word and break the oath.
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Characteristics of Voluntary Oath-takers
Table 3.8 shows the likelihood that a participant takes the statement volun-
tarily in Stage 2 according to his or her demographic characteristics.
Model 1 takes course, degree of studies, experience in the laboratory, gender
and age into account. The variables Female, Econ and Postgraduate are
dummy variables that takes the values one if the participant was respectively
female, studying economics or enrolled in a postgraduate course. Model 2
predicts the likelihood of making a voluntary pledge based on the extent to
which a participant is satisfied with financial income, average weekly income
and his or her religiosity. Model 3 uses the psychological measurements we
elicited in the experiment as explanatory variables. Model 4 combines all
previous three models and Model 5 controls additionally for the experience
a participant has made in the previous stage and his or her own contribution
behaviour in the past. The results show that only gender has a significant
and robust impact on the decision to voluntarily make a statement about
intended social behaviour. When a participant was female, she was 35% less
likely to make the voluntary statement (p = 0.03).
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Table 3.8: Regression: Oath-takers demographics
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Econ -0.0611 -0.286 -0.133
(0.138) (0.203) (0.231)
Postgrad 0.187 0.359 0.375
(0.209) (0.308) (0.339)
Experiment 0.153 0.160 0.121
(0.146) (0.222) (0.246)
Female -0.276** -0.492** -0.483**
(0.130) (0.191) (0.201)
Age -0.00695 -0.0202 -0.0189
(0.0107) (0.0189) (0.0203)
Finsat -0.185 -0.364* -0.379
(0.160) (0.219) (0.261)
lessRelig 0.0552 0.0317 0.0245
(0.0472) (0.0621) (0.0669)
CRT -0.0241 -0.0182 -0.0291
(0.0560) (0.0826) (0.0856)
SRM 0.0607 0.0231 0.0476
(0.0388) (0.0618) (0.0665)
SDS 0.0540* 0.0584 0.0318
(0.0310) (0.0406) (0.0451)
Avg Contrib S1 0.0507
(0.0457)
Avg Pot S1 0.00741
(0.0168)
Observations 64 48 63 47 47
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table presents the marginal effects (calculated at the means of all vari-
ables) from a probit regression on the likelihood a participants takes voluntarily
the oath in the second stage, based on the demographic characteristics.
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Characteristics of Oath-keepers
Table 3.9 displays the results of probit regressions on the probability that
a subject keeps the promise and contributes 15 ECUs or more. Model 1
estimates the likelihood based on the course of study, the degree of exper-
imental experience, gender and age. A student enrolled in a postgraduate
study is less likely to keep his or her promise (p=0.001). Female students
keep the made promise more often (p = 0.04). Model 2 predicts the promise
keeping probability based on financial satisfaction and religiosity. It reveals
that students who stated they were in a financially satisfying situation more
often kept their promise and contributed a minimum of 15 ECUs to the
common (p=0.009). Less religious students deviated more often from the
public statement (p = 0.04). Model 3 uses the psychological measures as
explanatory variables for the likelihood of promise keeping. A participant
who is more able to resist intuitively compelling responses (CRT), is also
more likely to keep the promise (p = 0.001). This is an interesting find-
ing, which suggests that promise keeping and consequently not following
the temptation of material gain requires in our experiment a high impulse
control. Subjects who stated in the Social Moral Reflective test (SRM) that
promise keeping is important, behaved consistently and lived up to their
word in the game more often(p < 0.001).
Model 4 combines all previous explanatory variables and Model 5 controls
additionally for the experiences a player had made in the previous stage and
whether a promise has been made in the voluntary or compulsory treatment
group.
For the last model, the negative effect of the degree of studies is robust
(p = 0.003). Participants, enrolled in a postgraduate course, were 12 percent
points less likely to keep the promise. Whereas when participants came
regularly to the laboratory to participate in economic experiments, they
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Table 3.9: Regression: Oath-keepers characteristics
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Econ 0.00907 0.00370 0.00383
(0.0307) (0.0366) (0.0365)
Postgrad -0.134*** -0.175*** -0.116***
(0.0408) (0.0427) (0.0425)
Experiment 0.0132 0.00542 0.132***
(0.0319) (0.0365) (0.0432)
Female 0.0630** 0.0212 0.0222
(0.0307) (0.0363) (0.0365)
Age 0.00680* 0.00491 0.00809*
(0.00410) (0.00418) (0.00438)
Finsat 0.0971*** 0.0509 0.108***
(0.0360) (0.0365) (0.0373)
lessRelig -0.0241** 0.000770 -0.0259**
(0.0114) (0.0127) (0.0132)
CRT 0.0438*** 0.0646*** 0.0635***
(0.0138) (0.0161) (0.0161)
SRM -0.0589*** -0.0756*** -0.0696***
(0.0101) (0.0124) (0.0124)
SDS 0.00541 -0.000368 -0.0112
(0.00652) (0.00773) (0.00804)
Compulsory 0.163***
(0.0453)
Avg Contrib S1 0.0536***
(0.00652)
Avg Pot S1 -0.0131***
(0.00191)
Observations 950 770 940 760 760
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table presents the marginal effects (calculated at the means of all variables) from
a probit regression on the likelihood that an Oath-taker keeps fulfills the promise to con-
tribute 15 ECUs or more in the second stage, based on the demographic characteristics.
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were more likely to keep their word and contribute a minimum of 15 ECUs.
The more students indicated to be financially satisfied, the more they were
likely to forego material benefits in order to keep the oath (p = 0.05). For the
psychological measures, the impact of cognitive reflection and social/moral
values is robust. Students with high cognitive ability and moral values were
more likely to keep the oath (p = 0.001 and p < 0.001).
Past contribution behaviour had a positive effect on the likelihood that
a subject kept the oath, but when a subject was previously in a group
who contributed a lot to the common he was less likely to keep the oath.
Ultimately, subjects in the compulsory treatment group are 12 percentage
points more likely to keep the oath and contribute 15 ECUs and more. This
is a result of the co-ordination effect, that was discussed in the previous
section
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3.3 Conclusions
Our results indicate that oaths and codes of good conduct do have the de-
sired effect on contributions to the commons. While rational choice would
predict that such statements are merely cheap talk and the effect is, if at
all, due to a selection effect, we could show that this is not the case: a
commitment effect exists and increases contributions. Additionally to the
commitment effect, we found evidence for a co-ordination effect ; contribu-
tions are highest when all group members make the statement.
To what extent are these results specific to the artificial situation in an ex-
perimental laboratory? The advantage of laboratory experiments is that
contributions to the commons are well defined and can be measured. The
disadvantage is that the situation is highly artificial and one needs to con-
sider what effects the situation has on participants. On one hand, we like
to argue that the abstract nature of the situation should decrease the effect
of a statement. The moral or emotional loading of a statement about good
conduct is lower in a laboratory than in a real world setting. The effect
may be therefore stronger in the natural environment. On the other hand,
we are aware that an experimenter effect may exist. We would expect that
this effect should be similar for the baseline as well as the treatment groups.
Thus if the statements do not affect the experimenter effect, our analysis is
able to shed some light on the effect of public statements on contributions
to the commons.
Along this line, the policy adopted by many academic journals to request
statements about conflict of interest and ethical conduct as a requirement
for submission of an article, is supported by our result.
In general, this research suggests that even a non-binding statement of in-
tention to contribute to the commons, increases the overall level of contribu-
tions. Thus, where it may be politically difficult to get agreement to legally
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binding rules and regulations that ensure contributions to the commons -
one might think about climate change negotiations, working with such pub-
lic statements may be a less invasive and politically easier way to achieve
solutions to mitigate the problem.
Chapter 4
Promises in Uncertain
Outcome Situations
Introduction
People are moral relativists, concluded the psychologists Goldstone and Chin
after observing how honest employees at the University of Michigan reported
copies made at a communal copy machine. In order to pay less, employees
regularly, in $ 40% of the cases, under-reported the actual amount of copies
made. However, only a minority cheated maximally and reported nothing.
This early and prominent experiment in Psychology laid the ground for many
following studies examining the relativism of moral and social decisions.
Today, it is known that individuals sacrifice financial gains in order to comply
with moral values. But it has also been found that moral decisions are not
uniform and rather are the result of an internal outweighing process (Gino
et al., 2009; Burks and Krupka, 2012). Individuals try to serve the self-
interest, but at the same time have the desire to act morally appropriately.
Socially oriented behaviour is therefore highly sensitive to external incentives
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and always depends on the circumstances in which the actor finds himself.
The relativistic character makes it in consequence difficult to predict social
choices.
This study aims to investigate whether a promise can in a situation with un-
certainty about the future, create a commitment that is strong enough, that
promisors behave accordingly and resist unforeseen material temptations for
opportunistic behaviour.
In daily life promises are frequently used to overcome situations of uncer-
tainty and facilitate co-operation or exchange. We can for example imagine
a person searching for a rare book. The visited book store does not have the
book on hold, but the shop owner offers to order the book for the customer.
Ordering the book presents a risky investment to the shop owner, as the
book is very specific and it is unlikely that it can be sold to anyone else. To
overcome this concern, the shop owner elicits a promise from the customer
that she will certainly come back in two days and get the book. Since the
promise is non-binding and, living in a large city, the customer does not
fear any external consequences from breaching the promise, she checks the
offers online. Indeed one online store offers the book, with free delivery and
even at a cheaper price than the local store. Is the commitment, made with
the promise towards the local shop owner, strong enough that the customer
resits the temptation of ordering online? How dependent is the decision on
the amount she can save by purchasing the book from the online store?
From previous research it is known that promises are an effective co-ordination
device and can facilitate co-operation. But all existing studies present the
entire strategy and outcome space to subjects before a promise can be
made. Hence, participants are able to simulate material and emotional con-
sequences of each choice option and of potential promise keeping and promise
breaking, before actually making a promise. This feature of foreseeability
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lacks, in our opinion, external validity. In our understanding, promises are,
in reality, often made without perfect knowledge of the situation they will
apply to. Thus, we designed a decision situation, in which the material
benefits a person needs to forego in order to keep a promise, are not known
when the promise can be made. The commitment moment is disentangled
from the decision moment by uncertainty about the outcome choices.
In a two player trust game, the social optimum can be reached when the
first mover trusts her counter player and transfers her endowment. Through
the transfer the amount gets multiplied and the second mover has then to
decide how the material gains should be divided. Each round two option are
offered: a Social Option, which leaves both players with the same payoff and
a Self-Serving Option, which equips the second mover with a higher payoff.
While the Social Option is constant over all rounds, the realization of the
Self-Serving Option is not known prior and is done by a random draw after
the first mover has decided whether to trust.
But in an antecedent promise stage the second mover has the possibility to
make a statement about intentions for the future play. The message was
either a free form message or needed to be chosen from a set of pre-defined
messages, varying the comprehensiveness of the promise. The message was
sent to the first mover before he had to decide whether to trust and transfer
money. All messages were non-binding and made at a point when the choice
options were not known. Consequently, the second mover commits to a
certain action, without knowing the material benefits she needs to forego in
order to keep the promise.
Our results show that when a promise was made voluntarily the sensitivity
to changing payoffs was significantly reduced. The Self-Serving Option was
chosen less often, regardless of the surplus offered. The elicited promise,
in contrast, did not have this effect. The frequency of Self-Serving choices
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was lower, but increased linearly with the material incentives provided for
opportunistic behaviour.
Since we also measured the heart rate of participants during the experiment,
we have indications about the internal outweighing process of material ben-
efits and moral sentiments. The LF/HF ratio is a reliable indicator for
experienced stress levels, and we see that voluntary promise makers expe-
rience more stress the more the realised payoff deviates from the promised
level. We also find for subjects, who keep their voluntary promise at the
decision stage, a strong physiological reaction at the promise-making mo-
ment. These results indicate promise keepers take the statement seriously
and thus have a stronger commitment, regardless of the material incentives
offered.
The article proceeds as follows; Section 2 gives a short overview of promises
as a commitment device and summarises the relevant studies on promises
and uncertainty as well as related studies measuring physiological reactions
during economic experiments. The experimental design and procedure are
described in Section 3, which also gives an introduction in the measurement
of heart rate variability. Section 4 presents the results of the behavioural
and physiological data. Section 5 summarises and discusses limitations of
the study.
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4.1 Literature
Standard economic theory predicts all sorts of cheap talk, defined as com-
munication without direct consequences, do not affect strategic behaviour of
decision-makers. In contrast, empirical evidence exists, showing that com-
munication can foster co-operation (see Balliet, 2009, for metastudy). In spe-
cific, statements of intentions have been found to be an effective commitment
device to elaborate co-operation. Partly, this effect can be explained with
strategic reasoning. In settings of repeated interactions economic agents
have an incentive to keep their word to secure future interactions and main-
tain a good reputation. But when interactions are one shot and the identity
anonymous, a purely-in-payoffs-interested agent should have not an incentive
to keep a promise. However, a wide branch of laboratory studies discounts
this prediction (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Hurkens
and Kartik, 2009). Even, in the abstract and anonymous environment of
laboratory experiments, a substantial percentage of subjects keep a promise
(Gneezy, 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). The compliance is ex-
plained with internal, emotional costs. Letting the expectations of others
down (Charness an Dufwenberg’s belief based guilt aversion (2006, 2010))
or deviating from a social/moral norm of truth telling (Bowles and Gin-
tis, 1998; Vanberg, 2008; Binmore, 2006) creates internal tension that the
promisor aims to avoid.
It could also be shown that the manifestation of this, so called, lying aversion
is heterogeneous among, but also within an agent (Hurkens and Kartik,
2009; Gibson et al., 2013). Participants are more likely to lie when the
benefits are increasing or the harm imposed on others decreasingng (Gneezy,
2005; Lundquist et al., 2009). Shalvi et al. (2011) used the term ’ethical
manouvering’ to describe the internal outweighing process. According to the
authors, a sufficient amount of profit is needed to compensate for the internal
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discomfort caused by lying. But this cost-benefit analysis has limits, when
behaving too immorally the emotional discomfort outweighs the material
gain. In consequence, people avoid lying a lot, but also a little. We assume
to see a similar balancing process in our study.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, we inves-
tigate the interplay of a commitment, made by a promise, and uncertainty.
In all existing promise studies actors knew for what they were signing up,
since strategy and outcome space were known previously. In our design, the
choice options are not fully known when making a statement. The promisor
thus commits to an action, without knowing the costs of keeping the promise.
Dimensions of uncertainty and the interplay with communication have been
investigated before in the literature, but, as said, not in the outcome space.
Schweitzer and Hsee (2002) showed for example that under vagueness about
the state of the world people are more likely to lie. In the study participants
were in the role of a car seller and learned how many miles they had driven
with the car. In one treatment the range of driven miles was between 74
and 76km, in another treatment the mile level ranged from 60 and 90km.
The authors measured how the range width corresponded with lying about
the level reported to a potential buyer. People were more likely to lie when
the range was wider.
Boles et al. (2000) investigated how imperfect information in an ultimatum
game influences the willingness to deceive others in a pre-communication
phase. When recipients did not know the size of the allocatable pie, lies on
the side of the allocators were more common.
Serra-Garcia et al. (2011) studied which impact vagueness in communication
has on the frequency of lies. The authors found that when information about
intended contributions to a public good game needed to be precise, lies were
more frequently told. But when vague messages were allowed, inconvenient
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outcomes were disguised by vague messages.
Our study incorporates uncertainty about the costs of keeping a promise.
For the promisor it is unknown, as well as to the promisee, how much mate-
rial gain the promisor has to sacrifice to keep his promise later in the game.
Previous studies showed that lying is sensitive on changes in payoffs. In
treatments in which lying was more materially beneficial or the caused ma-
terial harm for the counter parts was smaller, higher rates of lying could be
observed (Gneezy, 2005; Boles et al., 2000; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004;
Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Dreber and Johannesson, 2008, e.g.). The
comparisons were carried out in between treatment designs. In our study
subjects face over time different options from a linear function of benefit and
harm. The cost of promise keeping increases sequentially over the range of
possible outcomes. Hence, we are able to observe manoeuvring behaviour of
the promisors depending on the varying costs of promise keeping.
Our second contribution is the measurement of physiological reactions dur-
ing the experiment, which will give indications about the experienced inter-
nal tension/stress involved in a decision. We add hereby to the few exiting
studies in measuring physiologicall variables in economic experiments.
Wang et al. (2010) measured eye movements in a sender receiver game with
a pre-communication stage. The study makes use of the fact that the pupil
dilates under stress, but also under cognitive difficulty and arousal or pain.
While the pupil dilated more when senders deceived their counterparts, it
remains unclear whether the movement was because the sender felt guilty
or because the situation was cognitively more demanding for the deceiver.
Wibral et al. (2012) tested how an artificial increase in testosterone level
affects self-serving lying. Numerous studies before have shown that men are
more willing to lie in order to obtain material benefits (Dreber and Johan-
nesson, 2008; Childs, 2012; Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012). In Wibral’s
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study participants were either part of the testosterone administered or the
placebo group. Both groups played, unconscious about their group alloca-
tion, the die roll paradigm. Subjects were asked to roll a six sided die and
report the result. The self-reported outcome determined the payoff from the
game. The procedure was double blind, so the experimenter was not able to
detect lying. Surprisingly the results show that subjects in the testosterone
group were reporting honestly more often, and sacrificed a material gain
in favour of truth. One possible explanation of honesty in the testosterone
administered group is status seeking, but since participants did not have
counter players in this study, it is an unlikely motivator. The authors see
instead self-image and pride as the driving forces for honest reporting in the
testosterone group.
The third study using physiological measures to examine dishonesty be-
haviour is a fMRI study of Baumgartner et al. (2009). This work is most
related to the research program we pursue. The authors investigate neu-
ral correlates of promise making and promise keeping. The experiment was
based on a simplified form of the trust game. In an antecedent promise stage
second movers could state their intentions for future play. When first players
decided to trust and transfer money the second mover could either send back
half of the new amount or keep everything. The decision tree is displayed
in Figure 4.1. Subjects who broke their promise, showed increased activity
in brain areas related to emotional conflict (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
anterior cingulated cortex, amygdale, ventral striatum). Furthermore the
decision whether a promise was kept or broken could be predicted with the
activation in the promise stage. We argue this is not surprising since the
entire outcome space was known from the beginning on. It is very likely
that subjects simulated the financial and emotional consequences for each
choice, when making the promise. Hence, the decision to make a promise
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and keep/break a promise was done simultaneously.
In our study we have chosen an alternative set-up to disentangle the two
moments. By introducing uncertainty about the possible outcome options
promise makers commit to an action while not knowing the exact costs of
fulfilling the promise.
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Figure 4.1: Decision Tree - Baumgartner et al. 2009
Player 2
PROMISE
Player 1
SEND KEEP
Player 2 Player 1: $ 2
Player 2: $ 0
SEND KEEP
Player 1: $ 5
Player 2: $ 5
Player 1: $ 0
Player 2: $10
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4.2 Experimental Design
During the period of March 2013 and March 2014 we ran 12 computerised
experimental sessions. Participants were students of the Queensland Uni-
versity of Technology and were invited using the database software ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). The invitation email informed students that their heart
rate would be measured during the experiment. An extra compensation of
5 AUD was offered, so that the average earning was about 18 AUD. The
experiment lasted on average 45 minutes and 180 students participated in to-
tal. The experiment was programmed in the experimental software CORAL
(Schaffner, 2013).
When participants arrived, they were seated in front of visually isolated com-
puter terminals. A description about the heart rate monitors was handed
out. Students wired themselves with the heart rate monitors. While the ex-
perimenter was checking the monitors, the written instructions were handed
out. Participants could read the instructions in their own pace and questions
were answered privately.
The used trust game is referring to the design of Baumgartner et al. (2009).
In our modification, players did not have full information about the choice
options they faced later in the game. Also the parameters are set differently,
in our experiment 20 AUDs needed to be distributed when the first mover
decided to trust the second mover. Two options were available: Option A,
the Social Option, was offering always an equal split between the two players
($10 each), and Option B, the Self-Serving Option, was offering an unequal
split with an unknown realisation of $ 10 + x/ $ 10 - x with x [-2,10]. The
game lasted for 20 rounds and players were matched each round with a new
partner (Stranger Matching).
Figure 4.2 displays the course of the game. In each round we additionally
elicited the belief of the promise-maker (Player 2) whether he believed that
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Player 1 will follow and choose to interact1.
Figure 4.2: Course of Game
In the first four rounds subjects played the game without an antecedent
promise stage. These rounds served as practice rounds and to capture het-
erogeneity in the heart rate. From the fifth round onwards the second mover
could make a promise about intended behaviour. The promise was valid for
the consequent four rounds. Before each round the promise was transmit-
ted to the first mover, who then could decide whether to trust the second
movers or to choose the outside option. If the first mover decided to trust,
a nature move determined the realisation of the unequal split in this round.
Both players learned the realisation. Player 2 had to decide which option
to choose and respectively whether to keep or break the previously made
promise. In the meantime we asked Player 1 about his or her belief which
option Player 2 will choose. Figure 4.3 describes the decision stages.
1We have chosen not to incentivise the belief elicitation here, since we wanted to avoid
intensive thoughts on the belief question. This could have also influenced the heart rate
and it would have been more difficult to identify ex post what motivated the changes in
the heart rate.
4.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 119
Figure 4.3: Decision Tree
Player 2
PROMISE
Player 1
IN OUT
Player 2
Player 1: $ 7
Player 2: $ 0
EQUAL SPLIT UNEQUAL SPLIT
Player 1: $10
Player 2: $10
Player 1: $10 - x
Player 2: $10 + x
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Our experiment obtained two promise conditions. In the first condition a
free form message was offered to the second mover to express intentions
of future behaviour. In the following we call this condition ’Free Promise’
treatment. The alternative condition offered a 7 step scale2, with which
the second movers could define the generalisability of their promise3. This
treatment hence allowed for a mutable element in the promise, responding
to the uncertainty in the outcome space. We will call this treatment ’Select
Promise’.
Our data compromises 3600 decisions in total, from 180 participants. Each
participant played 20 rounds of the game. five sessions were conducted
with the Free Promise condition; consequently 43 subjects in the role of the
second mover could make a statement about their intended behaviour4. Six
sessions were conducted with the Select Promise treatment. Fourty-seven
subjects in the role of the second mover could choose one of seven statements
from a given promise scale to describe the intention for the next four rounds.
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the observations.
Table 4.1: Treatment Overview
Treatment Free Promise Select Promise
Roles Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 3
(promisor) (promisor)
Observations 43 43 47 47
Total 86 94
2I promise to choose always/usually/frequently/sometimes/rarely/ never the equal
split. + I do not promise anything.
3Instructions and screenshots can be found in the Appendix 8.2
4From the 5th round on.
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Heart rate measurements
During the experiment we collected electrocardinal data from the partici-
pants to measure the physiological reactions in different decision situations.
We wired the participants before they started the actual game. HRV mea-
surements have been used in economic experiments before (Falk et al., 2011;
Brandts and Garofalo, 2012; Dulleck et al., 2014), but are traditionally used
in medical research and psychological research regarding emotional and men-
tal processes. A detailed discussion of heart rate measurements and methods
in economic experiments can be found in (Dulleck et al., 2011). The mea-
surement of heart rate variability gives us insights into the Autonomous
Nervous System (ANS), which is responsible for the unconscious operations
of the human body, naturally including the heartbeat. The ANS balances
activity of its two major subsystems, the sympathetic and parasympathetic
systems. The first is dominant in fight and fly responses, while the latter is
more dominant in rest situations. Both systems have mechanisms to regu-
late the heart rate, but can be distinguished by the frequency of changes.
The sympathetic system has a relatively long reaction time of between 2
and 20 seconds (low frequency LF changes), whereas the parasympathetic
system regulates the heart beat within much shorter intervals between 0.5
and 4 seconds (high frequency HF changes). The LF/HF values, used in the
analysis, are normalised by the individual standard deviation to administer
for individual differences in the heart rate (Dulleck et al., 2011). It has
been shown that the relative activity of the two systems, as measured in
the ratio of low frequency changes and high frequency changes in the heart
rate (LF/HF ratio), is a reliable indicator of mental stress (Appelhans and
Luecken, 2006).
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Hypotheses
In our design two options were available for second movers; they could either
split the material surplus gained by the trusting action of the first mover,
equally by choosing the Social Option, or maximise material benefits by
choosing the Self-Serving Option. The financial surplus of the latter option
varied hereby from round to round5.
According to the assumptions of anonymity and rationality a second mover,
purely interested in monetary outcomes, should try to change the behaviour
of the counter player by making a promise, but ultimately always chooses
the unequal split6. The first mover, anticipating this behaviour, should not
pay attention to the promise and choose to not interact, since the expected
payoff is lower than the payoff of the outside option.
Based on the findings of previous studies we expect the promise to alter
behaviour (Balliet, 2009). We expect that the chance to communicate of
intentions is used, and the promise is understood as a serious attempt to
signal co-operative intentions (Deutsch, 1958; Braver and Wilson, 1986; Isaac
and Walker, 1988). For the promise makers, the promise constitutes a in-
ner commitment; behaving not accordingly creates discrepancy and inner
conflict that the actor aims to avoid (Festinger, 1957; Schlesinger, 2011).
Consequently promises are kept.
5Both splits, however always summed up to $ 20. A surplus for the second mover
meant thus a lower payoff for the first mover. This design characteristic is inherited from
Baumgartner et al. and other studies, in which the benefit from a lie consequently is a
loss for another person. Advantages and limitations of this design will be discussed in the
last section.
6Except when the upcoming unequal split is $ 8/ $ 12. We included this option to test
for lying aversion that is not related to material harm. This option also serves as a control
moment for the heart rate measurements.
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Behavioural Hypothesis: The promise enhanced internal constraints for
opportunistic behaviour. Less Self-Serving choices are observed when a promise
to split equally has been made prior. The counter player anticipates the com-
mitment effect correctly and is more likely to trust when a promise has been
made.
Research in psychology and experimental economics has shown that the
commitment effect is stronger when the decision to make a promise is self
chosen. Elicited promises have, in contrast, only little effect (Kiesler, 1971;
Charness and Dufwenberg, 2010; Belot et al., 2010). The act of actively
writing a statement of intentions engages the promise maker more strongly
in the promise than selecting a pre-formulated message. Hence, the psycho-
logical commitment is stronger for the first variation (Geller et al., 1989;
Boyce and Geller, 2000).
Behavioural Hypothesis: The effect of the self-formulated statements
in the ’Free Promise’ treatment is stronger than the effect of pre-fabricated
statements in the ’Select Promise’ condition.
For participants who have chosen a statement in the ’Select Promise’ which
includes a mutable element, – sometimes, frequently, usually –, we expect
more Self-Serving choices when the potential surplus is increasing. Char-
ness and Dufwenberg (2006, 2010) argued that people are keeping their
promise because they raised expectations of interaction partners and they
feel guilty when they not fulfill them. Since subjects announced with a re-
stricted promise that there might be exceptions to their promised behaviour,
the promisor should feel less guilty when breaking the promise. The aver-
sion to lying depends on the strength of the promise (Lundquist et al., 2009).
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Behavioural Hypothesis: Promise-breaking is more often observed for
subjects who have chosen a statement with a mutable element.
Physiological Hypothesis: Physiological reactions for subjects who break
a promise are less strong when the subjects made a statement with a mutable
element instead of a comprehensive promise.
In previous research it has been shown that lying aversion is also sensitive
to the degree a lie deviates from the truth (Gneezy, 2005; Lundquist et al.,
2009). In our experiment we expect subjects who made a comprehensive
promise, in the ’Free or Select Promise’ treatment, to experience a stronger
internal conflict the more the realised split deviated from the promised level.
Physical Hypothesis: Physical reactions of promise breakers are strongest
when the Self-Serving Option realizes a highly unequal split.
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4.3 Results
In the following section we present findings from the behavioural and physio-
logical data. We compare the two message types, - free form promises versus
promises chosen from a set of pre-fabricated statements. We will distinguish
in the first treatment between voluntary promise-makers and subjects who
decided not to make a promise. For the second treatment we will pool the
data from subjects who made a statement with a mutable element (some-
times, frequently, usually); behavioural patterns are the same and by pooling
we can increase the statistical power. The effect of these restricted promises
is compared with promises which indicate that the promisor will ‘always’
choose the Social Option.
4.3.1 Foreseeability
Before we start with the analysis of the promise effect, we want to check
whether our design was successful in disentangling the promise making mo-
ment from the decision moment. For this purpose we compare the heart rate
variability at the promise stage (red) with the measurements from the deci-
sion situation (blue). Figure 4.4 displays average values of the LF/HF ratio.
We distinguish between treatments, chosen options and promise forms.
The LF/HF values are always higher in the decision stage. Subjects experi-
ence a higher stress level when making the decision whether to split equally
or to choose the Self-Serving Option. This observation is ubiquitous, inde-
pendent from the treatment, the realised option or whether a subject had
made a promise. The findings suggest subjects were not able to simulate the
later decision stage in our design and the actual thought process happened
in the decision stage.
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Figure 4.4: HRV in Promise and Decision Stage
Note: This graph displays the average LF/HF ratio at the promise stage (left bar)
and the decision stage (right bar). The first row shows the values in the ’Free
Promise’ treatment, the second graph in the ’Select Promise’ treatment. On the
left are the average values for non-promise makers, on the right are the values for
promise-makers. In the second row are on the left the aggregate values of subjects
who made a restricted promise and on the right the values of the subjects who
promised to always choose the Social Option. Each graph distinguishes between
subjects who realized later, in the decision stage, the Self-Serving Option or the
Social Option.
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Effect of the Promises
Choice of Promise
When analysing the message type actors send to each other, it can be seen
that subjects frequently made use of the messages to express intentions for
future play. In the ’Free Promise’ treatment 49% of the subjects sent a
message with the intention to split equally, 18 % sent no message and the
remaining 33% used the communication option, but did not make a state-
ment about the intended future play. Whether free form messages implied
a promise about future play was decided independently by two research as-
sistants and the main author. In the rare cases of congruency the coding
with the higher match was taken.
Second movers,every four rounds, could write a new message that was sent to
the counter parts before interaction. The frequency of promise is hereby rel-
atively stable (5th round: 48.84%, 9th round: 41.86%, 13th round: 51.17%,
17th round: 53.49%). Only a few promises included an element which nar-
rowed the comprehensiveness of the statement (10.63%), e.g.: ”I probably
split equally” or ”Willing to grant us both $10 or at least you more than $7”.
In the ’Select Promise’ treatment, when subjects had to choose a message
from a set of pre-formulated promises the second movers decided in about
half of the cases, 48.94%, to send the strongest promise, I promise to always
choose the equal split. Second popular was the promise which indicated that
Player 2 will usually choose the equal split (28.72% ). Frequently and some-
times promises were chosen less often, in 11.70% and 5.32% of the cases. The
promise to never split equally and the option not to promise anything were
chosen rarely, 1.06% and 4.26%. Hence, we pool the promises that restrict
the comprehensiveness of the statement (usually, frequently and sometimes)
in the further analysis and compare its effect with the effect of an ’always’
promise.
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Effect on Trust
Promises were highly effective in facilitating trust and interactions. Facing
a self-formulated promise (Free Promise treatment) 75% of the first movers
decided to trust the counter player, this is an 17 % increase compared to
interactions with no promise (MWT7: z = −3.811, p < 0.001).
In the ’Select promise’ treatment first players decided in 81.25% of the cases
to interact, when a comprehensive message was sent. For promises nar-
rowing the commitment, the interaction rate was substantially lower and
decreased with the vagueness of the message: usually 68.52% (sd: 46.96),
frequently 53.41% (sd: 50.24), sometimes 42.5% (sd: 50.40). In summary,
the comprehensive statement (always) facilitated significantly more trust
(MWT8: z = −5.05, p < 0.001) than statements including a mutable ele-
ment (usually, frequently and sometimes).
Result: Messages stating clear intentions for future social behaviour gen-
erate trust and facilitate co-operation.
Our result is in line with the finding of previous studies; promises can be an
effective co-ordination device. A statement of intentions leads to a change
of beliefs of the exchange partner, and following an interaction can be relied
upon.
7Mann Whitney test on the interaction ratio of pairs with a promise maker vs. pairs
with a second mover who did not make a promise.
8Mann Whitney test on the interaction ratio of pairs with a comprehensive promise vs
pairs with a restricted promise.
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Effect on Trustworthiness
In the following, we investigate how the commitment affects the decision
behaviour of the promisor. Players, who gave a self-formulated promise to
split equally chose the Social Option in 52% of the following interactions, and
thus fulfilled the promise. Subjects who did not make a statements realized
the equal split 20% less often. The difference is statistically significant on a
1% level (MWT9: z = −3.81, p < 0.001).
In the ’Select Promise’ group we find that subjects who promised to always
split equally, do so in 58% of the cases, whereas subjects who used a vague
promise chose the Social Option in 44% of the cases. Also here is the differ-
ence statistically significant (MWT10: z = −2.81, p = 0.005).
Result: Subjects who made a promise act more often with trustworthiness;
the effect increases with the strength of the chosen promise.
Also this finding is a replication of existing findings (Charness and Dufwen-
berg, 2006; Lundquist et al., 2009). Subjects, who committed to a certain ac-
tion with a statement, are also more likely to perform this action. However,
we also see that the promise-makers do not always fulfil their promise. In
the next step we move away from aggregate behaviour and analyse how the
promise-makers react on the varying financial incentives to break a promise.
Is the ratio of not fulfilled promises a consequence of increasing material
temptation?
9Mann Whitney test on the ratio of chosen Social Options, promise-makers vs non-
promise-makers in the ’Free Promise’ treatment group.
10Mann Whitney test on the ratio of chosen Social Options, promise-makers vs non-
promise-makers in the ’Select Promise’ treatment group.
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Effect on Behavioural Consistency
To answer our initial question whether promises are able to create be-
havioural consistency, independent from changing material temptations, we
analyse how promise makers behave over the course of potential surpluses
the Self-Serving Option offers.
Figure 4.5 shows the frequency of Social choices for each potential surplus
from choosing the Self-Serving Option. The graph is for the ’Free Promise’
treatment and shows fitted values based on the OLS regression in Table 4.2.
The x-axis scatters the varying potential gains from choosing Self-Serving
Option, and simultaneously the resulting distance to the promised payoff for
the interaction partner.
We distinguish between second movers, who stated an intention to split
equally in the pre-communication phase, and subjects, who did not make a
promise. For the later group the probability, that a Social Split is chosen,
takes the form of a u-shape. When the potential surplus is little, the Social
choice is prominent (60%). But with increasing potential gains the Self-
Serving Option is offering, social splits are chosen less frequently. The lowest
ratio of Social choices (12%) can be observed when the Self-Serving Option
is ($ 16/ $4). After, the Social Option is chosen again more frequently. The
observed behaviour is in line with what Shalvi et al. (2011) describes as
ethical manoeuvring in a lying context. For small surpluses the Self-Serving
Option is not attractive, but when the potential material surplus is higher,
a deviation from the social choice is sufficiently compensated. The material
benefits outweigh social concerns. However, when the payoffs of the Self-
Serving Option are highly unequal (e.g. $20/$0), some subjects hesitate to
behave opportunistically. Moral concerns motivate an equal split (39%).
In contrast, the promise-makers behave more consistently over the course
of possible surpluses. The average frequency of realized social splits lies
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Figure 4.5: Behaviour in Decision Stage, Free Promise
Note: This graph displays the likelihood a subject chooses the Social Option in
the ’Free Promise’ treatment group, dependent on the surplus offered by the Self-
Serving Option and whether the subject made a promise. The lines are based on
fitted values derived from the OLS regression in Table 4.2.
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between 43 and 59%. It seems that the offered surplus in the Self-Serving
Option is less tempting for the decision makers. Table 4.2 shows the results
of a OLS regression11, estimating the likelihood that the Social Option is
chosen, controlling for the magnitude of the surplus and the incremental
change in surpluses. It can be shown when a subject made a promise in the
antecedent communication phase, this has a significant impact on the choice
behaviour. Promise-makers are 20% more likely to split equally. The second
regression allows for interactions between the promise and the control vari-
ables. It becomes apparent that the promise not only significantly reduces
the likelihood of self-serving behaviour (p = 0.007212), but also significantly
changes behaviour over the course of different surpluses (p = 0.00413).
Result: Subjects, who made a self-formulated promise in the past, react
in a less volatile way to material incentives for opportunistic behaviour.
11We are using here linear probability models to estimate the likelihood. This provides
us with consistent estimates and constitutes the best linear approximation. However, this
might be for some readers an unusual way to predict binary outcome variables. Please see
Angrist and Pischke (2008) for an argument on its appropriateness. To be complete we
included the corresponding probit models in the Appendix , see Table8.5
12H0: Surplus = Surplus X Free Promise.
13H0: Surplus X Surplus = Free Promise X Surplus X Surplus.
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Table 4.2: Free Promise – OLS Models: Social Choices
(1) (2)
Social Choice Social Choice
Surplus -0.153** -0.259***
(0.0592) (0.0697)
Surplus X Surplus 0.0110** 0.0195***
(0.00431) (0.00489)
Free Promise 0.207** -0.298
(0.0855) (0.352)
Free Promise X Surplus 0.194*
(0.109)
Free Promise X Surplus X Surplus -0.0156*
(0.00807)
Constant 0.772*** 1.043***
(0.203) (0.253)
Observations 357 357
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.056
Standard errors, clustered on individual level, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table presents the results of OLS models estimating the likelihood that a sub-
ject chooses the Social Option in the Free Promise treatment group.
We are controlling for the surplus magnitude the Self-Serving Option is offering (’Surplus’)
and its incremental change (’Surplus X Surplus’). ’Free Promise’ is a dummy variable,
which becomes one when the subject made a promise in the antecedent promise stage.
The variables ’Free Promise X Surplus’ and ’Free Promise X Surplus X Surplus’ are the
corresponding interactions with the promise making variable.
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How do subjects react to environmental changes when the statement about
their future behaviour needs to be chosen from a range of pre-formulated
promise messages? Can we see consistent behaviour for subjects who have
committed to a comprehensive statement and manoeuvring for those who
have selected a promise with a mutable element?
Figure 4.6 displays the frequency of Social Choice over the course of poten-
tial surpluses the Self-Serving Option is offering. The graph distinguishes
between two types of promise-makers; subjects who made a comprehensive
promise and stated to always split equally and subjects, who selected a state-
ment with a mutable element14. We pooled these observations to increase
the statistical power. The behaviour of subjects with mutable promises does
not differ considerably; the graph scattering data for each promise from the
7-step scale can be found in the Appendix 8.2.
Opposite to the findings in the ’Free Promise’ treatment, the frequency
of Social Choices is linearly decreasing for all second movers. Table 4.3
includes the related OLS regression. The estimations show that subjects who
promised to always split equally, chose the Social Option 17% more often and
thus more frequently kept their promise. However, the difference analysed
for each possible surplus is not statistically significant (p = 0.64)15. Most
apparent is that the behaviour over the course of potential surpluses does
not differ between the two types of promise makers, for both the likelihood
to choose Social split is linearly decreasing with the increasing surpluses the
Self-Serving Option is offering (p = 0.87)16.
14I will sometimes/frequently/usually choose the equal split.
15H0: Surplus = Surplus X Comprehensive Promise
16H0: Surplus X Surplus = Comprehensive Promise X Surplus X Surplus
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Figure 4.6: Behaviour in Decision Stage, Select Promise treatment
Note: This graph displays the likelihood a subject chooses the Social Option in
the Select Promise treatment group, dependent on the surplus offered by the Self-
Serving Option and the form of promise the subject made. The lines are based on
fitted values derived from the OLS regression in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Select Promise – OLS Models: Social Choices
(1) (2)
Social Choice Social Choice
Surplus -0.109** -0.0995
(0.0478) (0.0827)
Surplus X Surplus 0.00447 0.00369
(0.00380) (0.00669)
Comprehensive Promise 0.170** 0.208
(0.0799) (0.268)
Comprehensive Promise X Surplus -0.0157
(0.102)
Comprehensive Promise X Surplus X Surplus 0.00132
(0.00827)
Constant 0.866*** 0.844***
(0.132) (0.216)
Observations 411 411
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.078
Standard errors, clustered on an individual level, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table presents the results of OLS models estimating the likelihood that a subject chooses
the Social Option in the Select Promise treatment group.
We are controlling for the surplus magnitude the Self-Serving Option is offering (’Surplus’) and its in-
cremental change (’Surplus X Surplus’). ’Comprehensive Promise’ is a dummy variable, which becomes
one when the subject has made a promise to always choose the Social Option. The variables ’Compre-
hensive Promise X Surplus’ and ’Comprehensive Promise X Surplus X Surplus’ are the corresponding
interactions with the promise variable.
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Result: A self-phrased promise is more effective in supporting consistent
behaviour in an unforeseeable, changing environment than a pre-formulated
promise.
In summary, the difference between the two treatments is that when sub-
jects freely chose to make a promise, the behavioural variation in response
to a changing environment was significantly lower. Participants who did
not make a promise about their intention ,were balancing the material ben-
efit and harm imposed on others. Whereas in the ’Select Promise’ treat-
ment, participants could choose a statement from pre-determined set of
promises. The set contained promises which indicated possible exceptions
to the promised behaviour. We assumed subjects who made a promise with a
mutable element, will deviate and choose the Self-Serving Option from a cer-
tain surplus threshold. The statement indicated exceptions to the promised
behaviour, hence, restricted promise-makers can morally and socially justify
breaking the promise. Promises with a mutable element can be understood
as a signal for permissionable deviations in extreme cases. Our results, how-
ever, show the predicted pattern also for the comprehensive promise makers.
Supporting the findings of previous studies that predefined and elicited mes-
sages are less effective as a commitment device (Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006; Lundquist et al., 2009; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2010).
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Promises and Mental Stress
In the following we match the behavioural data with the physiological mea-
surements and test different explanations for the observed behaviour.
Figure 4.7 displays the results of a kernel-weighted local polynomial regres-
sion on the LF/HF ratios in the decision stage. We see that for subjects,
who did not make a promise, the heart rate variability is relatively con-
sistent for the different upcoming surpluses. When the subjects chose the
Self-Serving Option, the experienced stress level is slightly higher. Hence,
since we observed a high volatility (u-shape function) for this group in the
behavioural data, we can assume that subjects balanced social motives and
material temptation in their decision in a way that the outcome did not
cause an internal conflict, i.e. stress.
For the subjects who promised to split equally, we see more variation in the
heart rate data. Subjects who made a promise, but then chose the Self-
Serving Option, i.e. broke the promise, show an increasing LF/HF ratio
over the course of potential outcomes. This means breaking the promise
when the Self-Serving Option was (12/8)17 stressed the subjects less than
breaking the promise at (20/0).
One could argue that the stronger reaction is due to the stronger harm a
Self-Serving choice imposes on the interaction partner with more unequal
payoffs. But if the internal stress level is simply due to a violation of distri-
butional preferences, then we should see the same pattern also for subjects
who did not make a promise. This is not the case and we interpret the
increasing LF/HF ratio as a physiological indication for guilt aversion. The
more a promise maker deviates from the promised level the stronger is the
internal experienced conflict.
17The distance to the promised level of (10/10) was thus two
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Result: The emotional cost of breaking a self-formulated promise increases
with the distance the choice implies from the promised level.
In the Select Promise treatment, the physiological reaction for a highly un-
equal split choice is, on average, higher for subjects who have chosen a
promise with a mutable element. Especially those subjects, who keep their
promise when confronted with a potential high surplus, show high heart-rate
variability. If we remember the results from the behavioural data, we know
that these decision makers are a small minority. For subjects who made an
always promise, the physiological reactions are less volatile over the course
of potential surpluses. Figure 4.8 shows the behaviour for the restricted and
comprehensive promise makers in the decision stage.
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Figure 4.7: HRV in Decision Stage, Free Promise treatment
Note: This graph displays the variation in the LF/HF ratio over the potential surpluses the
Self-Serving Option is offering. The graph is based on the results of a kernel-weighted local
polynomial regression on the LF/HF ratios in the decision stage. The first row shows the heart
rate measurements for non-promise makers; left the LF/HF variation for subjects who chose the
Self-Serving Option, and on the right side the variation for subjects who realized the Social Option.
The second row shows the heart rate measurements for promise makers. In this case the left shows
the LF/HF ratio for subjects who broke their promise and the right the variation for subjects who
kept their promise.
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Figure 4.8: Select Promise: HRV at Decision Stage
Note: This graph displays the variation in the LF/HF ratio over the potential surpluses the
Self-Serving Option is offering. The graph is based on the results of a kernel-weighted local
polynomial regression on the LF/HF ratios in the decision stage. The first row shows the heart
rate measurements for subjects who made a restricted promise; left the LF/HF variation for
subjects who chose the Self-Serving Option, and on the right side the variation for subjects who
realized the Social Option. The second row shows the heart rate measurements for subjects who
promised to always choose the Social Option. In this case the left shows the LF/HF ratio for
subjects who broke their promise and the right the variation for subjects who kept their promise.
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Predicting Behaviour with Physiological Data
Baumgartner et al. (2009) found that based on the brain activity in regions
relating to emotional conflict during the promise making stage, it was pos-
sible to predict the decision of the subject in the later stage. Subjects who
broke the promise later on, showed a stronger activity already during the
promise stage. We argued that this is not surprising, since the authors had
measured the intention of breaking the promise at this earlier stage. After
all, the subjects had full knowledge about the outcome space at the promise
stage and could simulate the possible consequences of a choice.
Also we can predict the later decision for one group of decision makers,
the voluntary promise-makers, regardless of the uncertainty about the out-
come choices. When a promise-maker showed a strong physiological reaction
while making a promise, it is very likely that this promise is also kept in
the later stage. Figure 4.9 shows the heart rate variability in the promise
stage, separated on whether a subject made a promise and the later decision
choice. The LF/HF ratio of promise makers who later kept their promise,
was significantly higher than the physiological reactions of promise breakers
or subjects, who did not make a promise (MWT18 : z = −2.48, p = 0.013).
We interpret this reaction as a sign that those promise-makers took the state-
ment seriously and material incentives were therefore not able to dissuade
them from fulfilling the promise. This observation, however, applies only to
the free promise treatment. When subjects had to choose a statement from
a set of pre-formulated promises, no difference in the physiological reaction
is found between comprehensive and mutable promise makers, or promise
keepers and promise breakers (MWT19: z = 0.99, p = 0.32 and z = 1.16,
18Mann Whitney test on the LF/HF ratio during the promise stage of subjects who
kept their promise vs. subjects who broke the promise in the ’Free Promise’ treatment.
19Mann Whitney test on the LF/HF ratio during the promise stage of subjects who
made a comprehensive vs subjects who made a restricted promise in the ’Select Promise’
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p = 0.25). Please find the respective graph in the Appendix 8.2. This obser-
vation fits with our hypothesis and the findings from previous studies, that
elicited promises have less meaning to the promise-maker and induce if any,
only little commitment for the promise maker.
Result: Promise makers who demonstrate a high stress level (LF/HF) when
making the self-formulated promise are more likely to keep the promise.
treatment;
and subjects who kept their promise vs subjects who broke their promise in the decision
stage.
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Figure 4.9: HRV Free Promise Stage
Note: This graph displays the average LF/HF ratio during the promise stage of subjects in the
’Free Promise’ treatment who later chose the Self-Serving Option (left bar) or the Social Option
(right bar). The picture on the right displays the average LF/HF ratio for the voluntary promise-
makers. For this group choosing a Self-Serving Option was equal to breaking the promise, while
choosing the Social Option meant keeping the promise.
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4.4 Conclusion and Limitations
In this study, we designed a trust experiment with a pre-play communica-
tion stage, in which intentions for future play could be expressed. The game
structure contained uncertainty about the choice alternatives the promisor
faces later in the decision situation. The choice alternatives, respectively the
costs of promise keeping, were unknown at the promise making stage. Emo-
tional and material consequences related with the choice options could not
be foreseen. With a random draw over the possible choice options, we disen-
tangled the decision to make a promise from the decision to keep a promise.
This is, to our knowledge, a novel element, not present in any other promise
study. Choice options and consequences are usually deterministically known
before a promise is made. In contrast, in real life, promises are often made
to overcome the uncertainty of future conditions. With this study we inves-
tigated how the commitment of a promise influences social behaviour under
unforeseen material temptations.
Our results provide evidence that participants, who chose to make a promise,
acted in a less volatile way and their decisions were less affected by unfore-
seen incentives for opportunistic behaviour. During the experiment we also
measured the heart rate variability of the participants. For the analysis we
used the LF/HF ratio, a variable that is used in psychological and clinical
studies to obtain the mental stress level of a decision maker. The LF/HF
ratio was generally higher at the decision stage than in a promise moment,
so that we conclude that the actual decision was indeed made in the deci-
sion stage. Subjects did not play through the prior decision. We also find
a correlate of physiological reactions and the promise. When subjects had
a strong physiological reaction while making a free promise, the promise
was usually kept. When subjects instead broke the self-formulated promise,
the stress level was higher in teh decision stage the more the realised payoff
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deviated from the promise level.
But our study also shows that the choices and the physiological/emotional
reactions following a promise depend strongly on the form of communi-
cation. Hence, when a statement was chosen from a set of pre-formulated
promises, the frequency of broken promises increased linearly with the incen-
tives offered for opportunistic behaviour. The results herewith support the
assumption that free form communication is most effective as a co-ordination
device; even in decision environments with uncertainty.
The limitation of this study lies in the payoff dimension of the unequal
splits. Material gain automatically means, in our design, harm for the other
player. Hence, we cannot identify internal motives for promise keeping. The
promisors may want to keep the promise due to the expectations of the other
player or because the act of promise breaking itself imposes moral concerns
and internal costs for him. Vanberg (2008) tried to answer this question and
the results of his study support the later hypothesis. Further discussions can
be found in Charness and Dufwenberg (2010); Ederer and Stremitzer (2013);
Ismayilov and Potters (2012). Finally, support for our design can be found
in many real life situations, in which a promise is used to overcome co-
ordination problems (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2010). The recipient of a
promise is taken in a vulnerable position by believing the message. Promise
breaking consequently implies exploitation of the trustee.
Chapter 5
Commitment to pay taxes:
A field experiment on the
importance of promises 1
5.1 Introduction
Research in the area of tax compliance has convincingly argued that success-
ful tax collection is not only the exercise of power2: tax compliance, like all
human behaviour and institutions, is comprised of a mixture of ”love” and
”fear”. Early models of tax compliance were influenced by Becker’s (1968)
crime theory, which emphasizes the element of fear elicited via threat, in-
cluding the probability of detection and the degree of expected punishment
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). More recently, however, both researchers
and tax administrations have placed more emphasis on integrating the ”love”
aspect, especially given that citizen consent to pay taxes reflects identifica-
1This is joint work with Benno Torgler, Lars P. Feld and Bruno S. Frey.
2For an overview, see, for example, Alm et al. (2010), Kirchler (2007) and Torgler
(2007).
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tion with the taxing authoritys objectives (Boulding, 1981). Braithwaite
(2001) characterizes the taxpayer-authority relation in terms of five motiva-
tional postures or sets of beliefs and values: (a) commitment, (b) capitula-
tion, (c) resistance, (d) disengagement and (e) game playing. Our study will
take a closer look at the first motivational posture, namely commitment.
In general, the literature provides a solid basis for believing that loyalty is
sensitive to external influences (Torgler, 2007, 2006, 2005). For instance,
non-compliance is often explained by the perception of having received dis-
respectful treatment from the tax administration (Kirchler, 2007; Feld and
Frey, 2002). Thus, there is substantial evidence that taxpayers react to tax
administration behaviour. Exchange relationships and reciprocity matter.
However, because commitment ”reflects beliefs about the desirability of a
tax system and feelings of moral obligation to act in the interest of the col-
lective and pay ones tax with good will” (Braithwaite, 2001, p.6), it has
different dimensions. Yet too little is still known about how to enhance a
pro-active commitment to pay taxes.
We employ a field experiment to explore whether pre-commitment in the
form of a specific promise can increase tax compliance. According to psycho-
logical commitment theory (Cialdini, 1993; Kiesler, 1971; Festinger, 1957),
a promise has a binding function because of an individual’s need to behave
consistently. In our setting, we assume that the promise strengthens the
psychological contract between the taxpayer and tax authority (Feld et al.,
2006) and emphasizes the moral obligation to comply with tax payment.
Thanks to the support of a Swiss tax authority, we were able to conduct
this experimental research project in a field setting, which offers a different
perspective than the many experimental studies conducted in laboratories.
In our treatment groups, taxpayers were given the option of promising to pay
their taxes on time. Those who complied were entered into a lottery with
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the chance of winning either a financial reward or a non-financial reward.
In additional treatments, the rewards were offered in response to compli-
ance only (i.e., without the possibility of the formal promise), allowing us to
measure any pure reward effect disentangled from the commitment effect.
The experiment was conducted during the 2013 financial year in a Swiss mu-
nicipality whose taxpayers must pay their pre-taxes3. The analysis identifies
behavioural changes in the pre-tax payments of more than 2,000 taxpayers
before and during the field experiment. The treatments were manipulated
through a letter to taxpayers stipulating that those who paid their pre-taxes
on time would receive a reward. In the promise treatments, a postcard was
enclosed with the letter, on which the taxpayer could promise to pay all
rates on time. This enclosure introduced a novel element exploring the con-
sequences of holding participants to a moral commitment; in this case, the
promise to be compliant.
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of psycholog-
ical commitment theory and its possible applications. Section 3 summarizes
our general findings on the effect of offering rewards and links them to re-
cent developments in the tax literature on intrinsic motivation to pay taxes.
Section 4 then describes the experimental setting and design and outlines
the treatment selection. Section 5 reports the results and relates them to
findings in the literature. Section 6 concludes the paper by discussing the
3The tax amount amounts to the municipality tax (Gemeindesteuer) plus the church
tax (Kirchensteuer) plus the fire brigade tax (Feuerwehrsteuer). The tax amount for the
municipality is based on the cantonal tax. The municipality levies 104% of the amount
charged by the canton, although this rate can vary according to the municipality’s outlays
for the following year (e.g., infrastructure projects). Tax is based on income, and there is
no differentiation between tax on income and tax on property. In mid-February (around
the 15th) taxpayers receive an invoice declaring their tax liability for the current year,
which is estimated based on previous years. This tax amount must be paid in three
instalments throughout the year (at the end of March, June, and November 2013).
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limitations of the study and suggests directions for future research.
5.2 Supportive Incentives in the Taxation Context
5.2.1 Rewards
The role of rewards in shaping human (and also animal) behaviour has long
been of interest to social psychologists (see e.g.: Thorndike, 1911, 1932; Skin-
ner, 1953; Nuttin and Greenwald, 1968). One of the many theoretical in-
sights that have found their way from this research into management science
and practice is that of Sims (1980, p.134): ”the relationship between reward
behavior and subordinate performance is much stronger than the relationship
between punitive behavior and performance”.
This idea of supportive incentives is grounded in psychological reinforcement
theory (Skinner, 1938; Thorndike, 1932), which posits that decisions about
present behaviour are largely influenced by past experience; that is, someone
who has previously experienced a positive outcome or feeling is more likely to
repeat the same action again. Hence, as several studies have shown, whereas
close monitoring and penalties evoke fear and negative feelings, rewarding
effort and honesty can positively support an agent’s willingness to engage
in such behaviour (for an overview see Luthans, 2000). As a result, many
firms are developing programs to improve relations with their employees,
with social recognition identified as an important motivator for job per-
formance. When successful, recognition programs can reduce absenteeism
and turnover, increase job satisfaction, and improve employee performance
and productivity (Markham et al., 2002). The goal of such programs is
to ensure that organisational values become internalised and incorporated
into employee attitudes and behaviour through loyalty, identification, and
attachment (Simon, 1965).
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Recognising good work can also enhance personal interest in the organi-
zation’s success. These incentives thus aim to acknowledge the intrinsic
motivation for compliance while avoiding potential crowding-out effects (for
a theoretical discussion of the latter see: Deci, 1971; Frey and Jegen, 2001;
Benabou and Tirole, 2003).
In practice, firms use these instruments not only to foster relationships on
the employment side, but also to improve their interchanges with consumers.
Incentives, such as loyalty reward programs and special events, are offered
to frequent customers (Bolton et al., 2000). To date, however, these in-
struments have been little used by government agencies, which is surpris-
ing given that government institutions should be interested in cultivating
good relations with their citizens. Nevertheless, there is anecdotal evidence
that some governmental agencies are recognising this need and starting to
seriously consider using incentives as instruments. For example, in 2005,
Uganda’s Revenue Authority introduced a Taxpayers’ Appreciation Day, on
which it presents the so-called Vantage Award to compliant taxpayers from
different regions, dubbed Taxations Rising Star4. Asian countries have also
implemented reward systems; for example Japan offers the opportunity to
have a picture taken with the Emperor, and the Philippines places names
of compliant taxpayers into a lottery (Feld et al., 2006).
The idea of using incentives to foster tax compliance is not new: both Cial-
dini (1989) and Roth et al. (1989) argued for their usage several decades
ago. More recent arguments include Feld et al. (2006)’s contention that in-
centives can raise the benefits of paying taxes more than auditing, and fines
can increase the relative cost of not paying taxes.
In general, tax compliance can be characterised as a principal-agent prob-
4http://www.observer.ug/component/content/article?id=27845:kenyas-chris-kirubi-
to-grace-ura-taxpayers-awards.
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lem (Andreoni et al., 1998). The principal (the tax administration) wants
the agent (citizen) to do something (pay taxes), but has only limited con-
trol over the effort invested by the agent and how honest the agent is. The
setting is analogous to the relationship between employers and employees
and thus related to the question of how to maintain employee motivation. If
reductions in self-determination and intrinsic motivation are to be avoided,
it is essential for both applications that the rewards are perceived as ac-
knowledgment for good work and not in any way as compensation (Deci,
1971; Frey and Jegen, 2001).
Yet despite these observations, academic research on the effect of supportive
incentives on tax compliance is still limited. One study by Alm et al. (1992)
did test three forms of positive incentives: entry in a lottery with a monetary
prize, a fixed reward with the same expected value as the lottery prize, or
audit reduction in future rounds. After offering one of these options to
subjects, who had been audited and found to be fully compliant, they found
that the lottery entry had the strongest effect on compliance rate. Torgler
(2003), in a study using social exchange, moral suasion, and rewards as
instruments, also identified the positive reward treatment as generating the
highest level of compliance.
In Bazart and Pickhardt (2011), fully compliant subjects were given the
chance to win cash, which also had a positive impact, although the effect was
driven by male taxpayers who tended to evade prior a higher percentage of
taxes. A different outcome was observed by Nosenzo et al. (2013), however,
who took a different approach to comparing rewards with fines by framing
the game as a work situation. In this context, an employee had to decide
whether to invest effort in work (comply) while the employer chose to inspect
or not. In this setting, the deterrent fine was more effective than rewards in
encouraging work effort (compliance).
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It remains questionable, however, whether such findings are truly applicable
in the real world, because most are based on experiments conducted in the
sterile environment of a laboratory with students in the role of taxpayers.
Fellner et al. (2013) tested strategies to enforce compliance in payments of
TV licensing in Austria. The payment is hereby a fee and watching TV
consequentially a club good. The different strategies were introduced by
letters sent to citizens. No effect was found for letters in which the citizen
was approached with a moral appeal. Letters that gave information about
other’s payment behaviour had a positive effect, but only in municipalities in
which the general compliance was believed to be low. The strongest effect
was found for a threat treatment in which the detection probability was
made more salient.
Also Hallsworth et al. (2014) have chosen to send reminder letters in two field
experiments to UK tax payers. The findings indicate that norm statements
can motivate people to pay taxes. The social comparison was especially
efficient when the letter emphasised that the approached tax-payer with his
non-payments is part of a minority.
A field experiment was also the method of choice for Dwenger et al. (2014),
who comprehensively tested different deterrence and recognition systems (in-
cluding rewards) to gain insights into taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation. Their
field experiment was based on a local church tax with a general tax debt
between 0 and 100 euros. Church members self-assess the taxes owed ac-
cording to an income-based tax schedule and transfer the amount to the
church. Based on the four pre-treatment years, however, only 20% of the
church members had paid their church tax in the past. And although the
church has the legal right to cross-check the members’ self-reported income
against the information from their personal income tax returns, it has never
done so. The research team introduced three different treatments by ma-
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nipulating the official tax notification sent out by the Protestant Church
in 2011: compliant taxpayers were offered either the public mention in a
newspaper (social recognition), entry into a cash lottery (with prizes of 250
and 1,000 euros), or a combination of both. The results indicate strong het-
erogeneity in the effects of the tested deterrence and recognition systems,
measured as the tax amounts actually transferred to the church. Whether a
reward raised or reduced tax payments was strongly dependent on whether
the taxpayer had paid the local church tax in the past without incentives.
Whereas baseline donors increased their payments, baseline evaders further
decreased them. Since the evaders outweighed the compliers in the sample,
the aggregate effect of the reward was negative.
In general, such charitable giving is different from tax payment. The church
emphasizes the goodness of its cause and encourages overpayment. More-
over, the level and social impact of the tax is comparably small. In this
study, instead of exploring the effect of the treatments on the tax amount
paid or evaded as in Dwenger et al. (2014), it was investigated whether
individuals pay their tax duty by the due date.
5.2.2 Promises
Economists are becoming increasingly interested in the relevance of promises,
which are usually made with the intent of influencing the beliefs of an
interaction partner and creating trust so that an exchange can be relied
upon. Empirical studies confirm the efficiency of such messages, especially
in settings characterized by anonymous one-shot interactions. In particular,
promises change the expectations of interaction partners and thus improve
coordination between actors. The promise-makers, for their part, assume
that their message will be taken for granted by the receivers and live up to
their word, even when the promisor has to forego material benefits in order
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to keep the promise (Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Bicchieri and Lev-On, 2007;
Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Kerr and
Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Ostrom et al., 1992). Hence, the second effect of
promises is through changed beliefs. A related concept is expectation-based
guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), the fact that individuals
feel guilty when letting others down. Because a promise raises others’ ex-
pectations, promise-makers want to live up to their word in order to avoid
inner conflict. Thus, in general, once a promise is made, the probability of
its being fulfilled increases. On the other hand, cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957) interprets promise-keeping in terms of an inner urge for
consistency: behaving against stated intentions creates a feeling of discom-
fort. Behavioural economists, in contrast, suggest that promises are kept
because of a preference for keeping ones word (Ismayilov and Potters, 2012;
Ellingsen et al., 2010; Vanberg, 2008; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004) or
the desire to conform to the social norm of truth-telling (Binmore, 2006).
Most of these findings, however, have been generated in the laboratory,
raising the question of how far they apply in the real world5. Our field ex-
periment examines how promises work in a natural setting by observing real
citizens in their actual routine of paying taxes. The fact that the taxpay-
ers are unaware of their participation reduces the risk of an experimental
demand effect 6.
In our setting, the willingness to make a promise is rewarded to the possi-
5Belot et al. (2010) is an exception to this generalization. Using data from a television
game show, the authors provide evidence for the external validity of promises as an effective
coordination device. In their study, 50% of the players were more willing to cooperate
when the interaction partner voluntarily made a promise to share. When the promise was
elicited by the shows presenter, however, the promise had no effect.
6See Feld et al. (2006) for a discussion of the advantages of field experiments in the
area of tax compliance. There is an increasing trend towards using this method to better
understand tax compliance (for an overview, see Hallsworth et al. (2014).
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bility of winning a prize when full compliance is achieved. This situation
is compared to a treatment that offers a reward with no promise required.
In this case, the function of the reward is to recognize that a good job
has been done. We communicate the possibility of a reward ex ante to see
whether rewards help to promote loyal compliance. The underlying aim of
such an incentive is to be supportive and improve citizens attitude towards
tax payment by acknowledging compliance.
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5.3 Experiment
5.3.1 Background
Our study focuses on the third of three aspects of tax compliance - accurate
reporting, timely filing, and timely payment (Slemrod et al., 2001), thereby
avoiding measurement errors. The payment data are taken from the tax
administration database, which records the total tax amount owed and the
amount and date of all payments. Although the information in the data set
is anonymous, individual taxpayers can be matched over the years by their
addresses and identification numbers. We therefore know not only the pay-
ments in the treatment year, but also those from the three previous years
(2010-2012) . This allows us to measure the extent of taxpayer compliance
in previous years. The one shortcoming is that accurate reporting requires
close monitoring of the auditing process and is thus dependent on the qual-
ity and frequency of audits. The field experiment was conducted during
the 2013 financial year in collaboration with one of Switzerlands many mu-
nicipalities, Trimbach. Switzerland provides an interesting setting for field
experiments on tax compliance because municipalities are fully responsible
for the tax collecting process. Thus, our field experiment considers the com-
munal tax regulated and collected by this municipality. Because Swiss taxes
are collected in the form of pre-taxes, in mid-February of each year, tax-
payers receive an invoice asking them to declare their tax liability for the
current year, which is estimated based on taxes in the previous year. These
taxes must be paid in three instalments: at the end of March, June and
November. In the past, the municipality had to deal with missing pre-taxes
of around 20% of the taxes owed7. As a result, it has had difficulty budget-
ing its expenses over the course of the year. Hence, to better predict pre-tax
7Around 2.5 million CHF are missing during the 2012 year. For more information see
Appendix.
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funds, the tax and communal administrations announced at the end of 2012
that from 2013 onward, those who miss pre-tax payments will be dunned
(see Figure 5.1 for the timeline).
Figure 5.1: Timeline
5.3.2 Methodological Design
Our sample comprises 2,201 taxpayers (excluding firms) randomly assigned
to four treatment groups and one control group. Taxpayers not having a tax
debt the previous year were excluded, as were two additional observations
with exceptionally high tax debts8. By the end of the experiment, a further
244 taxpayers had been lost because of either migration or a change in civil
status. The sample statistic can be found in Table 5.1.
Shortly after receiving the tax invoice for the current year (i.e., within two
days), taxpayers in the treatment groups received a second letter remind-
ing them about the payment due date and introducing the incentives. This
letter was written easy to read and to comprehend. All tax administration
employees and local council members were given a list of standardized an-
swers to use in the case of taxpayer queries (see Appendix 8.3 for the letter
and the list). Table 5.2 shows the treatment variations.
8CHF85,400 and 90,000, twice the amount of the next highest tax debts.
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Table 5.1: Sample Statistic
Mean SD N
Taxdebt 4458.62 4244.00 2201
Age 56.35 18.25 1845
Married* 0.49 0.50 1843
Children* 0.18 0.38 2201
Single female* 0.27 0.45 1843
Single male* 0.24 0.43 1843
Houseowner* 0.34 0.47 1882
Swiss* 0.77 0.42 1916
Christ* 0.61 0.49 1843
* Dummy variables
The promise treatments introduce a moral commitment by asking taxpayers
to return a pre-paid postcard to the tax administration promising to pay
all rates on time. Promise-making was thus voluntary, and 30% of the sam-
ple decided to make the commitment. The text of the promise, illustrated
in Figure 8.15, is as follows; the taxpayers confirmed their pledge with a
signature:
”I, (first name, last name), tax identification number XXX, promise as an
honest taxpayer of the Trimbach municipality to pay all instalments of the
pre-tax on time during 2013”.
The promise commitment was a pre-requisite for entry into a lottery to win
either a cash prize of 1,000 CHF9 (cash promise treatment, CASH PRO) or a
wellness weekend for two valued at 1,000 CHF (wellness promise treatment,
WELL PRO). Whereas cash payments allow more flexible spending than
a wellness weekend, the latter may be perceived more as a prize (Frey,
9One thousand Swiss francs are roughly equal to 1,000 USD.
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Figure 5.2: Promise Card
2007). In the two other reward treatments (CASH and WELLNESS) the
same rewards were offered without the promise. In all the letters (including
the control group), taxpayers were informed about the introduction of the
dunning system (see Appendix Figures 8.13 and 8.14 for example letters).
The average tax debt in 2013 was 4,459 CHF, but no significant between-
treatment group differences are observable in the distribution of tax amounts
owed (see Table 5.3 and the Appendix for the average tax debt in each
group). Table 5.2 shows the treatments.
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Table 5.2: Experimental Groups
Control CASH WELL CASH PRO WELL PRO
Table 5.3: Pairwise Tax Debt Comparison in 2013
Taxdebt Contrast Std. Err. t P > t 95% Conf. Interval
WELLNESS vs CONTROL .0021178 281.038 0.00 1.000 -767.2438 767.248
CASH vs CONTROL -62.70242 280.0771 -0.22 0.999 -827.325 701.9201
CASH PRO vs CONTROL -207.1189 288.8413 -0.72 0.953 -995.6683 581.4305
WELL PRO vs CONTROL -219.7008 282.6907 -0.78 0.937 -991.4586 552.0571
CASH vs WELLNESS -62.70454 283.7554 -0.22 0.999 -837.369 711.9599
CASH PRO vs WELLNESS -207.121 292.4094 -0.71 0.955 -1005.411 591.1694
WELL PRO vs WELLNESS -219.7029 286.3354 -0.77 0.940 -1001.411 562.0052
CASH PRO vs CASH -144.4164 291.486 -0.50 0.988 -940.1858 651.353
WELL PRO vs CASH -156.9983 285.3923 -0.55 0.982 -936.1318 622.1351
WELL PRO vs CASH PRO -12.5819 293.9982 -0.04 1.000 -815.2097 790.0459
This table presents the comparison of the taxdebt in 2013 between the treatment groups. The
Tukey test has been chosen for the pairwise comparison.
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5.4 Results
In the promise treatment groups, taxpayers who made the promise are more
likely to have complied and paid all three rates on time than those who did
not make the promise. The compliance rates for promise-makers are 65% in
the cash treatment (CASH PRO) and 74% in the wellness treatment (WELL
PRO), while compliance rate for non-promise-makers are 35% and 38%, re-
spectively (Figure 5.4). Both differences are statistically significant at the
1% level in a two-sample test of proportions (Prtest) or a chi-square test
(Chi2). We do however recognize the risk of a selection effect among those
willing to make a promise and so also examine pre- intervention compliance
behaviour by analysing a three-year average of tax compliance (2010-2012).
The differences identified between taxpayers who made a promise in 2013
and those who did not are statistically significant at the 1% level in both
treatments (CASH PRO and WELL PRO). Our results thus provide evi-
dence for a strong selection effect: taxpayers who paid their taxes punc-
tually in the past are more likely to promise future compliancy. We also,
however, observe a notable increase in compliance for the promise- makers
in the WELL PRO treatment, with a non-parametric test comparing the
average 2010-2012 and 2013 compliance rates revealing a weakly significant
difference (Prtest: z = −1.7756, p = 0.0758 / Chi2: Pearson chi2 = 3.1528,
p = 0.076). In the CASH PRO treatment, on the other hand, compliance
among promise-makers actually decreases without being statistically signif-
icant (Prtest: z = 0.7104, p = 0.4774/ Chi2: chi2 = 0.5407, p = 0.477).
Similar evidence of a selection and commitment effect is also provided by
Koessler et al. (2015)’s laboratory experiment on public good.
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Figure 5.3: Compliance Rates I
Note: This graph shows the average compliance in the past (left bar) and the
intervention year (right bar). The first row shows the compliance of taxpayers in
the Promise Cash treatment group, who either decided against making a promise
(left) or made the compliance promise (right). The second row shows the compliance
of taxpayers in the Promise Wellness treatment group, who either decided against
making a promise (left) or made the compliance promise (right).
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We further control for both individual differences and the policy change that
took place in 2013 by conducting an additional multivariate analysis (see Ta-
ble 5.4), while also probing for a potential reward effect of the promise itself.
To do so, we first estimate the difference in compliance behaviour between
promise- and non-promise-makers in 2013, pooled over the two available
treatment groups (see specification (1)). Being a promise-maker as opposed
to a non-promise-maker (reference group) increases the probability of being
compliant by 33.4 percent (p < 0.001). We then increase the number of ob-
servations, adding in a no-intervention control group as the reference group
(specification (2)). Compared to those in the control group, promise-makers
are 26.3 percent more likely to comply (p < 0.001), while non-promise-
makers have a 7 percent lower compliance probability. In specification (3),
we distinguish between the two types of promise-makers and measure the
behavioural changes in comparison to the control group. Relative to the
latter, promise-makers in the wellness treatment have a higher probability
of compliance than promise-makers in the cash treatment (31 .5 percent as
opposed to 21.4 percent). On the other hand, non-promise-makers in the
wellness treatment report on average lower compliance rates than the ref-
erence group, although the difference is not statistically significant, while
non-promise-makers in the cash treatment have an 8.7 percent lower proba-
bility of compliance than those in the control group. To explore and control
for a selection effect, as well as for the 2013 policy change, in specifica-
tion (4) we include the data from the three pre- experimental years, with
standard errors clustered to take into account individual taxpayer hetero-
geneity. The 2013 coefficient extracts the effect of the new dunning policy
and records a significant increase of 3.27 percent ( p = 0.009). In particular,
promise-makers in 2013 were 26.6 percent (CASH PRO) and 23.4 percent
(WELL PRO) more likely to have paid their tax bill on time in the past
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(both p < 0.001), whereas individuals who decided not to pledge had a
past history of paying their taxes 6.4% and 5.4% less frequently (p = 0.03
for CASH PRO and p = 0.05 for WELL PRO). For the promise-makers
in the WELL PRO treatment, compliance improves by an additional 6.35
percentage points when all the previous factors are considered (p = 0.155).
This behavioural change is weakly significantly different to the behaviour
of the non-promise-makers within the same group (p = 0.1164 for promise-
makers in 2013 vs. non-promise-makers in 2013) and highly significantly
different to the behavioural change of promise-makers in the CASH PRO
group (p = 0.0352 for WELL PRO promise-makers in 2013 vs. CASH
promise-makers in 2013). Thus, compliance in this group decreased by 7%
in 2013 once we take into account the previous selection effect, the policy
change and individual characteristics (p = 0.148). Specification (5) con-
trols for robustness by including demographic characteristics as explanatory
variables10. The results do not change. Our data thus provide not only
empirical support for distinct selection and commitment effects associated
with promises (cf. Koessler et al.s 2015 public good laboratory experiment)
but also indicates that the promise effects differ depending on the reward
offered for compliance.
10Specifically, we control for the level of tax debt; gender; marital status; children; age
(65 + dummy) and whether the registered taxpayer owns a property in the municipality, is
registered as a church member of one of the three local churches and holds Swiss citizenship
(dummy).
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To investigate this reward-dependent difference in more detail and control
for the pure incentive effect of rewards, we conduct an additional step us-
ing only the pure reward treatment groups (Table 5.5). First, we compare
the behavioural changes of the CASH PRO group in 2013 with the CASH
only group as the reference group (see specifications (6) and (7)). On an
aggregate level, the CASH PRO and CASH treatments show no signifi-
cant differences (p = 0.50) (see specification (7)). However, promise-makers
have a 17.2 percent higher probability of being compliant than those in the
CASH reward treatment (p < 0.001), while non-promise-makers have a 12
percent lower probability (p = 0.001). Similarly, in the next two specifica-
tions ((8) and (9)), we explore the difference between the WELLNESS PRO
and WELLNESS only treatment. Again, no differences emerge between the
two treatment groups on an aggregate level (p = 0.182), but promise-makers
and non-promise- makers demonstrate significantly different compliance be-
haviours than the taxpayers in the reward only group. More specifically,
promise-makers have a 28.9 percent higher probability of paying on time
(p < 0.001), while non-promise-makers are 6.4% less likely to pay on time
than the reward only group (p = 0.072).
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Figure 5.4: Compliance Rates II
Note: This graph constitutes the average compliance of taxpayers in the Reward
Promise vs the Reward Only treatment groups. The left bar show the average
compliance before the intervention, the right bar the compliance rate in the inter-
vention year. The first row compares the compliance rates in the Cash Only vs.
Cash Promise treatment group, and distinguishes for the latter for taxpayers who
made the compliance promise. The second row shows the compliance rates in the
Wellness Only vs. Wellness Promise treatment group.
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The following two specifications adjust for selection effects, policy change
and individual characteristics ((10) and (11)). In line with the previous
results, the coefficients of past compliance indicate a selection effect: the
past compliance behaviour in the reward only groups (reward CASH and
reward WELLNESS) is not significantly different from past compliance in
the control group. According to the 2013 coefficient, which extracts the
behavioural changes triggered by the policy change, there is no significant
change in payment behaviour between the CASH only and CASH PRO
groups. However, in the wellness groups, the promise-makers improve their
payment behaviour by an additional 8 percent (p = 0.090). This commit-
ment effect is robust and persists when demographic factors are taken into
account (specification (10); p = 0.10)). Nevertheless, the positive change
observed for the promise-makers versus the control group is not statisti-
cally significantly different from the change observed in the wellness only
group (p = 0.3296 for specification (10) and p = 0.2458 for specification
(11)). In the CASH PRO groups, the decrease in compliance (compared to
the control group) differs from the positive effect of the cash only reward
(p = 0.1609 for specification (10) and p = 0.0886 for specification (11)).
Thus, offering cash rewards for compliance had a positive incentive effect,
but the combination of a promise and a cash reward is less powerful than
the cash reward alone. This finding, which may be due to incentives being
crowded out through over-conditioning, is in line with previous research;
Offering financial rewards can backfire when the recipient perceives them
as compensation rather than acknowledgement (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Deci,
1971).
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5.5 Conclusion
Our understanding of the relevance of promise is quite preliminary. The lim-
ited available evidence comes mostly from laboratory experiments, which are
faced with the problem of external validity. In a novel approach we conduct
a field experiment on the importance of promise as it relates to commitment
to tax compliance. This issue lies at the core of any country’s system of
government. Exploring the relevance of a promise is a challenging prob-
lem though field experiments in tax compliance are becoming increasingly
common. Fortunately, because of the highly decentralized and autonomous
structure of tax administrations in Switzerland, we were able to convince
a tax administration to implement such an experiment. As its conceptual
framework, this field experiment draws on the extant tax compliance litera-
ture, which not only stresses the importance of commitment but focuses its
attention on reciprocity, the rewarding of positive actions by government and
tax authorities with a higher level of taxpayer compliance. Taxpayers thus
react to a perceived situation they experience. Yet, societies remain unsure
of how to promote a pro-active commitment to pay taxes. A first key obser-
vation from our results is a strong selection effect: more compliant taxpayers
are more likely to make a pledge. Promise-makers have around 24 percent
more past compliance than those in the control group, while taxpayers unin-
terested in pledging are significantly less compliant than the reference group.
As pledges are voluntary the policy options of tax administrations are re-
stricted. A second key observation is that the type of reward affects impact
of a promise given: the option of a non-financial reward is more likely to
generate a positive commitment effect than a financial reward, probably be-
cause the willingness to be compliant is crowded out by over-conditioning.
The study is subject to several limitations, including the possibility that
individual taxpayers within the community may have discussed aspects of
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the intervention. This is somewhat unlikely because in Switzerland it cul-
turally discourteous to talk about income or taxes. The intervention in the
context of our field experiment does not seem to have been perceived as
problematic. Official institutions were seldom approached. The tax admin-
istration received only 7 written reactions and 12 phone inquiries. Nor was
there any media or social media coverage that could have contaminated the
field experiment. Given that one study objective was to compare different
types of incentives, any possible communication (if randomly distributed
among treatments) is not necessarily a major shortcoming. Nevertheless,
future studies might employ more widespread stratification of treatments to
ensure identification of the unique effect of each incentive. Conversely, it is
also possible that some taxpayers did not properly read the letters used to
introduce the different treatments, although here again we assume no sys-
tematic differences between the treatment groups. It should also be noted
that Switzerland is highly decentralized and grants its citizens the right to
direct democratic participation, which may directly impact the closeness
between taxpayers and the tax administration and thus affect tax morale.
Our experiment was carried out in an environment of high social control and
identification with the community, leading to a high level of general compli-
ance and a particularly high tax compliance rate (Torgler et al., 2010). As
a result there could be a ceiling effect in which additional supportive incen-
tives can only have a small effect. On other hand, encouraging individuals
to pro-actively pledge to be compliant can be problematic if government
institutions work poorly. Thus, a certain level of reciprocity or government
quality may be required to introduce an oath or pledge. Further research
is therefore needed to determine how such instruments shape tax compli-
ance in other countries where tax compliance is low and the setting is more
anonymous. Finally, an issue may be that the tax administration offers
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rewards for fulfilling a civic duty and statutory obligation. To take this con-
cern into account and strengthen the tax administration’s credibility, future
field experiments might offer local community rewards such as free access to
public swimming pools or other public infrastructures, which carry no addi-
tional costs and are directly related to pre-tax revenues. The instrument of
promise is an interesting avenue to consider because it aims to strengthen the
psychological contract between taxpayers and the tax authority. Moreover,
society is already familiar with many professional examples of compulsory
promise statements, including the Hippocratic oath taken by doctors. In-
deed, following the financial crises, there have been calls for similar ethical
declarations by managers or bankers (Boatright, 2013; DeMartino, 2010).
The question is whether it makes sense to require compulsory promises or
whether individuals can choose to make or not to make a promise. Our
study suggests that tax administrations can to some extent rely on promises
made voluntarily by its citizens.
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Chapter 6
General Conclusion
6.1 Motivation
Co-ordination problems pervade social interactions in every dimension of our
daily life. Thomas Schelling, Nobel laureate of the year 2005, applied game
theory to real life co-ordination problems to gain a better understanding of
the conflicts involved. In his opinion, communication is a powerful alterna-
tive to strong regulations and legal constitutes to overcome co-ordination
problems (Schelling, 1989). Promises and threats are, according to his view,
commitment devices in two different forms. Promises carry out a positive
framing of conditional actions, whereas threats work with a fear component.
But both messages are, following Schelling, a self-selected self-commitment,
whose effectiveness depend on the credibility of the declaration made. Psy-
chological theories, like the commitment theory and the cognitive dissonance
theory, state in this context that the effectiveness of these statements of in-
tent is derived from an individual’s want to behave consistently. The act
of promising creates a binding function for the promisor (Festinger, 1957;
Kiesler, 1971). Other studies found the motivation for promise keeping more
in an external dimension; statements create expectations in others and the
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promise-makers feels guilty when not living up to these expectations1.
Finally, a wide branch of empirical studies, mainly laboratory experiments,
demonstrates that communication, and promises in particular, are a pow-
erful instrument to help to overcome co-ordination problems (Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008). Hence,
talk is not cheap, also not, opposing to the assumptions of standard economic
theory, in settings of anonymous one-shot interactions.
Based on these insights, this thesis explored non-binding statements as a pos-
sible way to promote social behaviour in economic decision making. Three
studies were presented, applying conceptual and methodological insights
from behavioural and experimental economics.
In the following section the three studies are summarised and their con-
tribution to existing knowledge highlighted. In the section after, possible
implications for policy are derived, before the thesis concludes with an out-
look on potential future research.
6.2 Summary
The first study was motivated by the practice of using codes of conduct,
which are introduced in certain professions to strengthen professional in-
tegrity. The ambition of this study was to explore the effect of public state-
ments in social dilemma situations and contrast compulsory with voluntary
pledges. It has been shown that publicly stated intentions towards a group,
a novel characteristic of our study, created a commitment for the players;
contributions to the common increased significantly due to the statement.
In the voluntary treatment condition, subjects who behaved in a more so-
cially oriented manner in the past, were more likely to make a promise. We
called this the selection effect; previous studies have missed to control for
1Please see the literature review in section 2 for a comprehensive discussion
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such endogeneity. However, subjects who made a promise, also increased
their contributions additionally after the pledge. These findings provide
solid evidence that statements of intent indeed create a commitment for
promise-makers, and are not only due to a selection process.
In a treatment comparison, the voluntary choice to make a statement was
contrasted with a treatment condition, in which the statement about social
oriented, future behaviour was compulsory. This condition corresponds with
the observation from businesses, in which the pledge of codes of conduct is
usually obligatory. Following the reinforcement theory, one might predict
that the compulsory statement is not as effective. Then important feature
for an effective commitment is, according to Kiesler (1971), the autonomous
choice to commit. However, our results from this study demonstrate that
individual contributions to the commons were higher, on an aggregate level,
in the compulsory group. We argued that the statement derives its effec-
tiveness in the compulsory condition through the assurance that everyone
has to sign up for the same ’rules’. From a co-ordination perspective this
is more powerful than if only a few declare that they will behave according
to the code of good conduct. The compulsory statement creates a common
norm for desired behaviour. Our findings thus suggest also obligatory codes
of conduct can promote socially oriented behaviour in organisations.
A potential limitation of this study and the observed effectiveness of state-
ments of intent, lies in the temporal dimension. In our study we repeated
interactions for ten rounds, and the positive shift, initiated by the pledges,
was maintained, but it is unclear what would have happened to the effect
after a longer period of time. This is certainly a relevant question, especially
when we think about oaths and codes of conduct that are pledged at the
entrance into a profession, but one which is left for future research.
The second study in this thesis aimed to explore the relativity of social
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choices and tested whether promises are an effective way to foster social
behaviour in conditions of uncertainty. In a modified version of the trust
game we gave subjects the option to make a promise for choosing a socially
oriented option later in the game; but the commitment was made without
the promise-maker knowing the material benefit that the alternative, self-
serving option would offer. Consequently and in contrast to existing studies,
the costs for keeping a promise could not be foreseen in our design. We
expected that ergo a form of ex-post maneuvering would happen in the
decision situation. Throughout the experiment we measured the heart rate
of the participants, and found that the LF/HF ratio, a recognised measure
for mental stress, is indeed significantly higher in the decision situation. This
observation indicates that our design successfully disentangled the moment
of promise-making from the decision of whether to keep or break a promise.
In the behavioural choices subjects reacted linearly in their decisions to the
cost determinant, when no promise was previously made; i.e. the higher
the benefit was the self-serving option offered, the more likely it was that
a subject chose this option. Promise-makers instead reacted less variant to
changes in the payoff function. The majority resisted material gains and kept
the promise by deciding for the social option. In conclusion, a voluntarily
made promise helps to co-ordinate, even in a situation of uncertainty, be-
cause it increases the predictability of behaviour. Promise-keepng is hereby
motivated by the aversion of inner tension or stress. For subjects who broke
their promise, we could observe high stress levels. And the LF/HF values
were stronger, the more the realised payoffs deviated from the promised
allocation.
The limitations of this study are twofold. First, breaking a promise and thus
obtaining higher payoffs, implies in this study always diminishing payoffs for
the interaction partner. Our design did not allow us to distinguish whether
6.2. SUMMARY 181
a promise is kept due to lying aversion and other regarding preferences.
Secondly, in real world scenarios, where reputation and future interactions
also play a role, a clear trade-off between promise keeping and material
benefits, like in this study, do not exist. In most settings promise keeping
might also be financially beneficial, since it secures future interactions.
The third study investigated a possible application for moral commitments.
In order to acknowledge and promote the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes
without undermining intrinsic motivation, we tested the incentive effect of
small rewards for tax compliance. In collaboration with a Swiss tax author-
ity, we conducted a field experiment in the natural setting of tax payments.
In two conditions, the taxpayers were additionally asked to make the promise
to pay the taxes punctually in the following year. In these conditions, the
reward could only be obtained when the promise was made and the tax
payments were also made correctly.
Overall, the intervention was found to have a small, but positive effect.
In the two promise conditions, it has been shown that promises can be a
useful tool with which to gain a better understanding of future payment.
Taxpayers who accurately paid their taxes in the past, were more likely to
make the promise. This finding provides external validity to the selection
effect we have identified in the first study of this thesis. But these taxpayers,
similar to in the laboratory, additionally improved their payment behaviour.
We called this commitment effect in the first study. However, the effect was
only found when a non-monetary reward was offered for compliance. With
the cash incentive, on the opposite, less accurate payments were observed.
We argued that the lack of improvement is likely due to a crowding out of
initial intrinsic motivation. The study concluded that conditional rewards
need to be selected with care and be pre-tested in the respective field.
It is to note, that this study has been conducted in the environment of a
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highly decentralised political system, in which social distance is little and
tax compliance generally high. The findings need to be therefore taken as
indicative and further testing in the field is needed to make general assump-
tions.
6.3 Policy Implications
The aim of this research was to explore alternatives to strong regulations
and monitoring, which are likely to crowd out intrinsic motivation and trust.
Non-binding moral statements have been implemented in scenarios of so-
cial dilemmas, co-ordination problems and tax payments to gain a better
understanding of the effect of moral commitments and test how varying
characteristics influence this effect.
To understand the novelty of this approach, it is worth discussing first how
economics commonly relates to policy practice.
Traditionally policy recommendations are derived on the foundation of stan-
dard economic models. In such models human behaviour is sketched with
decisions of rational, perfectly informed actors who pursue their self-interest.
Along this line, societies rely on regulations and enforcement to harness the
pursuit of self-interest and enable a living side-by-side possible. (Business)
interactions, for instance, need to be organised in contracts defining every
dimension of a trade, and contract compliance is generally reached by the
threat of detection and punishment. In reality, contracts defining each even-
tuality in a trade are non-existent and information asymmetries are ubiq-
uitous. Trade, however, frequently arises in practice, based on the vague
structure of incomplete contracts. This observation stands in contrast to
the predictions of standard economic models. Then according to this view,
regulations and fines need to be installed when information asymmetries are
present, so that selfish individuals do not exploit the information asymme-
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tries.
In practise nonetheless, these forms of close monitoring and strict enforce-
ment are highly costly and also not always possible in practice (Bohnet et al.,
2001; Irlenbusch, 2006). Moreover, taking the observations of practice into
account, one might think of the symbolic handshake, which seals the business
deal between two honourable merchants, the question becomes prominent
whether strong control and deterrence mechanism are really needed and
second whether such mechanisms are actually beneficial in practice. Ev-
idence in psychological and behavioural economic studies finally supports
these doubts. It could be shown that deterrence policies potentially crowd
out intrinsic motivation for pro-social behaviour (Deci, 1971; Frey and Je-
gen, 2001; Benabou and Tirole, 2003) and in contractual contexts, strong
enforcement policies and explicit incentives for compliance lead to a non-
monotonic effect on the trustworthiness of actors (Bohnet et al., 2001; Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006). Based on these findings, this thesis was motivated
by the attempt to explore alternatives of strong regulations and punishment.
The exploration of alternative policies in such a direction, can be especially
relevant for professions that are strongly relying on the intrinsic motivation
and integrity of the actors within a profession. Jobs in the educational, so-
cial and health sector provide good examples. The quality of work in these
jobs is difficult to assess: standardised and catalogised work tasks are not
practical, and final outcomes depend not only on the effort of the employee,
but also strongly on external, unobservable factors, e.g. the willingness of
a client to collaborate. Performance-based contracts and strict regulations
are not suitable for an environment influenced by information asymmetries
in such a strong manner. Fixed salaries, based on trust, in combination with
moral commitments, as discussed in this thesis, might be instead the way
to go and an approach which supports the mission orientation of employees.
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A prominent example for moral commitments in practise is the Hippocratic
Oath for doctors; but also codes of good conduct in normal business com-
panies might strengthen the professional integrity, without undermining the
intrinsic work motivation of employees.
In the following, three findings from this thesis are listed, that are potentially
insightful for policy practise.
First, it has been shown that public statements of intent, like those used in
oaths or codes of conduct, have a positive effect on social behaviour. This
work and previous studies have shown that individuals interpret promises in
conflictual situations as a serious attempt to co-ordinate and that individuals
making a promise are more likely to act in a trustworthy manner and live up
to their word. Hence, statements of intent can, especially in situations with
co-ordination problems and uncertainty, ease co-operation and exchange.
Second, it has been shown that the effect of the statements is twofold: first,
the statement creates a moral commitment for the actor who experiences
emotional costs when acting against the stated intentions. Psychological
theories suggested in this context that the effect is strongest when the indi-
vidual makes an autonomous choice for the commitment. In this thesis we
found contrary evidence. In a social dilemma experiment higher levels of co-
operation were found in conditions with compulsory pledges. This finding
is an indication for a second effect that takes place when individuals make a
declaration about future behaviour; the assurance that everyone in a group
pledged to act socially, is a powerful co-ordination device and makes social
behaviour more salient. For practice, compulsory codes of good conduct can
thus be a way, in situations where co-ordination is crucial, to induce social
norms of desired behaviour and promote co-operation.
Nonetheless, the strongest effect of policies using statements of intent is
expected when the voluntary element of a pledge is preserved, but the design
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of a code is such that as many individuals as possible want to make a pledge.
In the next section ’directions for future research’ concrete design suggestions
will be discussed.
In a last step this thesis applied insights on moral commitments to a real
world setting. In the setting of tax payments, promises and supportive
incentives were offered to motivate compliance. The study shows hereby
that the possibilities to encourage compliance are not exhausted in practice
yet.
While marketing practice widely exploited the psychological power of com-
mitments, one might think of the so called foot-in-door technique, has gov-
ernance practice, to my knowledge, not taken up this approach yet. A dis-
cussion of potential benefits and risks of such a form of ’nudging’ in policy
contexts might be worthwhile to undertake. Whether non-binding state-
ments of intent can be a way to promote collaboration between citizens and
government agencies is thus left for future research. For potential interven-
tions, however, it will be essential that the individuals do not feel pressured
to make a statement of future intended behaviour. In our studies, we there-
fore offered taxpayers an incentive: the rewards served as a reason why to
make and fulfill the promise about future compliance. Since every exter-
nal intervention runs the risk to undermine feelings of self-determination or
overlay civic duty feeling, it is suggested for practitioners to select and im-
plement the incentives with great care. Based on the research undertaken,
I suggest for future interventions small non-financial rewards, that have a
clear reference to the community and tax-payments for future investigations;
like free entry for the communal pool, for museums or free public transport.
But in all cases, pre-tests on how the rewards are perceived in the concrete,
respective setting are strongly recommended.
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6.4 Directions for Future Research
Two directions for future research arise from this work; first, research ques-
tions that suggest an investigation in the controlled setting of laboratory
experiments, and second, work that explores further the effectiveness of
non-binding statements in the field.
Regarding the first category, it has been shown in this thesis that the ef-
fect of non-binding statements is twofold. Statements of intent motivated
pro-social behaviour in public good games through internal motives, this
was called commitment effect and on the other side, through the informa-
tion on others’ intentions, this was called co-ordination effect. For future
research, it is now an interesting task to develop mechanisms maintaining
the autonomous choice character of a code, but at the same time to moti-
vate as many individuals as possible to pledge the code of good conduct.
Possible experimental designs could for example alternate the choice order,
instead of letting subjects decide simultaneously about making a pledge, the
decision could be elicited sequentially. It is likely that then social pressure
arises to publicly declare future social actions. This potentially increases
the numbers of pledge takers, but it is unclear how such a procedure would
influence the commitment effect.
Another question worth exploring is based on the fact that a substantial
number of subjects are conditional co-operators in public good games. These
players alternate their contributions after they have learned about the con-
tributions of the others. The introduction of a code of good conduct did not
visibly influence this pattern. Hence the question arises, whether a potential
commitment effect of the statement is corrupted by the exposure of others’
behaviour. An interesting modification to look thus at in future is, how a
statement about intended behaviour influences the behaviour, when no in-
formation is provided on who else pledged the code of good conduct. This
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comparison of public and private statements would also provide important
insights to the question, of how strong the commitment effect is, when the
declaration to act socially is made without a witness. This could ultimately
contribute to the discussion about the pure intrinsic motivation to keep a
promise.
The second direction for future research leads to the field and possible appli-
cations of moral commitments in real world scenarios. In this thesis state-
ment of intent have been used to promote tax compliance, but areas of
compliance interest can also imply water consumption, CO2 emissions, re-
cycling, etc. . Moreover, since the field experiment has been conducted in
a setting with already high general compliance, future work is encouraged
to test such supportive interventions also in countries, in which tax morale
is traditionally low. In settings where tax payments are not understood as
a civic duty, but rather as a waste of resources, feeding a corrupt govern-
ment system, the results of such interventions might be very different. For
example is the risk of undermining intrinsic motivation to pay taxes in such
settings very low and monetary rewards or status incentives might be better
instruments to motivate compliance.
In conclusion, this thesis was motivated by the attempt to explore alterna-
tives of strong regulations and punishment. Statements of intent were offered
as a possible co-ordination device in conflictual decision situations and it has
been demonstrated that such statements can be effective in promoting social
behaviour, on one hand due to moral motives and on the other hand, by
facilitating co-ordination through information. Based on these and previous
findings, it can be concluded that relying on honesty and trust (Hodgson,
2012) in business or governance relationships, is not necessarily a negative
feature. It may instead strengthen the intrinsic motivation of actors to act
in a fair, honest and trustworthy manner.
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Chapter 8
Appendix
8.1 Appendix Project 1: OATH
Subject pool
Table 8.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Econ 0.56 0.50 0 1 192
Undergrad 0.85 0.23 0 1 192
Female 0.46 0.50 0 1 192
Age 22.60 6.35 17 63 192
Income 171.53 16.05 50 1000 144
Finsat 0.32 0.468 0 1 175
lessRelig 4.43 1.55 1 6 175
CRT 1.21 1.12 0 3 192
SRM 5.83 1.51 4 11 191
SDS 4.43 2.35 0 11 190
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Raw Data
Figure 8.1: Average Contributions per Treatment group
Note: This figure presents the average contributions per round in all three treat-
ments.
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Figure 8.3: Average Contributions per Form of Oath-takers
Note: This figure presents the average contributions per round. Contribution of
subjects who decided for and against the statement in the voluntary treatment are
plotted separately.
214 CHAPTER 8. APPENDIX
Demographics
Table 8.2: Demographics over Treatment groups
Treatment Group
Control Voluntary Compulsory Total
Econ-Fin-Bus (%) 57.8 54.7 56.3 56.3
Undergrad (%) 92.2 84.4 78.1 84.9
Female (%) 45.3 45.3 48.4 46.4
Av. Age 22.94 23.64 22.23 22.93
Av. Income 174.44 169.79 170.59 170.53
Finsat 0.29 0.34 0.33 0.32
lessRelig 4.40 4.63 4.27 4.43
CRT 0.95 1.34 1.33 1.21
SRM 5.67 5.86 5.97 5.83
SDS 4.27 4.46 4.57 4.43
N 64 63 63 190*
* Two subjects did not answer the psychological questionnaires.
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Punishment Behaviour
Table 8.3: Punishment points received
Punishment points received (mean)
Contributions
CONTROL VOLUNTARY COMPULSORY Total
Punish No Oath Oath Total
0 0.6 3.6 2.9 3.3 4.9 2.9
1 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.8
2 0.3 3.8 1.0 3.3 2.0 2.3
3 3.5 3.5 3.5
4 2.4 1.0 0.0 0.7 1.8
5 1.6 4.0 2.3 3.7 7.0 2.8
6 0.5 6.7 0.0 5.0 9.0 3.4
7 1.5 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.5
8 0.4 3.0 3.0 1.5
9 0.1 1.3 2.0 1.5 0.5
10 0.3 1.2 1.4 1.2 4.5 0.8
11 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.4
12 0.2 1.5 1.0 1.4 0.8
13 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.3 5.0 0.2
14 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.1 4.0 1.3
15 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
16 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.0
17 3.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 0.9 1.5
18 6.0 0.0 1.3 1.1 0.5 0.7
19 0.0 1.3 1.0 1.5 1.4
20 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5
Total 0.5 1.6 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0
Note: This table shows the average punishment points received for each contribution level, depending
on the treatment group and whether the subjects made the oath.
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8.1.1 INSTRUCTIONS
Section 1: BASELINE
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. Please read the follow-
ing instructions carefully. Depending on your decisions and those made by the
other participants, you can earn a substantial amount of money. It is therefore
important that you take your time to understand the instructions.
Please note that all information provided during the experiment is treated con-
fidentially. You are not allowed to communicate with the other participants
during the experiment. If you have any questions now or during the experiment,
please indicate this by raising your hand.
Independent of your behaviour in the experiment, you receive 5 AUD for showing
up.
In the experiment we use ECUs (Experimental Currency Units) as the monetary
unit. Profits during the experiment will be converted from ECUs into Australian
Dollars and added to your show up fee.
The exchange rate complies
5 Experimental Currency Unit = 1 AUD
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Game Structure
The experiment is divided in three sections. Each section is seen as independent
and decisions from a previous section do not affect the possibilities or payments
in a latter section of the experiment. At the beginning of every section the
participants will be randomly matched into groups of 4. You will be therefore in
a group with 3 other participants. The groups will remain the same throughout
each section of the experiment.
Each section lasts for 10 periods.
Payment
The sections last for 10 periods. At the end of every section one round of the
10 rounds will be chosen by a random draw, which determines your payoff for
this section.
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Contribution Stage
As mentioned before you will be a member of a group consisting of 4 people.
At the beginning of each round each participant receives 20 ECUs and has to
decide what to do with them.
You have to determine how many of the 20 ECUs you want to contribute to a
project and how many of them to keep for yourself. The consequences of your
decision are explained in detail below.
project income = 0.4 *(sum of contributions of all 4 group members)
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same
way. This means that each group member receives the same income from the
project.
Example: Suppose the sum of the contribution of all group members is 60 ECUs,
then each group member receives an income from the project of 0.4 ∗ 60 = 24
ECUs. If the sum of all contributions is 9, then every member receives an income
of 0.4 ∗ 9 = 3.6 ECUs from the project.
Once all the players have decided their contribution to the project you will be
informed about the group’s total contribution and your personal total income
from this round.
Total Income
Your total income consists of two parts. First the ECUs which you have kept
for yourself and second the income from the project.
Your total income per round can be thus written as:
total income = (20 - your contribution to the project) + 0.4* (sum of contri-
butions of all 4 group members)
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You have always the option of keeping the ECU for yourself or contributing
them to the project. Each ECU that you keep raises your total income by 1
ECU. Supposing you contributed this point to the project instead, then the
total contribution to the project would rise by 1 ECU. Your income from the
project would rise by 0.4∗1 = 0.4 ECU. However, the income of the other group
members would also rise by 0.4 ECU each, so that total income of the group
from the project would be 1.6 points. Your contribution to the project therefore
raises the income of the other group members.
On the other hand you also earn an income for each point contributed by the
other members to the project. In particular, for each point contributed by any
member you earn 0.4 ECU.
To make a contribution to the project, type a number between 0 and 20 in
the input field. Then you have to press the Continue button. After that your
decision cannot be revised anymore.
Once everyone in the group made her/his decision, you will learn how much
each group member contributed to the project and what your payoff will be, if
this is the round is chosen by a random draw as the payoff round.
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Practice Round for Contribution Stage
Let’s practice the Contribution Stage, where you decide how you want to allocate
your endowment of 20 ECUs. Please answer therefore the following questions.
They will help you to gain an understanding of the calculation of your income
per round.
Remember your total income from the contribution stage is calculated as total
income = 20 - your contribution to the project + 0.4 * (sum of all contributions)
1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. Nobody (including
yourself) contributes any point to the project.
• How high is your total income ?
• What is the income of each other group members ?
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 20
points to the project at the first stage. All other group members contribute
20 ECUs each to the project.
• What is your total income ?
• How high is the income of each other group members ?
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. The other three
group members contribute together a total of 30 ECUs to the project.
• What is your total income if you contribute 0 ECUs
to the project ?
• What is your total income if you contribute 15 ECUs
to the project ?
4. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 8
ECUs to the project.
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• What is your total income if the other group members together
contribute 3, 0 and 4 ECUs to the project ?
• What is your total income if the other group members together
contribute 16, 12 and 4 ECUs to the project ?
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Belief Stage
After you made your own contribution, we ask you to guess what the contribu-
tion of the other group members is. Please enter what you think the contribution
of each single group member will be.
Next we ask you what you think what the other players’ best guess about your
contribution is. For both guesses you can also earn money. Your payoff depends
on the distance between your best guess and the actual contribution of the
player/ the player’s guess about your contribution. The following payment rule
is applied:
Your best guess is
• exactly right you receive 10 ECUS
• deviates by 1 point you receive 9 ECUS
• deviates by 2 points you receive 6 ECUS
• deviates by 3 points you receive 1 ECUs
At the end of the section one round will be randomly chosen for which you get
paid for the accuracy of your guesses.
Example: Suppose your guess about Player’s 2 contribution in round 6 is chosen
randomly as payoff determining. Your best guess about Player’s 2 contribution
was 13, but his actual contribution is 12. Following the payment rule you get 9
ECUs for the accuracy of your best guess.
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Practice Round for Belief Stage
Let’s practice now the belief stage, where you have to guess what the other
player did. Please answer the following questions. Remember:
If your guess is exactly right, you receive 10 ECUs from this stage.
If your guess deviates by 1 point, you receive 9 ECUs.
If your guess deviates by 2 point, you receive 6 ECUs.
If your guess deviates by 3 point, you receive 1 ECUs.
If your guess deviates by more than 3 points, you receive 0 ECUs.
Your best guess about the other players’ contributions:
Assume Player 2’s contribution has been selected as the payoff determining
entry. Following the payoff rule for the belief stage (see above), you have to
compare his actual contribution with your guess about his contribution.
1. Your best guess about his contribution was 12, Player 2’s actual contri-
bution was 12.
How many ECUs will you receive?
2. Your best guess about his contribution was 2, but Player 2’s actual con-
tribution was 18.
How many ECUs will you receive?
3. Your best guess about his contribution was 8, but Player 2’s actual con-
tribution was 10.
How many ECUs will you receive?
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Your belief about the others’ best guess about your contribution: Here
we ask you to state what you believe about what the other players’ best guess
about your contribution will be. Following the payoff rule for the belief stage,
you have to compare his actual guess about your contribution with your belief
about his best guess.
1. Player 3’s best guess about your contribution was 8, but you stated
he will guess 16.
How much ECUs do you receive from the second belief stage?
2. Player 3’s best guess about your contribution was 8, but you stated
he will guess 7.
How much ECUs do you receive from the second belief stage?
3. Player 3’s best guess about your contribution was 8, but you stated
he will guess 11.
How much ECUs do you receive from the second belief stage?
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Figure 8.5: Screenshot: Enter Contribution
Figure 8.6: Screenshot: Enter Beliefs
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Section 2: VOLUNTARY STATEMENT
In the second section you need to make the same decisions as in the first
section. Again you have to decide how much you want to contribute from
your endowment of 20 ECUs to a project and how much you want to keep for
yourself.
You are matched with a different group of 3 people than in the previous section.
You will remain in this group for all rounds of Section 2.
Section 2 has 10 rounds.
This section differs slightly from what you have done so far. You now have
the possibility to make a statement about your intended behaviour in Section 2.
The statement outlines social behaviour in the given context and is non-binding.
If you want to make the statement, you click Yes and you confirm your intention
by writing down the statement in the designated box on the following page. If
you do not want to make the statement you click on No.
Your decision on the statement, does not restrict your range of choices later on.
Once all the players have decided if they want to make the statement or not,
you will learn who made the statement in your group.
The following statement is offered to describe your intended behaviour for the
entire Second Section.
I promise to contribute each round at least 15 ECUs to the project.
Do you want to make this statement? [Yes, No]
Please be aware that everyone has to enter a text in the next stage, regardless
if he/she made the statement or not.
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You have decided that you want to make the statement. Therefore please type
the statement in the designated box.
Alternatively: Please type the following text in the designated box. I am a
voluntary participant in this experiment, no coercion or interference has taken
place.
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COMPULSORY STATEMENT
In the second section you need to make the same decisions as in the first
section. Again you have to decide how much you want to contribute from
your endowment of 20 ECUs to a project and how much you want to keep for
yourself.
You are matched with a different group of 3 people than in the previous section.
You will remain in this group for all rounds of Section 2.
Section 2 has 10 rounds.
This section of the experiment differs slightly from what you have done so far.
You now have to make a statement about your intended behaviour in Section
2 before you can enter the section . The statement outlines social behaviour in
the given context and is non-binding.
You confirm your intention by writing down the statement in the designated box
on the following page. The statement does not restrict your range of choices
later on.
Once all the players have written down the statement the game continues.
The following statement shall describe your intended behaviour for the entire
Second Section.
I promise to contribute each round at least 15 ECUs to the project.
Please be aware that everyone has to enter the text in the next stage.
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Figure 8.7: Screenshot: Decide Statement
Figure 8.8: Screenshot: Enter Statement
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Section 3: STATEMENT & PUNISHMENT
In the third section you need to make the same decisions as before. Once again
you have the possibility to make a statement about your intended behaviour in
Section 3 before you enter the contribution stage.
For Compulsory: Once again you have to make a statement about your
intended behaviour in Section 3 before you can enter the contribution stage.
You are again matched with a different group of 3 people than in the previous
sections. You will remain in this group for all rounds of Section 3.
Section 3 has 10 rounds.
In addition you now have the possibility to decrease the earnings of the other
group members after they made their contributions.
(Details are explained on the next page.)
Distributing points
Once everyone learned how much each group member contributed,you can de-
cide if you want to reduce the income of the other group members or leave it
equal. The other group member can also reduce your income if they wish to.
To reduce another player’s income you have to distribute points. Each point
will cost you 1 ECU and will reduce the income of the other person you assign
it to by 2 ECU. If you choose 0 points for a particular group member you do
not change his or her income. You can distribute between 0 and 5 points per
group member .
The following table illustrates the relation between distributed points to each
group member (what you pay for them) and the effect on the payoffs of others.
Supposing you give 2 points to one member this costs you 2 ECUs and reduces
his/her payoff by 4. The total reduction for any player depends on the points
that the player received from the rest of the group. If somebody received a total
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Table 8.4: Distributing Points
cost of points for you 0 1 2 3 4 5
reduce of other group member’s payoff 0 2 4 6 8 10
of 3 points (from all other group members in this period) his or her income would
be reduced by 6 ECUs.
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Your total income from the two stages is calculated as follows:
total income = income from the 1st stage - points you receive - points you
distribute
After all participants have made their decisions, your final income from the
period will be displayed on the screen. Please note that your income in ECUs
at the end of the period can be negative.
Practice Questions for Points
Let’s practice this new stage. You income varies now with your distribution as
well as with your receipt of points. Remember every distributed point costs you
1 ECU, every received point decreases your income by a multiple of 2.
1. You distributed the following points to your three group members: 5, 3, 1
- What are the total costs of your distributed points?
2. You distributed the following points to your three group members: 0, 0, 0
- What are the total costs of your distributed points?
3. You received a total of 0 points from the three group members.
- By how many ECUs will your income from the first stage be reduced?
4. You received a total of 8 points from the other three group members.
- By how many ECUs will your income from the first stage be reduced?
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8.2 Appendix Project 2: HRV
8.2.1 Analysis – Behavioural Data
’Free Promise’ treatment group
Figure 8.9: Behavioural Data: Free Promise
Note: This graph displays the frequency of how often subjects chose the Social
Option in the ’Free Promise’ treatment group. On the left side is the frequency
displayed for subjects who decided against a promise, on the right side for subjects
who made a promise.
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Table 8.5: Free Promise – Probit Models: Social Choices
(1) (2)
Social Choice Social Choice
Surplus -0.160** -0.283***
(0.0623) (0.0756)
Surplus X Surplus 0.0115** 0.0214***
(0.00451) (0.00522)
Free Promise 0.215** -0.354
(0.0909) (0.355)
Free Promise X Surplus 0.219**
(0.111)
Free Promise X Surplus X Surplus -0.0175**
(0.00818)
Observations 357 357
Standard errors, clustered on individual level, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table presents the marginal effects (calculated at the means of all variables)
from probit regressions on the likelihood that a subject chooses the Social Option in the
’Free Promise’ treatment.
We are controlling for the magnitude of the gain the Self-Serving Option is offering (wd-
Surplus) and the incremental change in this gain (Surplus X Surplus). Free Promise is
a dummy variable, which becomes one when the subject made a promise. The variables
Free Promise X Surplus and Free Promise X Surplus X Surplus are the corresponding
interactions with the promise making variable.
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’Select Promise’ treatment group
Figure 8.10: Behavioural Data: Select Promise
Note: This graph displays the frequency of how often subjects chose the Social
Option in the ’Select Promise’ treatment group. On the left side is the frequency
displayed for subjects who decided for a restricted promise, on the right side for
subjects who made the promise to always choose the Social Option.
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Figure 8.11: Behavioural Data: Select, 7 Promises
Note: This graph displays the frequency of how often subjects chose the Social
Option for each promise form in the ’Select Promise’ treatment group.
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8.2.2 Analysis – Physical Data
Figure 8.12: HRV Select Promise: Promise Stage
Note: This graph displays the average LF/HF ratio during the promise stage of
subjects in the ’Select Promise’ treatment who later chose the Self-Serving Option
(left bar) or the Social Option (right bar). The picture on the left displays the
average LF/HF ratio of the restricted promise-makers, on the right are the average
LF/HF ratio for the comprehensive promise-makers, who stated to always choose
the Social Option.
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8.2.3 Instructions
8.2.4 Instructions (FREE)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment
is to study how people make decisions. In case you should have questions at
any time, please raise your hand. Please do not speak to other participants
during the experiment and please turn off your mobile phone. We also ask you
not to reveal any details about the experiment after you have participated. You
will receive $5 for arriving on time and $5 for wearing the heart rate monitor.
Depending on your decisions and the decisions of other participants, you will
receive an additional amount (see below). At the end of the experiment, you
can collect the final amount in cash privately in a sealed envelope from the
School of Economics and Finance front office.
This session consists of 20 rounds. In each round you will interact with another
randomly chosen participant. No participant will ever know the identity of the
person with whom he or she is paired. At the end of the session one round is
randomly chosen as the round that will be paid.
TASK DESCRIPTION
At the start of the experiment each participant will be randomly assigned to
role Player A or Player B. You will stay in the same role for the duration of
the experiment. In each round one participant with the role Player A is paired
with another participant with the role Player B. The amount of money you earn
depends on the decision made within your pair. Player A is the first mover.
They have to decide whether they want to interact with Player B or not. The
consequences of these decisions are as follows:
• If Player A decides not to interact (move OUT) the game is over.
Player A then receives $7 from this round, while Player B receives nothing.
• If Player A decides to interact (move IN) then Player B is asked to
decide between two options, EQUAL SPLIT or UNEQUAL SPLIT.
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The consequences of the two are then as follows:
– EQUAL SPLIT: each player receives $10
– UNEQUAL SPLIT: $20 will be unequally allocated between the two
players. The unequal split valid for the respective round is randomly
determined by the computer. Each of the following allocations comes
up with the same probability:
(Player A / Player B):
($0 / $20), ($2 / $18), ($4 / $16) ,($6 / $14), ($8 / $12), ($12 /
$8)
When Player A decides between IN and OUT they do not know which unequal
payoff is valid for the respective round. The computer determines the unequal
split valid for the respective round after Player A has made their choice.
Player B sees first Player A’s choice and then learns about the unequal split
effective for the respective round. If Player A has chosen OUT Player B has no
decision to make and both players learn their payoffs (Player A $7 and Player
B $0) for this round. If Player A has chosen IN Player B now decides between
LEFT and RIGHT knowing the consequences of each of these options for both
players. After Player B has made his decision, the interaction in this round is
over and both players learn their payoffs from this round.
A new pair of players will then be matched together for the next round.
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MESSAGE
Before the 5th round starts Player B can make a promise.
This message is valid for 4 rounds and will be displayed to each Player
A before she makes the decision whether to interact or not. Before the
9th, the 13th and the 17th round starts Player B can make a new statement
which is then again valid for the next four rounds and will again be displayed to
the Player A of the respective round. Please recall that a new pair of players is
matched together for each round.
The promise option will be given from the 5th round on, which means that the
first 4 rounds will be played without a promise.
Please note that you have for each of your choices 30 sec. time to make a
decision (except for the message stage). If you do not make a decision in
this time, the computer automatically distributes a zero payoff for you and a
compensation payoff for the other player.
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8.2.5 Instructions (SELECT)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment
is to study how people make decisions. In case you should have questions at
any time, please raise your hand. Please do not speak to other participants
during the experiment and please turn off your mobile phone. We also ask you
not to reveal any details about the experiment after you have participated. You
will receive $5 for arriving on time and $5 for wearing the heart rate monitor.
Depending on your decisions and the decisions of other participants, you will
receive an additional amount (see below). At the end of the experiment, you
can collect the final amount in cash privately in a sealed envelope from the
School of Economics and Finance front office.
This session consists of 20 rounds. In each round you will interact with another
randomly chosen participant. No participant will ever know the identity of the
person with whom he or she is paired. At the end of the session one round is
randomly chosen as the round that will be paid.
TASK DESCRIPTION
At the start of the experiment each participant will be randomly assigned to
role Player A or Player B. You will stay in the same role for the duration of
the experiment. In each round one participant with the role Player A is paired
with another participant with the role Player B. The amount of money you earn
depends on the decision made within your pair. Player A is the first mover.
They have to decide whether they want to interact with Player B or not. The
consequences of these decisions are as follows:
• If Player A decides not to interact (move OUT) the game is over.
Player A then receives $7 from this round, while Player B receives nothing.
• If Player A decides to interact (move IN) then Player B is asked to
decide between two options, EQUAL SPLIT or UNEQUAL SPLIT.
The consequences of the two are then as follows:
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– EQUAL SPLIT: each player receives $10
– UNEQUAL SPLIT: $20 will be unequally allocated between the two
players. The unequal split valid for the respective round is randomly
determined by the computer.
Each of the following allocations comes up with the same probability:
(Player A / Player B):
($0 / $20), ($2 / $18), ($4 / $16) ,($6 / $14), ($8 / $12), ($12 / $8)
When Player A decides between IN and OUT they do not know which unequal
payoff is valid for the respective round. The computer determines the unequal
split valid for the respective round after Player A has made their choice.
Player B sees first Player A’s choice and then learns about the unequal split
effective for the respective round. If Player A has chosen OUT Player B has no
decision to make and both players learn their payoffs (Player A $7 and Player
B $0) for this round. If Player A has chosen IN Player B now decides between
LEFT and RIGHT knowing the consequences of each of these options for both
players. After Player B has made his decision, the interaction in this round is
over and both players learn their payoffs from this round.
A new pair of players will then be matched together for the next round.
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MESSAGE
Before the 5th round starts Player B can make a promise.
The following 7 messages are available:
- I promise to choose always the equal split.
- I promise to choose usually the equal split.
- I promise to choose frequently the equal split.
- I promise to choose sometimes the equal split.
- I promise to choose rarely the equal split.
- I promise to choose never the equal split.
- I do not promise anything.
This message is valid for 4 rounds and will be displayed to each Player A before
she makes the decision whether to interact or not. Before the 9th, the 13th and
the 17th round starts Player B can make a new statement which is then again
valid for the next four rounds and will again be displayed to the Player A of the
respective round. Please recall that a new pair of players is matched together
for each round.
The promise option will be given from the 5th round on, which means that the
first 4 rounds will be played without a promise.
Please note that you have for each of your choices 30 sec. time to make a
decision (except for the message stage). If you do not make a decision in
this time, the computer automatically distributes a zero payoff for you and a
compensation payoff for the other player.
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8.3 Appendix Project 3: TAX
8.3.1 Data Source
The data is taken from the tax administrations data base, which records
the total tax amount owed as well as the amount and date of all payments.
Although the dataset is anonymous, individual taxpayers can be matched
over the years by their identification number. At the same time, because
we have not only the treatment year payments but also those from the
five previous years (2010–2012), we are able to identify different types of
taxpayers and thereby control for consistency. We are also able to match
demographic information from the municipality’s civil database with the tax
data, including gender, age, children, type of household, property, wealth,
marital status, church membership, and the year the individual moved to
the municipality.
8.3.2 Taxdebt in 2013
Table 8.7: Taxdebt in 2013
Treatment Mean Sd Min Max
CONTROL 4,553 4,591 91 57,011
CASH 4,553 4,054 111 47,937
CASH PRO 4,490 4,127 97 51,300
WELL PRO 4,346 4,513 95 52,203
4,333 3,909 101 44,203
Total 4,459 4,244 91 57,011
Taxdebt 2013 2,201
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8.3.3 Missing Amounts
From a policy perspective, the crucial research question is what effect the
instruments have in total numbers; that is, how much money is or is not
available for budget transactions. To detail the total amounts missing for
each year, the first column of Table 8.8 displays the amount that the tax
administration is missing by each due date, whereas the last column shows
how much money was actually requested. Hence, on the first due date 1/3 of
the amount in the last column was due, on the second due date 2/3 and on
the third due date a compliant tax payer will have paid the entire amount.
In 2013, on the day after the March 31 deadline, 1.2 million CHF were miss-
ing, which corresponds to 35.6% of the amount the tax administration should
have received by that date. On July 1 and December 1, 1.7 million (25%1.)
and 1.8 million (18%) CHF were missing, respectively. These amounts sug-
gest that although taxpayers may be paying roughly the estimated pre-tax
amounts, they are not doing so by the expected deadlines, which makes it
difficult for the tax administration to schedule its own transactions.
Nevertheless, comparing the payment practice with those of the previous
years reveals a substantial improvement: in 2012, 38% of the amount was
missing by the first due date, 42% by the second due date, and 27% by
the third due date. Because the municipality must take out loans in the
amount of the missing funds to defray expenses during the year (and at a
rate of 3%, a 2.5 million CHF loan means interest costs of 75,000 CHF in
unnecessary municipal burden), our subsequent analysis of why payments
were more timely in 2013 has great policy relevance for the municipality,
which must search for ways to make up missing resources.
12/3 of the taxdebt should have been received by the tax authority until July 1st, in
2013 this should have been 9, 813, 420 ∗ 2/3 = 6, 542.280 CHF, instead the tax authority
received only 4,890,498 CHF up until July 1st. Hence, 1,651,782 CHFare missing, which
corresponds with a missing rate amounts to 25%
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Table 8.8: Missing Amounts
Year
∑
missing
∑
missing
∑
missing
∑
owed
1st due date 2nd due date 3rd due date Total year
2010 1,078,467 1,853,047 2,291,028 8,429,910
2011 1,177,415 1,960,851 2,414,538 8,935,609
2012 1,202,867 2,012,183 2,547,931 9,611,443
2013 1,165,656 1,651,782 1,760,571 9,813,420
Total 4,624,405 7,477,863 9,014,068 36,790,382
N 8,058
Note: This table presents the total annual taxdebt (last column) and how
many CHF were missing at each due date. The entire taxdebt is split in
three instalment that need to be paid until the due date.
8.3.4 Practice Change 2013
Although the payment of pre-taxes is a legal obligation in Switzerland, 30-
40% of the taxpayers in our study failed to make the pre-tax payments on
time and 18% did not make any payment during the corresponding year.
Prior to 2013, no enforcement took place: the missing amount was simply
charged with a default interest rate when the final tax calculation was made
in the following year. On November 6, 2012, however, in a public council
meeting, the tax administration first announced its plan to implement a
dunning system to highlight the statutory tax obligation. It then used the
following announcement on the payment notice to inform all taxpayers about
the change in practice: Non-paid pre- taxes will be dunned after expiration
of the payment deadline. This new practice was adopted by the council on
November 6, 2012, because of diminishing payments.
According to this new policy, if no payments have been made, taxpayers
receive a first dunning letter two weeks after the payment due date. If the
tax administration cannot register the respective pre-tax amount after four
weeks, it sends out a second letter notifying the taxpayer that a penalty of
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50 CHF has been added to the current tax debt. As in previous years, owed
amounts are also charged default interest once the final tax calculation has
been made. In addition to increasing the tax amount, the dunning also raises
the moral cost by justifying the penalty as follows: Reason: The municipality
is paying current expenditures with tax revenues. If the necessary money has
not been received, the municipality must borrow money, incurring interest
and fees.
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8.3.5 Announcement Letters
Figure 8.13: Announcement Letter: Control
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Figure 8.14: Announcement Letter: Wellness Pro
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Translation: Announcement letter
Provisory Taxes 2013, pre tax rates
Dear Sir or Madam,
The provisory taxes are due within the taxing period in 3 rates, with a third of
the tax liability each. In the next days you will receive the invoice for the first
rate of the pre-taxes. Please transfer the pre-tax rate on time with the form
attached to the invoice.
The first rate has to be paid as usual until the 31st of March, the second rate
until the 30th of June and the last rate until the 30th of November.
To thank you for your valuable help, we will honour this year those tax payers,
which are leading by their good example.
As a reward for your valuable collaboration, the tax administration want to award
this year those tax payers who are leading by a good example. All taxpayers
that pay their pre taxes in time at all due dates,
• will receive a certificate that honours him/her as a cooperative tax payer.(CERTIFICATE
TREATMENT)
• will be part of a lottery to win cash of 1000 CHF.(VOUCHER and VOUCHER
PRO TREATMENT)
• will part of a lottery to win a wellness weekend of the value of 1000
CHF.(CASH and CASH PRO TREATMENT)
Pro treatments:
You can be part of the lottery by signing the attached card and sending it back
to the tax administration until the 31st of March.
Yours sincerely
Tax administrator
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8.3.6 Promise Card
Figure 8.15: Promise Card
Translation Promise Card I, (first name, last name), with the tax identifica-
tion number XXX, promise as an honest taxpayer of the municipality Trimbach
that I will pay all installments of the pre-tax on time in the year 2013.
(Location, Date) (Signature)
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8.3.7 TAX GLOSSARY
Tax amount = municipality tax (Gemeindesteuer) + church tax (Kirchensteuer)
+ fire brigade tax (Feuerwehrsteuer)
Municipality tax The tax amount for the municipality is based on the canton
tax. The municipality levies 104% of the amount the canton charges. This
rate can vary according to necessary investments the municipality has to do
in the following year (infrastructure projects). Tax is based on income, no
differentiation between tax on income and tax on property.
Pretax Taxes are collected in the form of pre-taxes. In mid-February (15.02.)
the taxpayers receive an invoice declaring their tax liability for the current year,
which is estimated based on the previous years. This tax amount has to be paid
in 3 rates throughout the year (end of March, June, November 2013).
Due dates:
• 31.03.2013
• 30.06.2013
• 30.11.2013
The tax declarations are evaluated during the next year. Redundant amounts
are paid back and missing amounts are claimed. Pre-taxes are used to defray
community expenses during the year. In the past, the community had to deal
with missing pre-taxes (around 20% of the tax income).
• Total tax debt in 2012 11.5 Mio. CHF
• Around 2.5 Mio. CHF are missing during the current year
For the missing amount the municipality has to take out a loan to the current
interest. Additionally, taxpayers who missed paying the pre-taxes are usually
not able to clear their tax debt soon after the final calculation. The tax admin-
istration estimates a loss of 400.000 CHF each year by this.
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financial year default interest refund interest
2011 3.5% 3.5%
2012 3.0% 3.0%
2013 3.0% 3.0%
When taxpayers missed to pay the pre-taxes in the current year, they get charged
additionally with a default interest (when they defrayed the tax debt in the final
accounting process). The default interest is based on what the canton charges
for default interest and based on the interest rate at the market.
Interest for default Belated tax payments are charged with an interest for
defaults; the rate is defined by the Kanton Solothurn and gets each year ad-
justed. In 2013 the interest rate was 3%.
source: http://www.so.ch/departemente/finanzen/steueramt/zinssaetze.html
Tax declaration The tax declaration forms are sent out in February of the
following year, the taxpayers are asked to hand in the declarations until the 31st
of March. In special cases an extension can be requested for a fee of 50 CHF,
the new date line is the 21 of July of natural persons and the 31st of October
for juristic persons. If the tax declaration does not get handed in, the person
gets dunned two times, each time combined with a penalty of 60 CHF. When
this is without success, the tax authority arbitrarily determines the tax liability
and adds a penalty of 100 CHF.
As a last instance, the criminal prosecution for ?erletzung der Verfahrenspflicht?takes
place, combined with a penalty of 1,000 CHF; in hard cases or events of repeat
offences a penalty of 10, 000 CHF can be imposed.
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Dunning
Information on pre tax bill
Important Amendment:
Non-paid pre taxes will get dunned after expiration of the payment deadline.
This new procedure were determined by the local council due to the diminishing
payments at the 06th of November 2012.
Reason:
The municipality is paying current expenditures with the tax revenues. If the
needed money is missing, the municipality has to borrow money and needs to pay
interest and fees. In the municipal assembly the citizens set consequently the
following regulations and give the tax administration the following instruction:
Extract from the tax regulation, 01.01.2008:
• Paragraph 11, Passage 2:
As a general rule the taxes are paid in 3 rates at a third of the pre tax
liability.
The due dates are:
– First rate: 1st March, payable until 31st of March
– Second rate: 31st May, payable until 30st of June
– Third rate: 31st October, payable until 31st of November
• Paragraph 12, Passage 1:
The tax payments have to be made within 30 days of the due date.
Missed payments are meant to get dunned. For each dun a fee according
to the fee regulations will be charged.
Payment problems:
At the explicit request of the tax payer the tax administration can split the
annual tax liability into monthly rates. A possibly resulting interest of default
is owed according to tax regulation (Paragraph 12, Passage 1.)
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Dunning timeline
• 31.03.: Due date for first rate of pre-taxes
• 15.04.: Dunning letter
• 16.05. Second dunning letter combined with 50 CHF penalty, added up
to tax debt
• 30.06.: Due date for second rate of pre-taxes
• 15.07.: Dunning letter
• 16.08. Second dunning letter combined with 50 CHF penalty, added up
to tax debt
• 31.11.: Due date for third rate of pre-taxes
Missed payments for the last rate did not get dunned any more. This was not
known by the taxpayers, a policy change the tax administration decided during
the course of the year. Consequently the total tax debt can increase by 100
CHF due to dunning costs, if the taxpayer never paid the pre tax rates.

